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Abstract: I examine the extent to which boards with expertise in related product markets, i.e., downstream 
(customer) or upstream (supplier) industries, delegate their monitoring and advisory functions to stock 
markets. Directors from related industries (DRIs) are argued to have greater access to information about the 
input and output product markets of the firm. This, in turn, is predicted to reduce the reliance on stock-
based compensation, a costly mechanism, particularly for firms that depend more on information about 
product markets and whose stock prices are not very informative about product markets. The evidence 
documented in this paper is largely consistent with these predictions. A number of additional tests suggest 
that this evidence is not likely to be explained by the potential conflict of interests between the firm’s 
stockholders and DRIs. Hence, I conclude that boards with related industry expertise delegate to stock 
markets to an optimally lesser extent due to their informational advantages. 
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“Obviously, if shareholders (or board of directors) could directly observe the firm’s 
opportunities and the executives’ actions and know beforehand which actions would maximize 
shareholder wealth, no incentives would be necessary.” 
Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003) 
 
The role of corporate boards has recently been examined using a conceptual framework 
where there is a tradeoff between intense monitoring of management and value-enhancing 
information flows from management to the board.1 In general, however, the board may not be 
entirely dependent on management for strategic information. I argue, in this paper, that directors 
who serve a significant role in downstream (customer) or upstream (supplier) industries of the 
firm can act as a conduit of information about the firm’s product markets and opportunity set.2 
This is because multiple roles in economically-connected industries can provide a director with 
less costly access to private information on current and possible future developments in these 
industries such as the degree and likelihood of demand and supply shocks, major changes in 
corporate policies or in market structures through acquisitions or spinoffs, and so forth. Thus, a 
director from related industries (DRI) has the potential to expand the board’s information set 
about the opportunities of the firm and optimality of executive actions. A natural question that 
arises from these arguments and the excerpt from Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003), then, is 
whether DRIs are associated with less reliance on incentive mechanisms. I examine stock-based 
incentives in CEO compensation contracts to address this question. 
The extant literature indicates that the choice of board composition and its effect on firm 
value depend critically on information-related factors such as complexity of the firm (e.g., Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen, 2008), availability and quality of sources of information such as analyst 
forecasts (e.g., Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas, 2010) or informative stock prices (e.g., Ferreira, 
                                                          
1
 Adams and Ferreira (2007), for example, develop a model where the monitoring role of the board is traded off 
against information flows from the CEO to the board that enhance the advisory role of the board. Adams, Hermalin 
and Weisbach (2010) provide an extensive survey of recent theoretical studies on the role of directors.  
2
 For example, Arthur Martinez, a director of PepsiCo since 1999, serves also as a director at International Flavors 
and Fragrances Inc., a firm in a supplier industry of PepsiCo. Mr. Martinez is argued to have access to more 
information about the developments in the supply chain of beverage industry than a director without an economic 
link to PepsiCo’s industry, such as Victor Dzau, M.D., another director on PepsiCo’s board and, at the same time, 
the Chancellor for Health Affairs and President and CEO of Health System at Duke University. 
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Ferreira, and Raposo, 2008), and geographical distance of directors from the firm’s headquarters 
(Alam, Chen, Ciccotello, and Ryan, 2010). Thus, firms seem to take into account the availability 
of information to director candidates along with their other qualifications such as political 
connections (Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2009) or financial expertise (Guner, Malmendier, and 
Tate, 2008) before appointing them. The amount and quality of information available to its 
members determine the board’s uncertainty about the operating environment of the firm and 
optimality of executive actions, which in turn determines the way it conducts its role. Stock-
based compensation, on the other hand, ties CEO pay to the stock price which is based on the 
information produced in the stock market. It can be interpreted as the mechanism through which 
the board delegates its monitoring (and advising) functions to stock investors. Further, the degree 
of this delegation is expected to depend on the uncertainties faced by the board (Prendergast, 
2000; 2002). Therefore, to the extent that the flow of information from DRIs can reduce such 
uncertainties, boards with these directors are likely to resort less to the stock-based incentive 
mechanism and substitute it with board monitoring and advising.3 Consequently, DRIs are 
expected to be associated with a lower sensitivity of CEO pay to the stock price (PPS). The 
hypothesis based on the preceding arguments and the resulting prediction is coined the 
Information Hypothesis. 
Weaker stock-based incentives can, however, also be an outcome of potential conflict of 
interests between DRIs and shareholders. At least some DRIs are expected to be the agents of 
customer or supplier firms that maintain trading relationships with the incumbent CEO. Others 
may collaborate with the CEO for that purpose. The CEO may further have influence over 
current or future employment opportunities of DRIs, particularly in related industries. Through 
these and other possible channels, the CEO who is risk averse and prefers a more stable 
compensation can create incentives for DRIs to help him extract a contract that features lower 
sensitivity to the stock price. The hypothesis that formalizes these arguments and also predicts a 
lower PPS in the presence of DRIs is coined the Conflict-of-Interests Hypothesis. 
                                                          
3
 The information flow from a DRI is to the board and is argued to reduce the uncertainties that predicate the board’s 
ability to monitor and to advise. It is unlikely to have any effect on the uncertainty in the stock price, i.e., stock 
volatility, because directors are legally bound to not trade on their information or transmit it to stock markets. 
Therefore, the effect of DRIs on stock-based compensation is not expected to be through any changes in stock 
volatility.    
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A crucial implication of the Information Hypothesis is that the information that DRIs can 
provide must be associated with their industry expertise. Hence, their impact on PPS is expected 
to be more negative for firms with greater dependence on information about customer and 
supplier industries.4 Another important implication of the Information Hypothesis pertains to the 
informativeness of the stock price. Firms whose stock prices are less informative about product 
markets are more likely to substitute its board members’ information for stock-based 
compensation. Under this scenario, then, DRIs are expected to have a more negative effect on 
PPS when the firm’s stock price is less informative. As discussed earlier, the Conflict-of-
Interests Hypothesis also predicts lower PPS. Therefore, to understand the underlying 
explanation for any effect of DRIs on PPS, I also derive and test a number of implications of the 
Conflict-of-Interests Hypothesis.5 One implication, for example, is that dependent DRIs, i.e., 
those who are expected to be under CEO influence, are associated with a lower PPS than 
independent DRIs.6  
Pay for sector performance (PSP) is another type of stock-based incentive contracts that 
has received considerable attention. Standard models suggest that the agent should not be 
compensated for luck, i.e., factors that are beyond his control, as introducing luck into his 
compensation makes it riskier without providing additional incentives (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979). 
This prediction, however, is not supported by empirical studies which commonly use sector 
performance as their measure of luck (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001).7 Subsequent 
studies provide explanations consistent with the optimal contracting theory. Among others,8 
Gopalan, Milbourn, and Song (2010) suggest that PSP gives the CEO incentive to choose the 
optimal level of exposure to the firm’s primary sector. Optimal sector exposure, on the other 
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 For example, sales of firms that produce differentiated products are likely to be more sensitive to demand and 
supply shocks. Thus, the information that DRIs can provide is more relevant for these firms. 
5
 A summary of all implications of the Information and the Conflict-of-Interests Hypotheses is presented in Table 1. 
6
 The other implications of the Conflict-of-Interests Hypothesis are as follows. The level of CEO pay is expected to 
be significantly higher in the presence of DRIs. Furthermore, the conflict, if any, and thereby the negative impact on 
PPS is expected to be stronger with directors from active customers and suppliers of the firm than it is with DRIs 
from firms with no trading relationship with the firm. Finally, any asymmetry in the sensitivity of CEO pay to 
positive and negative stock returns is likely to be greater in the presence of DRIs.  
7
 Bertrand and Mullainathan’s other proxies for luck, that is, prices in the oil industry and exchange rates in traded 
goods sectors are also related to product markets. 
8
 See, e.g., Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b), Garvey and Milbourn (2003), Oyer (2004) and Rajgopal, Shevlin, and 
Zamora (2006). 
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hand, clearly depends on developments in key input and output product markets. A permanent 
shock to these markets, for example, is expected to change conditions in the sector and the 
degree to which the firm should be exposed to that sector. Therefore, the information and advice 
that DRIs can offer may help the CEO identify optimal sector exposure with less effort. 
Correspondingly, the Information Hypothesis predicts the extent of PSP to be smaller for firms 
with DRIs. On the other hand, the Conflict-of-Interests Hypothesis suggests that boards with 
DRIs will lower PSP only in the case of negative sector performance.   
My empirical tests of these predictions use a large dataset on directors and officers drawn 
from Compact Disclosure. To identify directors with more than one position in related industries, 
I first match the SIC industry code(s) associated with one position of a director to SIC industry 
codes of his other positions in the same year.9 I then identify the pairs of SIC codes that are 
vertically related using benchmark input-output tables published every five years by the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis. More specifically, suppose that a given firm is in industry i and one of its 
directors is also an executive or director in industry j. To quantify the vertical relatedness of 
industry j to industry i, I compute the proportion of output products of industry i sold to industry 
j and the proportion of input products of industry i bought from industry j. If the sum of these 
proportions exceeds 1% (5%), then industry j is classified as vertically related to industry i at the 
1% (5%) vertical-relatedness threshold and the corresponding director is considered to be from a 
related industry (DRI). As the main explanatory variable in PPS regressions, I use either a 
dummy variable that equals one if the firm has at least one DRI on its board or the proportion of 
DRIs on the board. I refer to these variables as DRI Measures. Merging the data on compensation 
from ExecuComp with the data on directors leads to a sample of 19,616 firm-year observations 
that span the period 1993 – 2005. About 56% (24%) of this sample involves at least one director 
from related industries where related industries are identified using the 1% (5%) vertical-
relatedness threshold.  
Overall, the results documented in this paper are largely consistent with the Information 
Hypothesis. Univariate tests show that firms with DRIs have significantly higher stock-based 
compensation. However, after controlling for other determinants of PPS such as firm size, DRIs 
                                                          
9
 Matching to the positions over the last two years and defining DRI accordingly yield qualitatively similar results. 
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are found to have a negative effect on PPS. This implies that had those firms not appointed DRIs 
on their board, they would have used greater stock-based compensation. The negative effect of 
DRIs on PPS holds with a variety of alternative measures of DRIs and PPS.10 More crucially, 
among the subsample of firms that produce differentiated products or have low stock price 
informativeness, those with DRIs are more likely to lower PPS, consistent with the Information 
Hypothesis.11 These findings suggest that the information that DRIs can bring to the table is more 
likely to be employed by the board when it is more relevant and when the private information 
conveyed by the firm’s stock price is limited.   
As discussed earlier, lower PPS in the presence of DRIs is also consistent with the 
Conflict-of-Interests Hypothesis. Thus, I conduct several additional tests as an attempt to uncover 
the main reason. First, using the IRRC (now RiskMetrics) database, DRIs are classified as 
independent or dependent and as non-co-opted or co-opted (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2010).12 I 
find that PPS is significantly lower largely for firms with independent or non-co-opted DRIs 
rather than dependent or co-opted DRIs, inconsistent with the Conflict-of-Interests Hypothesis,. 
Second, I examine the influence of DRIs on the level of CEO compensation. Under the Conflict-
of-Interests Hypothesis, CEO compensation is predicted to be higher in the presence of DRIs. 
Inconsistent with this prediction, I find an insignificant relationship between the level of 
compensation and DRIs. Third, if DRIs have conflicted interests, they are expected to be 
associated with a lower PPS only when the stock price are heading downward. CEO pay is found 
to be equally less sensitive to the positive stock return with DRIs on the board. Last, but not the 
least, DRIs that represent the active suppliers or customers of the firm on the board are likely to 
face a more severe conflict with shareholders than DRIs from firms with no business ties to the 
firm. Hence, the effect of directors from customer and supplier firms on PPS should be more 
negative than otherwise. To test this possibility, I first identify directors that represent customer 
or supplier firms listed in Compustat segment tapes. I observe that 465 firm-year observations 
involve a director from either a supplier or a customer firm. These directors do not seem to have 
                                                          
10
 I also find that serving on the compensation committee is not necessary for DRIs to communicate their 
information that has influence on the compensation contract.  
11
 In unreported regressions, it is also documented that, among firms with DRIs, those in differentiated industries 
and those with low stock price informativeness are more likely to reduce their use of stock-based pay. 
12
 Co-opted directors are defined as directors who are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumed the CEO post. 
6 
 
a significant effect on PPS. Hence, the negative relationship between DRIs and PPS is, on 
average, not likely to be explained by a possible conflict between DRIs and shareholders.   
 The PPS measure described above captures the sensitivity of CEO compensation to the 
stock price but does not account for the possibility that the CEO is replaced. Therefore, I also test 
whether DRIs are related to the sensitivity of non-routine CEO turnovers to the stock price in a 
similar way that they are to PPS. The economic magnitude of the sensitivity of forced CEO 
turnovers to the recent stock performance is smaller especially for firms with independent or 
non-co-opted DRIs, consistent with earlier findings. However, this effect is statistically 
insignificant in many cases. This implies that boards with DRIs act more consistently with the 
stock market at the stage where the stock price signals the need for forcefully replacing the 
incumbent CEO. Finally, I investigate how directors from related industries affect pay for sector 
performance. Consistent with earlier studies, I confirm that CEOs are paid for sector 
performance. DRIs, on the other hand, are associated with lower pay for sector performance 
(PSP). Following Garvey and Milbourn (2006), I also look into the asymmetry of PSP. 
Consistent with the Information Hypothesis and inconsistent with the Conflict-of-Interests 
Hypothesis, DRIs are associated with a lower sensitivity of pay to positive sector performance. 
Further support for the Information Hypothesis is provided by the evidence that DRIs impact on 
PSP is observed primarily in industries with more research and development (R&D) activities. 
This implies that DRIs are effective particularly in environments with potentially greater 
industry-related information challenges such as high-R&D industries.13 14  
In my empirical analysis, it is necessary to account for the possibility that there are 
factors leading to both the presence of DRIs on the board and lower PPS. To address this 
concern, I first use the Heckman treatment effects model, where in the first stage, a number of 
industry and firm characteristics are employed to control for selection of DRIs. Moreover, I 
employ instrumental variables that are both economically meaningful and also pass the validity 
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 In unreported regressions, I also find that the DRIs are associated with lower pay for sector performance only for 
firms producing differentiated products. 
14
 This evidence can also mean that DRIs play a role in the choice of the degree of sector exposure when the firm has 
the strategic flexibility to change its exposure, to the extent that R&D activities measure such flexibility.  
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and the relevance tests.15 Finally, to control for potential simultaneity biases, PPS and DRI 
regressions are estimated simultaneously. The main findings in the paper are robust to all these 
alternative estimation methods.  
Given the arguments and findings in the paper, the question that arises is why all firms do 
not have DRIs on their board. There are a number of reasons why this might be the case. First of 
all, the board may fear leakage of strategic information from the firm to interested parties 
through DRIs. Secondly, there is always the risk of being subject to antitrust scrutiny and 
lawsuits for having directors from firms in related industries especially when two firms with 
common directors are competitors at least in one line of business.16 Finally, assuming that there 
is an optimal board size for every firm (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008), 
boards are expected to be highly selective in appointing their members. Only firms with certain 
characteristics such as producers of differentiated products are likely to benefit from directors 
with expertise in related product markets more than they would from directors, say, with 
financial expertise or political connections.     
This paper contributes particularly to the literature on incentive contracts: (i) pay-for-
performance sensitivity (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Yermack, 1995; Guay, 1999; Core and 
Guay, 1999; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a;  Prendergast, 2000, 2002; Coles Daniel, and 
Naveen, 2006); (ii) CEO replacement decisions (e.g., Weisbach, 1988; Parrino, 1997; Huson, 
Parrino, and Starks, 2001; Kaplan and Minton, 2008; Jenter and Kanaan, 2010); (iii) pay for 
sector performance (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Garvey and Milbourn, 2006; 
Gopalan Milbourn, and Song, 2010). It introduces an important factor that affects the design of 
                                                          
15 Instrumental variables that I employ are the supply of DRIs within 100 miles of the county of the firm’s 
headquarters, the average pair-wise correlation of the firm’s industry returns with its supplier and customer industry 
returns, the number of supply chain industries and the industry median value of the respective DRI measure 
(calculation excludes the firm itself). There is no a priori reason for any of these variables to be related to stock-
based compensation decisions of the firm.    
16
 The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 prohibits interlocking directorates between rival companies. A salient example 
for concerns about antitrust scrutiny as well as leakage of information is the case of Google and Apple. Eric 
Schmidt, CEO of Google, and Arthur Levinson, former CEO of Genentech, were the common directors of the two 
companies in 2009 when the companies came under antitrust scrutiny. Besides, in response to critics of Mr. 
Schmidt’s directorship at Apple, Google noted that he recused himself from board meetings when Apple’s board 
discussed mobile phones – a business line for both companies. The following article on NY Times provides more 
detail on this case:  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/05/technology/companies/05apple.html?src=sch.  
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incentive contracts – presence of directors who can bring sector-related information.17 The 
broader contribution is to the literature on the role of directors.18 The primary focus of theoretical 
and empirical studies on boards has been on board structure and how it relates to firm value (e.g. 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Raheja, 2005; Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja, 2007; Adams 
and Ferreira, 2007; Harris and Raviv, 2008; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008; Linck, Netter, and 
Yang, 2008; Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas, 2010). This paper complements the work of Dass, 
Kini, Nanda, Onal, and Wang (2011) in that both studies emphasize a novel characteristic of 
boards—the presence of DRIs—which is driven by the economic needs of the firm. In addition to 
documenting that DRIs lead to higher firm value, they find that firms with DRIs do not 
experience a decline in value following a sales shock which implies that their management are 
better informed about these shocks. This result can be interpreted as a direct evidence of the 
information role of DRIs. 
The board is, in general, assumed to serve a dual role: monitoring and advising. This 
study contributes to the literature on both fronts. The most related strand of literature studies the 
interaction between different governance mechanisms. Stock-based compensation can be viewed 
as a mechanism through which boards can delegate monitoring to investors (e.g. Holmstrom and 
Tirole, 1993; Garvey and Swan, 2002). Cai, Liu, and Qian (2009) show that firms facing a 
greater information asymmetry substitute incentive compensation and exposure to the market for 
corporate control for direct board monitoring. This paper suggests that firms can also appoint 
directors with informational advantages to allow for more internal monitoring. The analysis on 
the choice of sector exposure, on the other hand, is related more to the advisory role of 
directors.19 Outside directors are commonly assumed to rely heavily on inside directors for 
information (e.g., Raheja, 2005; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Harris and Raviv, 2008). Inside 
directors, however, have incentive to conceal their private information if they are concerned 
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 Edmans and Gabaix (2009) provide a review of recent theoretical papers that propose some real-life complexities 
as the reason for seemingly low pay-for-performance sensitivities. DRIs can be considered as an additional real-life 
factor that can explain a lower PPS than would otherwise be required, particularly for firms with certain 
characteristics such as producers of differentiated products. 
18
 Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Becht, Bolton, and Roell (2003) and Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2009) 
provide surveys of this literature. 
19
 The recent spark of research on the advisory role of boards is not surprising given the findings in a number of 
survey studies such as Mace (1971), Lorsh and MacIver (1989), Demb and Neubauer (1992) and Adams (2009) that 
the majority of directors consider themselves as advisers rather than monitors.  
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about retaining their positions in the firm. Hence, unless outside directors are “friendly” or there 
are other sources of information such as accurate analyst forecasts (Duchin, Matsusaka, and 
Ozbas, 2010); outside directors are not likely to advise effectively. This paper is an attempt to 
show that certain types of outside directors are less dependent on inside directors, analysts, or 
investors for information. Finally, this paper contributes to the literature that links product 
markets to corporate finance (e.g., Fee and Thomas, 2004; Kale and Shahrur, 2007; Shenoy, 
2010). It suggests that greater access to information about product markets affects the design of 
incentive contracts significantly.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I lay out the theoretical 
background and develop hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes the data and discusses some 
of the summary statistics. Empirical analyses and results are provided in Section 4. Finally, 
section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development 
Optimal contracting theory suggests that the agent’s compensation should be linked to an 
observable performance measure to induce the agent to choose the optimal set of actions from 
the principal’s point of view.20 Furthermore, the strength of this link, coined pay-for-
performance sensitivity (PPS), should be based on the level uncertainty in the monitoring 
environment faced by the principal (Prendergast, 2000; 2002).21 In certain environments, the 
principal can acquire information readily and monitor actions at a low cost. This alleviates the 
need for performance-based compensation. In uncertain environments, on the other hand, the 
cost of monitoring (and advising) is likely to exceed the cost of introducing incentives into the 
agent’s compensation.  
Extensions to these arguments can be built on possible information channels available to 
the board in the context where the board is the principal and the CEO is the agent. The increased 
amount and quality of information available to the board will enhance its ability to deal with 
uncertainties. Along these lines, Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas, (2010) take analyst forecasts as 
a mechanism that expand the information set of directors, while Alam, Chen, Ciccotello, and 
                                                          
20
 See e.g. Mirrlees (1976), Shavell (1979), Holmstrom (1979, 1982). 
21
 Prendergast (1999) surveys the evidence on the tradeoff between uncertainty and incentives.  
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Ryan (2010) consider geographical proximity of directors to the firm headquarters as a proxy for 
having access to sources of soft information. Stock markets, on the other hand, can also 
constitute an important source of information not only for managers (e.g., Chen, Goldstein, and 
Jiang, 2007), but also for the board if stock-based compensation is thought of as a means for the 
board to utilize the information generated in stock markets. Consequently, the board’s reliance 
on stock-based compensation is expected to be stronger (weaker) when the stock price is more 
(less) informative (e.g. Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993; Garvey and Swan, 2002; Kang and Liu, 
2008; Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo, 2011).22  
In this study, I examine the impact on stock-based compensation of a mechanism that can 
lead to informational advantages for the board: having directors with greater involvement in the 
firm’s operating environment. Specifically, a director who at the same time holds another 
directorship or an executive position in a related industry, i.e., an upstream (supplier) or 
downstream (customer) industry, is argued to produce soft information that is useful in 
monitoring and advising activities of the board. Boards with directors from related industries 
(DRIs) can, then, substitute its information about product markets for that in stock prices. Hence, 
DRIs are expected to be associated with lower stock-based incentives. Furthermore, information 
about related industries is more relevant for firms with greater reliance on these industries and 
for firms with stock prices that contain too much noise. Thus, if there is a negative relationship 
between DRIs and PPS, it is more likely to be the case for such firms. These arguments lay the 
ground for the Information Hypothesis and its following implications.   
Information Hypothesis:  
1. DRIs are associated with a lower sensitivity of CEO pay to the stock price (PPS). 
2. DRIs are more negatively related to PPS for firms with tighter economic link to 
customer/supplier industries and for firms with lower stock price informativeness 
than otherwise. 
                                                          
22
 See, also, Paul (1992), Kim and Suh (1993), Goldman and Slezak (2006), Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) 
for potential costs of stock-based compensation. 
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Lower PPS can also mean that DRIs are dependent on the incumbent CEO and help him 
reduce his exposure to stock markets. Some DRIs have trading relationships with the CEO and to 
protect such relationships, they may provide convincing arguments in support of lower PPS. 
Other DRIs may also act in the best interest of the CEO with the expectation of future business 
relationships. Another channel that the CEO can control a DRI is through his influence over that 
DRI’s employment opportunities within the supply chain of the firm. Under these scenarios, 
DRIs are expected to act as agents of the CEO rather than shareholders and, in particular, help 
the CEO extract a compensation contract with a higher level of compensation and lower 
sensitivity to the stock price. The hypothesis based on these arguments is referred to as the 
Conflict-of-Interests Hypothesis.  
 To test the Conflict-of-Interests Hypothesis, one can investigate the degree of a DRI’s 
dependence on the CEO and whether that is related to the level of PPS. More specifically, 
according to the Conflict-of-Interests Hypothesis, DRIs who are under greater CEO control are 
expected to reduce PPS more than otherwise. Secondly, the CEO can use the help of DRIs to 
justify a higher level of compensation. Hence, the related implication is that CEOs of firms with 
DRIs receive a higher level of compensation. Furthermore, if the CEO, in collaboration with the 
DRIs, is able to foresee the direction of the stock price, the Conflict-of-Interests Hypothesis 
implies that DRIs should have a more negative effect on PPS when the stock price is heading 
downward. A final approach that I use to understand the relationship between DRIs and stock-
based incentives focuses on DRIs from active customers and suppliers of the firm. This exercise 
is based on the assumption that directors from supplier or customer firms have stronger 
incentives to favor the CEO to maintain their business relationship with him. Hence, the 
Conflict-of-Interests Hypothesis predicts that DRIs from active suppliers or customers are 
associated with a lower PPS than DRIs from firms with no trading relationship with the firm. A 
summary of the implications of the Conflict-of-Interests Hypothesis that are based on the 
preceding arguments is as follows. 
Conflict-of-Interests Hypothesis: 
1.  DRIs under CEO control are associated with a lower PPS than independent DRIs. 
2. DRIs are associated with a higher level of CEO compensation. 
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3. DRIs are associated with a higher sensitivity of CEO pay to positive stock returns and 
lower sensitivity to negative stock returns. 
4. DRIs from active customer or supplier firms of the firm are associated with a lower 
PPS than the rest of the DRIs. 
The Information Hypothesis, on the other hand, predicts an equally lower sensitivity to 
positive stock returns. It entails no heterogeneity with respect to PPS based on the independence 
of DRIs or their business ties with the firm. Finally, it has no implication regarding the level of 
compensation.  
The analysis, thus far, has abstracted away from the possibility that the CEO is replaced 
by force. The board can, however, also choose to delegate CEO replacement decisions to stock 
markets to the extent it is uninformed about CEO actions. The empirical implications for the 
sensitivity of CEO turnovers to stock returns follow directly from the arguments on PPS. A 
lower sensitivity is expected for both the Information Hypothesis and the Conflict-of-Interests 
Hypothesis. Thus, to explain the motivation behind lower sensitivity of CEO turnovers to stock 
returns, I derive similar testable implications for each hypothesis. For example, the Conflict-of-
Interests Hypothesis predicts the effect of dependent DRIs on the sensitivity of CEO turnovers to 
stock returns to be more negative than that of the independent ones. 
Optimal contracting theory also suggests that the agent should not be compensated for 
factors that they have no control over such as exogenous shocks to the market or the industry as 
these factors only introduce more risk into the risk-averse agent’s compensation without giving 
him any additional incentive (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1982). 
Accordingly, if such common factors are observable, then one should find no relationship 
between these factors and the agent’s compensation. Empirical evidence is largely inconsistent 
with this prediction (see e.g. Murphy, 1985; Janakiraman, Lambert, and Larcker, 1992; Gibbons 
and Murphy, 1990; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Garvey and Milbourn; 2006). Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2001) conduct three experiments all of which yield support for compensation for 
observable exogenous factors, i.e., “luck”. They observe that CEO compensation is significantly 
and positively related to the following proxies of luck: (i) oil prices in the oil industry; (ii) 
exchange rates for firms in the traded goods sector; (iii) year-to-year differences in the average 
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sector performance. It is important to note that all of these exogenous factors are related to input 
or output product markets or both, which are argued to be the areas of expertise for DRIs.  
Empirical studies on pay for sector performance that followed provide explanations that 
are consistent with optimal contracting theory. Gopalan, Milbourn, and Song (2010), among 
others,23 point to another potential role that DRIs can play. They model and show that CEOs that 
have the ability to select the degree of exposure to the firm’s sector are also those who are paid 
for sector performance. With her pay tied to sector performance, the CEO has the incentive to 
exert the effort to choose the optimal sector exposure from shareholder’s perspective. In this 
context, managers and directors can be said to face an information gap with the input and/or 
output product markets. Assuming that DRIs help bridge that information gap, boards with DRIs 
are likely to advise and evaluate more effectively the choice of sector exposure. Thus, the extent 
of pay for sector performance (PSP) is expected to be less with DRIs on the board. Under the 
Uncertainty Hypothesis, it is also expected that the relationship between DRIs and PSP be 
stronger when the firm’s primary sector involves greater information challenges about its product 
markets such as high-tech or differentiated industries. 
Information Hypothesis:  
3. DRIs are associated with less pay for sector performance and this effect is stronger 
for firms facing greater information challenges about their primary sector. 
Alternative explanations for pay for sector performance have also been suggested. 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) show that the CEOs that control the board are paid for luck, 
consistent with the skimming model (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2000) or the rent extraction 
hypothesis (Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). As pointed out by 
Garvey and Milbourn (2006), however, this evidence does not necessarily indicate that the CEO 
has captured the pay-setting process. The link between CEO pay and luck leads not only to a 
reward for the CEO in a period of sector growth, i.e., when “luck is up”, but also penalizes him 
                                                          
23
 Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000), Oyer (2004) and Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006) argue that the reason for 
not filtering sector performance from compensation is to retain the incumbent CEO; Aggarwal and Samwick 
(1999b) suggest that it restricts the intensity of competition in concentrated industries; Garvey and Milbourn (2003) 
considers the possibility that wealthy CEOs can filter sector performance from their pay on their own through 
hedging. 
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during sector downturns, i.e., when “luck is down”. Skimming/rent-extraction model is 
supported only if the CEO pay is at least partly immune to sector downturns, which is indeed 
what Garvey and Milbourn document.  
Gopalan, Milbourn, and Song, on the other hand, reconcile asymmetric benchmarking as 
well with optimal contracting theory. They suggest that the reason for asymmetry is that CEOs 
have a greater incentive to avoid wealth losses during sector downturns than they do to gain from 
good times in the sector. Following Garvey and Milbourn (2006) and Gopalan Milbourn, and 
Song (2010), I also investigate the asymmetry in sensitivity of CEO pay to sector performance. 
According to the Information Hypothesis, boards with DRIs reduce the sensitivity both for 
positive and negative sector performance. On the contrary, the Conflict-of-Interests Hypothesis 
predicts that boards with DRIs reinforce asymmetric benchmarking in favor of the CEO.  
Conflict-of-Interests Hypothesis: 
5. Boards with DRIs are associated with a lower sensitivity to negative sector 
performance and higher sensitivity to positive sector performance. 
In general, the purpose of this paper is to investigate directors with more than one 
position in a given supply chain and whether they are associated with the type of incentive 
design that is more in line with their potential role to fill information gaps (i.e., the Information 
Hypothesis) or with potential conflict of interests with shareholders due to these directors’ 
business ties with the incumbent CEO (i.e., the Conflict-of-Interests Hypothesis) or both. A 
summary of all the implications of these non-mutually exclusive hypotheses is presented in 
Table 1. 
3. Data Description 
The data on executives and directors are drawn from Compact Disclosure CDs for the 
period of 1993-2005. This dataset lists all the executives and directors who are employed by 
publicly-traded companies identified by ticker symbols. Each executive or director is assigned a 
unique identifier using an algorithm described in Appendix A of Dass, Kini, Nanda, Onal, and 
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Wang (2011). I obtain the primary SIC codes corresponding to each ticker by merging the data 
from Compact Disclosure with Compustat. Firms with non-positive sales or assets are excluded 
to eliminate potentially erratic data.  
Matching a director’s appointments as an executive or a director with his all other 
appointments in a given year allows me to identify his industry affiliations that are in the same 
supply chain. Whenever four-digit SIC codes of a pair of firms that a director is associated with 
are vertical related, I identify that director as a director from related industries (DRI) for both 
firms. Vertical relationships between industries are measured using the benchmark input-output 
(I-O) tables published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis every five years. The board data 
from 1993 to 1996 are matched with the Use table from 1992 using the concordance table for 
SIC codes and I-O codes. The data for the periods of 1997-2001 and 2002-2005 are matched 
with the Use tables from 1997 and 2002 respectively, using the respective concordance tables for 
NAICS codes and I-O codes. A director is considered to be from related industries if at least one 
of the other industries that he is affiliated with either uses a significant amount of the output of 
the firm’s own industry and/or supplies a significant amount of the input of the firm’s own 
industry.  
Formally, for a given pair of industries, industry i and j, suppose that the proportion of 
the output of industry i used by industry j is a% of the total output of industry i and the 
proportion of the use of industry j’s output by industry i is b% of the total use of industry i. If the 
sum of a% and b% is at least 1% (5%), then industry j is identified as vertically related to 
industry i at the 1% (5%) threshold. After identifying industries in the same supply chain, I 
identify directors from related industries as those who are affiliated with industries in the firm’s 
supply chain. The affiliation may either be in the form of a directorship or an executive position. 
Having identified directors from related industries, I first construct dummy variables that equal 
one if the firm has at least one director from related industries (DRI) on its board. I refer to these 
variables as dummy DRI Measures. In addition, I construct variables that are basically 
proportion of DRIs on the board. Similar to Dass, Kini, Nanda, Onal, and Wang (2011), I 
construct a number of DRI Measures to capture different degrees or types of supply chain 
relationships. The main measure is based only on the outside directors who are executives or 
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directors of other firms in the firm’s supply chain.24 This measure is scaled by the number of 
outside directors on the board. I also construct measures based on inside as well as outside 
directors from related industries and these measures are scaled by the board size. All measures 
are constructed for both the 1% and 5% vertical-relatedness thresholds. 
The data on directors are matched with the data on CEO compensation from 
ExecuComp,25 leading to a sample of 19,616 firm-year observations. Panel A in Table 2 presents 
descriptive statistics on dummy scores for directors from related industries. The mean gives the 
percent of firm-year observations with at least one director from related industries defined by the 
respective criteria. DumDRIOUT, for example, equals one if the firm has at least one outside 
director who is an executive or a director of another firm in its upstream or downstream 
industries based on the vertical-relatedness threshold of 1%. 56% of firm-year observations 
involve directors from related industries fitting this category. DumDRIOUT, 5%, on the other hand, 
is based on the vertical-relatedness threshold of 5%. About 24% of firm-year observations 
involve outside directors from related industries identified using the 5% vertical-relatedness 
threshold. As the definition of DRIs is broadened, the percent of firm-years with DRIs also 
increases.  
I present statistics on proportional DRI Measures in Panel B. The mean for proportional 
scores is naturally small because a large number of firm-year observations have boards with no 
directors from related industries and thereby will have a score of zero for most of the definitions 
of DRI. The mean for DRIOUT which is defined as the proportion of outside directors from related 
industries based on the 1% vertical-relatedness threshold is 10.7%. For the sample that has non-
zero DRIOUT, however, the mean (median) is 19% (17%). This suggests that for the sample of 
firms with DRIs, about two out of ten directors are from related industries. Not surprisingly, the 
figures for both dummy and proportional DRI Measures are larger than those in Dass, Kini, 
Nanda, Onal, and Wang (2011), as firms covered in ExecuComp are typically larger than the 
Compact Disclosure universe and, as such, are more likely to appoint DRIs. Table 3 presents the 
                                                          
24
 Formally, each director seat in related industries is assigned a score of 0.5 whereas each executive position is 
assigned a score of 1 because the latter imply greater involvement in the corresponding related industry. These 
scores are then summed and limited to a maximum of 1 for each director. Finally, the measure for the firm is the 
sum of the scores assigned to its directors.  
25
 CEOs are identified based on two variables, CEOANN and BECAMECEO on ExecuComp. 
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top and bottom ten industries in the distribution of the dummy and proportional scores for 
outside directors by 48 Fama-French industry categories (Fama and French, 1997).  
Table 4 lists the descriptive statistics for the variables that are used in the following 
empirical analyses.26 All unbounded variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% and all dollar 
values are converted into 1992 dollars. Panel A contains information on CEO compensation. 
Total direct compensation (TDC) and its components are drawn from ExecuComp. Mean 
(Median) TDC is $3.24 million ($1.69 million). The sensitivity of CEO pay to the stock price, 
PPS is defined as the dollar change in CEO wealth for a 1% change in the stock price following 
Guay (1999), Core and Guay (1999) and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006).27 Option values are 
based on the Black and Scholes (1973) formula modified to account for dividends (Merton, 
1973). The sensitivity of previously granted option and share values to the stock price is 
computed using the approximation method detailed in Core and Guay (2002). The mean 
(median) PPS is $431,670 ($123,490). Furthermore, for firms with DRIs, both the mean 
($458,850) and the median ($136,495) PPS are significantly higher than the mean ($396,812) 
and the median (107,400) PPS for firms without DRIs. However, to understand the direct 
relationship between PPS and DRIs, one needs to control for other factors that determine PPS. 
Panel B provides summary statistics on a number of CEO and governance characteristics. 
Board size, proportion of outside directors and CEO-Chairman duality are drawn from Compact 
Disclosure. The mean (median) board size is 9.4 (9). The mean (median) proportion of outside 
directors is 72% (75%). Occurrences where CEO is also the Chairman constitute about 60% of 
the dataset. CEO tenure, age and ownership are drawn from ExecuComp. Mean (median) CEO 
tenure is 7.3 (5) years. CEO Age has a mean (median) of 55.7 (56). The mean (median) percent 
of shares owned by the CEO is 3.1% (0.4%). Finally, the data on institutional ownership are 
drawn from CDA/Spectrum. The mean (median) of percent of shares owned by institutions 
(Inst_Ownership) is 60.8% (63.1%). Finally, Inst_Concentration is the ratio of number of shares 
owned by top ten institutions to total number of shares owned by all institutions. The fewer the 
number of institutions that command all institutional ownership is, the more powerful each one 
                                                          
26
 Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix A. 
27
 The results outlined in the following section are qualitatively similar when I instead use the change in CEO wealth 
for a $1000 increase in firm value, used for example by Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Yermack (1995) among 
others.  
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of them is expected to be as suggested by Hartzell and Starks (2003). The mean (median) 
Inst_Concentration is 0.58 (0.56). Other firm characteristics used as control variables are listed 
in Panel C. Market Value, i.e., market value of equity, has a mean (median) of about $4.3 ($1) 
billion. Annual percentage return (after dividends reinvested) has a mean (median) of 22% 
(12%). R&D Intensity defined as the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets captures the 
innovativeness of the firm and has a mean of 4%. Luck and Skill are estimated following Garvey 
and Milbourn (2006). Luck (Skill) is defined as the market value of the firm at the beginning of 
the year multiplied by the predicted value (residual) from the regression of firm stock returns on 
the equal-weighted and value-weighted industry returns and year effects. Luck has a mean 
(median) of about $1.4 ($0.17) billion, while Skill has a mean (median) of about $1 ($0.07) 
billion. Tobin’s Q is used as a proxy for growth opportunities and has a mean (median) of 1.67 
(1.2). PIN is the yearly mean of the quarterly estimates of probability of informed trading used in 
Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo (2004) and estimated based on the market microstructure model of 
Easley, Kiefer, and O’hara (1997).28 Both mean and median PIN is about 0.15. Multi-Segment is 
a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is multi-divisional. Its mean is 0.39. Firm Volatility 
is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the past five years. The mean (median) 
firm volatility is 0.43 (0.37). Market share is based on sales and has a mean (median) of 11% 
(4%). Book leverage has a mean (median) of 23% (21%). 
Among industry characteristics, differentiated industries (Differentiated_Ind) are 
identified based on Rauch’s (1999) classification except that the four-digit SIC industries that are 
not included in his dataset are assigned the classification of their respective three-digit SIC 
industries. Three-digit SIC industries, on the other hand, are classified as differentiated (non-
differentiated) if at least one (none) of the four-digit SIC industries with the same three-digit SIC 
code is differentiated. Based on this modified definition, 37% of the sample involves a 
differentiated industry. Industry concentration is captured by the sale-based Herfindahl-
Hirshman Index (HHI). The mean (median) HHI is 20% (15%). Industry homogeneity is 
estimated following Parrino (1997). Specifically, the partial correlation of each firm’s stock 
returns with its four-digit SIC industry returns is calculated and averaged across all the firms in 
                                                          
28
 PIN measures the probability that the trading activity for a given stock and period is based on private information.  
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that industry. The mean (median) industry homogeneity is 18% (16%). Proportion of vertically-
integrated firms in the industry, Prop_Integrated has a mean (median) of 10% (5%) at the 1% 
relatedness threshold. Supply of potential DRIs is based on the sample of all directors and 
executives in Compact Disclosure. DRI Supply is the number of all directors and executives of 
firms that are in the firm’s supply chain and headquarters of which are located within a radius of 
100 miles of the firm’s headquarter. It has a mean (median) of 698 (388) at the 1% vertical-
relatedness threshold and 190 (70) at the 5% vertical-relatedness threshold. Average pair-wise 
correlation between a given industry and its related industries has a mean (median) of 47% 
(50%) at the 1% (5%) vertical-relatedness threshold. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
In this section, I provide a thorough empirical analysis of the relationship between 
directors from related industries and incentive contracts for CEOs. I study particularly three 
incentive mechanisms: sensitivity of CEO pay to the stock price (PPS), sensitivity of forced 
CEO turnovers to stock returns and sensitivity of CEO pay to sector performance (PSP). CEO 
pay is argued to be tied to the stock price to the extent the board lacks the information and ability 
to evaluate and guide CEO actions. The sensitivity of CEO replacements to stock returns is also 
likely to be designed in a similar fashion. Pay for sector performance, on the other hand, arises 
due to the need to give the CEO incentive to overcome the informational challenges or gaps in 
the choice of exposure to the primary sector of the firm.  
If DRIs have advantage in acquiring information, they can help bridge the information 
gaps that the board and the CEO are facing. This, in turn, implies that PPS and PSP will be 
utilized to a lesser extent in the presence of DRIs. However, it is possible that common factors 
drive the need for DRIs as well as the degree of use of stock-based incentive mechanisms. I 
employ the Heckman treatment effects model to account for this endogeneity problem. 
Specifically, I use a model of the determinants of DRI appointments in the first stage and, how 
DRIs affect stock-based compensation or replacements in the second stage. I also use the 
instrumental variables approach for which I use instruments that are based on the determinants of 
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a firm’s decision to have DRIs on its board. The following section discusses the determinants of 
DRI appointments. 
4.1. Determinants of Directors from Related Industries 
  Under what circumstances, do firms appoint a director from a related industry? In this 
section, I address this question by drawing on the economic factors employed by Dass et al. 
(2011) that are likely to influence a firm’s decision to appoint a director from related industries. 
DRIs are argued to help bridge the information gap with supplier and customer industries and the 
gap for firms in innovative industries is expected to be deeper. Therefore, a positive relationship 
between the degree of innovativeness in the firm/industry and the likelihood of appointing DRIs 
is predicted. Innovativeness is a multidimensional concept and can be measured by a number of 
different variables. Investment in research and development (R&D Intensity) is perhaps the most 
obvious measure of innovativeness. In addition, the productivity of R&D activity that can be 
captured by the number of patents and citations received on those patents can also be considered 
as a dimension of innovativeness. Furthermore, it is crucial for firms in industries that produce 
differentiated products à la Rauch (1999) to anticipate industry conditions and take measures to 
ensure the success of their businesses. On the contrary, firms in homogeneous industries are less 
likely to experience significant changes in demand or supply conditions. Overall, I predict the 
likelihood of having DRIs on board to be positively related to proxies for innovativeness – i.e., 
R&D intensity, the number of patents and citations, and being in differentiated industries, and 
negatively related to Parrino’s (1997) measure of industry homogeneity (Ind_Homogeneity). 
The need for DRIs is likely to be less if alternative sources of information such as 
informative stock prices are available. To test this possibility, I employ two measures of the 
quality of information contained in stock prices: probability of informed trading (PIN) (e.g., 
Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo, 2004) and price non-synchronicity (e.g., Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 
2008). The information that DRIs can bring is expected to be more relevant when the firm’s own 
industry follows its supplier or customer industries closely in economic upturns and downturns. 
Thus, I construct the average pair-wise correlation between the firm’s own industry and its 
supplier and customer industries (Ind_Correlation) and expect it to increase the likelihood of 
DRI appointments. I also include a number of other firm and industry characteristics that are 
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expected to affect the appointments of DRIs. Larger and multidivisional firms, firms with higher 
market share and firms in concentrated industries (low HHI) are likely to be the firms that need 
and appoint DRIs. Managers of larger and multidivisional firms are expected to face greater 
information challenges and, thus, can benefit more from DRIs. Firms with lower leverage are 
less likely to experience financial distress and offer safer director seats to DRIs. Firms with 
higher market share and those in concentrated industries are more concerned about maintaining 
their market power. Therefore, they need to follow developments in their related product markets 
more closely and having DRIs on the board is one way to facilitate that.  
Appointing a DRI is not the only way to have access to information about supplier or 
customer industries. Vertical integration is possibly a better but more costly way. The propensity 
of vertical integration in an industry can be viewed as an indicator of the need for bridging 
information gaps with supplier or customer industries in that industry. To account for this 
possibility, I include the proportion of integrated firms in the industry (Prop_Integrated) as a 
determinant of DRIs. Other variables that are expected to affect the likelihood of DRI 
appointments are the supply of potential directors from related industries, board characteristics 
such as board size, CEO-Chairman duality and the proportion of outside directors 
(Prop_Outside). Putting all these explanatory variables for DRI appointments together leads to 
the following specification: 
DRI Measureit  = β0 + β1 Innovativenessi(k)t + β2 PINit + β3 Ind_Corrkt + 
 β4 Ind_Homogeneitykt +β5 Market Shareit + β6 HHIkt  + β7Prop_Integkt + 
 β8Ln(MarketValueit ) + β9Multi-Segmentit  + β10 Book Leverageit +  
 β11 CEO-Chairman Dualityit  + β12 Ln(Board_Size)it  + β13 Prop_Outsideit + 
 β14 Ln(DRI Supply)kt  + Year Dummies + εit                         (1) 
The subscripts in Specification (1) and those in the following sections refer to firm i, 
industry k and year t. DRI Measure is either the dummy variable that equals one in the presence 
of DRIs and zero otherwise, or the proportion of DRIs on the board. For the dummy variable, I 
use the Probit model whereas for the proportion of DRIs, I use either the OLS or the Tobit 
models to estimate Specification (1). The results for DRI Measures that are based on outside 
directors who hold executive positions or directorships in the firm’s supply chain are presented 
22 
 
in Table 5. All columns use R&D Intensity as the measure of innovativeness but results are 
similar with the other measures such as number of patents granted to the firm. Most of the 
coefficient estimates have the predicted signs and several of them are statistically significant. 
The coefficients on R&D Intensity, Ind_Correlation, HHI and Ln(Market Value) are significantly 
positive, while the coefficient on PIN is significantly negative.  
The impact of these variables on the DRI Measure is also economically significant. To 
describe a few, in Column (1), for a one standard deviation increase in R&D Intensity, Ln(Market 
Value) and Ln(DRI Supply) around their mean, the probability of having a DRI increases by 
about 2.57%, 3.36% and 9.66% respectively. A one standard deviation increase in PIN around its 
mean is associated with a 1.58% decrease in the probability of having a DRI. Only the 
coefficient on Multi-Segment does not have the predicted sign and is statistically significant. The 
possible explanation which follows from Gopalan, Milbourn, and Song (2010) is that multi-
segment firms have more flexibility to move their investment out of the current primary industry. 
Hence, a multi-segment firm needs a DRI who is associated with its current primary industry less 
than a single-segment firm which does not have the flexibility to move out of its current industry 
at least in the short term. Consistent with this explanation, in unreported results, I observe that 
the DRI Measures based on all the segments of the firm are significantly positively related to 
being a multi-segment firm. Having described the conceptual model for DRI appointments, I 
now turn to the question of how DRIs influence the design of incentive contracts. 
4.2. Sensitivity of CEO Pay to the Stock Price (PPS) 
This section presents the empirical analysis of the impact of directors from related 
industries (DRIs) on the sensitivity of CEO pay to the stock price (PPS). First, I describe the 
empirical specifications to be employed. Following Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (1999), I 
define the dependent variable, i.e., PPS, as the change in the dollar value of option and stock 
holdings of the CEO for a 1% change in the stock price. As suggested by Baker and Hall (2004), 
if one is interested in examining the actions of CEO that affect percentage returns (e.g., setting 
the firm strategy) rather than dollar returns (e.g., buying a corporate jet), the PPS measure based 
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on the percentage change in the stock price is more relevant. Thus, the way PPS is measured is 
chosen accordingly to account for the likelihood that DRIs’ role pertains to strategic decisions.29 
 The specification used to examine the relationship between PPS and directors from 
related industries (DRIs) is as follows:  
       PPSit = β0 +β1DRI Measureit + β2  Ln(Market Valueit ) + β3 Tobin’s Qit +  
                                    β4 Firm Volatilityit +β5 Ln(CEO Tenure)it + β6 Cash Flowit  + 
                                   β7 PINit  + β8 Inst_Holdingit  + β9 Inst_Concentrationιt  + 
     Year and Industry Dummies + εIt                                                                                       (2)                            
       DRI Measure is the main explanatory variable and stands for either the dummy variable 
that equals one if the firm has at least one DRI on its board or the proportion DRIs on the 
board.30 The Information Hypothesis predicts that the coefficient of DRI Measure is negative and 
significant. Sample selection criteria and control variables follow Core and Guay (1999) with 
additions of some variables that have been shown to affect PPS. Firm size has commonly been 
used as a control for CEO talent, difficulty of monitoring and CEO wealth (e.g., Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985; Smith and Watts, 1992; Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia, 1999; Baker and Hall, 
2004).31 Hence, it is predicted to be positively related to PPS. I use the natural logarithm of 
market value of equity as a proxy for firm size.32 Tobin’s Q is employed to control for growth 
opportunities which can be regarded as another proxy for the difficulty of monitoring actions 
(e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992). Firm Volatility is used as a proxy for the uncertainty in the 
environment and thus is expected to be positively related to PPS (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; 
Core and Guay, 1999). CEO Tenure is used as a proxy for CEO wealth and risk aversion (e.g., 
Guay, 1999). It also controls for potential horizon problems (Dechow and Sloan, 1991), weaker 
career (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992) or reputational concerns (Milbourn, 2003) that arise as 
CEOs approach retirement. CEO tenure has also been used as a measure of CEO entrenchment 
(e.g., Harford and Li, 2007). I control for the need for higher incentives due to the free cash flow 
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 Similar results are obtained using the alternative measure of PPS. 
30
 It is chosen to be contemporaneous with PPS to capture how incentives are set for the period that a DRI is on the 
board. However, taking one-year lag of DRI Measures relative to PPS yields similar results. 
31
 CEO wealth captures CEO risk aversion. Wealthier CEOs are projected to be less risk averse. 
32
 The relationship between DRI Measures and PPS is not affected by using other proxies for firm size such as total 
assets or sales. 
24 
 
problem (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia, 1999) by including Cash Flow 
which is measured as the sum of income before extraordinary items, depreciation and 
amortization scaled by total assets. Following Hartzell and Starks (2003) and Kang and Liu 
(2008), I control for the impact of institutional investors on PPS using two variables: percent of 
shares held by institutions and the concentration of institutional ownership. To the extent that it 
reduces liquidity, institutional ownership is likely to mitigate informativeness of stock prices 
and, as such, is expected to reduce PPS (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993). Consistent with this 
prediction, Kang and Liu (2008) find a negative relationship between institutional ownership and 
PPS.  The concentration of institutional ownership, on the other hand, is expected to capture the 
influence of institutions on incentive design. Kang and Liu also document a strong positive 
relationship between stock price informativeness and PPS. Therefore, I include PIN in all PPS 
regressions to control for stock price informativeness. In all specifications, I include year and 
Fama-French industry dummies (Fama and French, 1997).33 I exclude finance and utility firms as 
boards of these firms may not have full control over the pay-setting process. Reported t-statistics 
are robust and account for clusters at the firm level. Heckman t-statistics are based on 100 
bootstrap replications.   
The results from the estimation of Specification (2) are presented in Table 6. In Panel A, 
DRI Measures in Columns (1) – (4) are dummy variables that equal one if at least one of the 
outside directors of the firm is from a related industry. The scores in Columns (5) – (8) are the 
respective proportional scores. In Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6), related industries are identified 
using the vertical-relatedness threshold of 1%, whereas in Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) they are 
identified using the 5% vertical-relatedness threshold. Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) contain the 
OLS results. Except for Column (1), the coefficient on DRI Measure is significantly related to 
PPS in all columns. In Columns (2) and (4), I use the Heckman treatment effects model to 
account for potential endogeneity problems. The coefficient of DRI Measure is negative and 
significant in both columns. Moreover, the effect of DRIs on PPS is economically more 
significant after controlling for endogeneity. In Columns (2) and (4), the change in CEO wealth 
for a 1% change in the firm’s stock price is smaller by $155,000 and $227,000, respectively, for 
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 Controlling for four-digit SIC industry fixed effects yield qualitatively similar inferences. 
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firms with DRIs. In Columns (6) and (8), I estimate a system of two equations simultaneously 
using 2SLS. In one equation, PPS is modeled using Specification (2), whereas the other equation 
models DRI appointments using the explanatory variables from Table 5 for the respective DRI 
Measure. Proportional DRI Measures are found to be negatively related to PPS and this 
relationship is also both statistically and economically significant.34 In Column (6), increasing 
DRIOUT by one standard deviation leads to a decline in PPS by about $77,142, while in Column 
(8), increasing DRIOUT, 5% by one standard deviation reduces PPS by about $108,570. These 
results are consistent with both the Information and the Conflict-of-Interests Hypotheses. 
Coefficient estimates of other variables are consistent with the findings of studies using similar 
specifications.35  
Panel B employs instrumental variables to correct for potential endogeneity biases. 
Instruments are largely drawn from the determinants of DRIs: Ln(DRI_Supply), 
Ln(NumofSCInd), Ind_Correlation and Ind_Median_DRI. DRI_Supply measures availability of 
DRIs in the geographical area of the firm. NumofSCInd is the number supply-chain industries of 
the primary sector of the firm. This variable is also a measure of availability of DRIs. 
Ind_Correlation gauges the degree to which the firm’s own industry returns move with the 
returns in customer and supplier industries. Finally, Ind_Median_DRI is defined as the median 
value of the respective DRI measure in the firm’s four-digit SIC industry and captures the 
tendency in the industry to appoint a DRI. The calculation of this variable excludes the firm 
itself. As can be seen in Table 5, these variables are among the determinants of DRIs with the 
most explanatory power. More importantly, there is no a priori reason to expect these 
instruments to be correlated with PPS. Last, but not the least, these instruments pass the standard 
relevance and validity tests that ensure their quality as instruments. Using instrumental variables 
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 Results from the DRI regression suggest that firms with higher PPS are less likely to appoint directors from 
related industries. These results can be furnished upon request.  
35
 Core and Guay (1999), Hartzell and Starks (2003) and Kang and Liu (2008), for example, find similar results on 
firm size, CEO tenure, firm volatility, PIN, institutional ownership and concentration of institutional ownership. 
Using the specifications from Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) leads to qualitatively similar findings on the effect of 
DRIs on PPS. I also find a negative tradeoff between uncertainty and incentives. This suggests that the uncertainty 
captured by the volatility measure in specification (2) and that captured by the cumulative distribution function of 
the variance of dollar stock returns are different in nature. As pointed out by Prendergast (2002), a positive tradeoff 
between uncertainty and incentives is plausible.   
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also allows for controlling for firm fixed effects.36 Similar to other board characteristics, DRI 
Measures remain largely stable over time and, therefore, capturing their impact on PPS is not 
feasible after controlling for firm fixed effects.37 Instrumental variables that I employ, however, 
are industry characteristics with enough time variation. It is for this reason that the negative 
impact of DRIs on PPS prevails at conventional significance levels even after controlling for 
firm fixed effects, as seen in Panel B of Table 6.  
4.2.1. Sensitivity of CEO Pay to the Stock Price (PPS) in Different Industry and Information 
Environments  
 In this section, I investigate whether the negative relationship between directors from 
related industries is stronger for firms with greater dependence on customer/supplier industries 
and firms with less informative stock prices. The information that DRIs can provide is more 
relevant if the firm’s actions and performance are more sensitive to the developments in the 
customer and supplier industries. Firms that produce differentiated products (e.g., electronic 
equipment) fit this description well because they are more likely to face competitive 
disadvantages than firms producing homogenous products (e.g., tobacco) if they do not act 
preemptively on the changes in customer and supplier industries. Thus, the need for PPS is 
expected to be alleviated by DRIs particularly in differentiated industries. The evidence 
presented in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 is consistent with this prediction. PPS is found to be 
significantly higher for firms that produce differentiated products only when they don’t have a 
DRI on their board. To put it differently, CEOs in differentiated industries do not seem to be 
given additional incentives to acquire information about related industries when a director on the 
board is already equipped with that information. 
Firms also differ in the quality of sources of information available to them. Such 
heterogeneities across firms are expected to have implications for stock-based incentives. Stock 
markets are indeed one of the main sources of information available to the board as well the 
management. Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007), for example, suggest that the management base 
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 An alternative specification uses a dummy variable that equals one for firms that add a DRI. The coefficient of 
that variable is negative and significant implying that addition of a DRI on the board leads to a reduction in PPS. 
37
 Of firms that have a DRI on their board in year t, 82%, 75% and 70% continue to have a DRI in year t+1, t+2 and 
t+3, respectively. 
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their investment decisions particularly on informative stock returns. Kang and Liu (2008) find 
that PPS is lowered when the stock price becomes less informative. In Table 6, the positive and 
significant coefficient on PIN is consistent with this result. In Columns (3) and (4) of Table 7, I 
define Low_PIN as a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s PIN is less than the median 
value of PIN in the firm’s four-digit SIC industry. I, then, examine the low-PIN firms with and 
without DRIs separately and find that lower PPS is adopted only by firms with DRIs. This 
finding suggests that to reduce stock-based incentives, boards need an alternative source of 
information to base their monitoring or advisory activities on. When such an alternative is 
absent, the board seems to maintain the same level of PPS, regardless of the informativeness of 
the stock price.38  
4.2.2. Sensitivity of CEO Pay to the Stock Price (PPS) and Information Hypothesis versus 
Conflict-of-Interests Hypothesis 
In this section, I attempt to run a horse race between the Information Hypothesis and the 
alternative explanation for lower PPS, i.e., the Conflict-of-Interests Hypothesis. Although, as a 
proxy for CEO entrenchment, CEO Tenure is controlled for in all specifications,39 there are 
possibly other avenues that DRIs may be in conflict with shareholders. If appointing directors 
from supplier or customer industries is solely part of an existing or prospective deal between the 
incumbent CEO and the sending firms, DRIs are likely to act in the best interest of the incumbent 
CEO. Moreover, if CEOs who engage in such deals also tend to exert suboptimal effort and 
perform poorly, they prefer to be given contracts with a low sensitivity to the stock price. To that 
end, DRIs can help them extract such contracts. Therefore, additional tests are required to 
understand what might be driving the negative relationship between DRIs and PPS. 
First, I identify DRIs who are more likely to be under CEO control. I draw data on 
director independence and tenure from the IRRC (now RiskMetrics) database and match them 
with the directors from Compact Disclosure. This allows me to identify outside DRIs who are 
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 Using an alternative specification that focuses on firms with DRIs, it is found that firms in differentiated industries 
or those with low stock price informativeness are more likely to lower their PPS. This, again, suggests that boards 
with DRIs substitute information from its members for stock-based compensation when it is optimal to do so.  
39
 In unreported regressions, I also control for other proxies for CEO power such as CEO-Chairman duality or board 
size find similar results. 
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classified as independent40 and those who are non-co-opted, i.e., appointed after the incumbent 
CEO assumed the CEO’s post (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2010).  I find 2207 firm-year 
observations over the period of 1996-2005 that involve at least one independent DRI and 475 
firm-year observations over the period of 1998-2005 that involve at least one non-co-opted DRI. 
Dependent or co-opted DRIs are more likely to be in conflict with shareholders. Hence, if the 
Conflict-of-Interests Hypothesis is valid, dependent or co-opted DRIs are expected to lower PPS 
more than the independent or non-co-opted DRIs. The evidence presented in Table 8 is not 
consistent with this prediction. Firms with independent or non-co-opted DRIs are more likely to 
have significantly lower PPS than firms with no DRIs.  
In the second test, I consider the relationship between DRIs and the level of CEO 
compensation. According to the Conflict-of-Interests Hypothesis, DRIs can help the CEO receive 
a higher level of compensation. In Table 9, this implication is tested for both the level of 
compensation (in Columns (1) and (2)) and the change in the level of compensation (in Columns 
(3) and (4)). I find no significant relationship between DRIs and either the level or the change in 
the level of CEO compensation.41 Next, I analyze the sensitivity of CEO pay to positive returns 
separately from its sensitivity to negative returns. If DRIs help reduce PPS to the advantage of 
the CEO, then it is expected to be the case only when the stock price is headed downward. 
Otherwise, the sensitivity is expected to be lower regardless of the possible direction of the stock 
price. It is important to note that this test is based on the assumption that the CEO, possibly in 
collaboration with the DRIs, has the ability to foresee the direction of the stock price. The 
empirical results from this test are presented in Table 10. Positive_Return is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the stock return is positive, while Negative_Return is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the stock return is negative. The coefficients on the interactions of these dummy 
variables with the respective DRI Measure illustrate whether DRIs are associated with an 
asymmetric sensitivity of CEO pay to performance or not. In none of the columns of Table 10, 
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  The IRRC database defines independent outside directors as those who are not former employees of the company, 
providers of professional services to the company, customers or suppliers of the company, or family members of an 
employee. 
41
  In unreported regressions, firms that add a DRI on their board are also not found to have any significant increase 
in CEO compensation.   
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the sensitivity of CEO pay to negative returns is significantly lower than its sensitivity to positive 
returns.  
In the final test, I argue that if lower PPS is the outcome of a tacit agreement between the 
CEO and DRIs at the expense of shareholders, then directors who are representatives of customer 
or supplier firms that already have an ongoing trading relationship with the incumbent CEO are 
in greater conflict with shareholders. Hence, the Conflict-of-Interests Hypothesis predicts that 
directors from customers and suppliers are expected to extract an even lower PPS for the CEO. I 
identify such directors using the data on customers provided in the Compustat segment tapes.42 
After matching the director data with customer and supplier firms, I find only 465 firm-year 
observations with at least one director from a customer or supplier firm. This implies that 
appointing directors from supplier and customer firms is not common practice possibly due to 
the fear from antitrust lawsuits by competitors or leakage of strategic information to competitors.  
The multivariate results regarding directors from customers or suppliers are presented in 
Table 11. The main explanatory variables are a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has at 
least one director from its actual customer or supplier firms (Firm DRI) and the dummy DRI 
Measure that excludes directors from actual customer and supplier firms (Industry DRI). Under 
the conflict-of-interests hypothesis, Firm DRI is predicted to have a larger negative effect on 
PPS than Industry DRI. In none of the columns, however, the coefficient of Firm DRI is negative 
and significant. The coefficient of Industry DRI, on the other hand, is negative and significant 
particularly after controlling for selection. Overall, the negative relationship between DRIs and 
PPS does not seem to be due to potential conflicts between DRIs and shareholders.  
4.2.3 Sensitivity of CEO Pay to the Stock Price (PPS) and Compensation Committee 
Membership 
This section investigates whether being on the compensation committee as a DRI is 
necessary to have an influence over the design of stock-based compensation. DRIs who serve on 
the compensation committee are identified using the IRRC database. The evidence on the 
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 As public firms are required to report only those of their customers that contribute a minimum of 10% to their 
total sales, the data do not cover all the customers. This also results in an asymmetric match between suppliers and 
customers as inverting the data to identify suppliers leads to many suppliers matched to relatively fewer large 
customers.   
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importance of compensation committee membership for DRIs is provided in Table 12. 
Comp_Comm DRI is a dummy variable that equals one if at least one outside director is both a 
DRI and serves on the compensation committee. Non_Comp_Comm DRI is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the firm has at least one outside DRI on the board but none of them serve on 
the compensation committee. Coefficients on both variables are negative and significant in 
Columns (2) through (4). Hence, regardless of whether they serve or not on the compensation 
committee, the flow of information from DRIs is still reflected in CEO incentives.  
4.3 Sensitivity of CEO Turnovers to Stock Returns 
Replacing CEOs when necessary is another crucial duty of directors. I explore how DRIs 
affect such replacement decisions in this section. More specifically, I examine whether DRIs rely 
less on stock markets also in CEO replacement decisions. Of all CEO turnovers identified for 
ExecuComp firms between 1993 and 2005 (1389 observations), forced turnovers are determined 
based on the announcements on Lexis-Nexis and Factiva and the criteria from Huson, Parrino, 
and Starks (2001). That is, a turnover is classified as forced if: (i) the announcement states that 
the CEO was ousted or departed due to unspecified policy changes; (ii) for CEOs under the age 
of 60, the announcement does not state that the CEO died, had poor health, or accepted another 
position within the firm or elsewhere; or (iii) the announcement states that the CEO is retiring 
but departure takes place within six months of the announcement. The cases where the CEO is 
also the chairman and steps down only from the CEO position are not classified forced. This 
whole process leads to 323 forced turnovers which constitute about 23% of all turnovers and is 
close to the 21% reported in Hazarika, Karpoff, and Nahata (2009) – out of 1895 turnovers over 
1992-2004, and 24% of Jenter and Kanaan (2010) – out of 1,590 turnovers over 1993-2001. 
After merging CEO turnovers with the data from Compact Disclosure, 275 forced turnovers 
remain. Of those, 171 turnovers or 62% are executed by boards with outside DRIs based on the 
1% vertical-relatedness threshold. 
The results on the sensitivity of forced CEO turnovers to stock returns are presented in 
Table 13. In all columns of Panel A and Panel B, related industries are identified using the 1% 
vertical-relatedness threshold. In both panels, Columns (1), (3) and (5) use the Logit model for 
estimation, and Columns (2), (4) and (6) use the Heckman treatment effects model to 
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additionally control for potential selection biases. Mkt_Adj_Return is defined as the cumulative 
market-adjusted return over the twelve months prior to the firm’s fiscal year end. Control 
variables are drawn from the literature on CEO turnovers and consist of industry-adjusted return 
on assets (Ind_Adj_ROA), Ln(Market Value), CEO-Chairman Duality, a dummy variable that 
equals one if the CEO is 65 or older (CEO Age>=65), percent of shares owned by the CEO 
(CEO_Percent_Owned) and, finally, a dummy variable that equals one if the proportion of 
outside directors is greater than 50% (Outsider_Controlled) along with year and industry 
dummies. Industry adjustments and industry dummies are based on the Fama-French industry 
categories (Fama and French, 1997). 
In all columns of Panel A and Panel B, recent market-adjusted stock performance is 
significantly negatively related to forced CEO turnovers. In Panel A, the impact of 
Mkt_Adj_Return on forced turnovers is analyzed separately for the subsample of firms with DRIs 
(DRI Measure=1) and the subsample without DRIs (DRI Measure=0). In Columns (1) and (2), 
the relationship between all DRIs and the sensitivity of forced turnovers to stock returns is 
investigated. The coefficient of Mkt_Adj_Return x DRI Measure=1 is smaller in magnitude than 
the coefficient of Mkt_Adj_Return x DRI Measure=0. Both coefficients are negative and 
statistically significant. In Columns (3) through (6), the DRI Measure is based on directors who 
are identified as independent or non-co-opted previously using the IRRC database. The economic 
magnitude of the sensitivity of CEO turnovers to market-adjusted stock returns becomes smaller 
in the presence of independent and non-co-opted DRIs on the board. The sensitivity further 
becomes statistically insignificant when a non-co-opted DRI is serving on the board. 
Furthermore, the coefficient of DRI Measure is, generally, positive and statistically significant, 
especially for potentially more independent DRIs. These findings altogether indicate that, as a 
factor that leads to forced CEO replacements, recent stock performance seem to lose some of its 
importance when there are independent or non-co-opted DRIs on the board. DRIs are, at the 
same time, associated with a higher likelihood of forced turnovers. This implies that lower stock-
based incentives are combined with a higher likelihood of turnovers that is based on the private 
information of directors from related industries. It is also possibly due to the larger network of 
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these directors in related industries that constitutes a pool of potential candidates to replace the 
incumbent CEO.   
Panel B uses an alternative specification to investigate the sensitivity of forced CEO 
turnovers to the recent stock performance. This specification includes the market-adjusted stock 
performance by itself along with its interaction with the DRI measures. In all columns, the 
coefficient of the interaction term is positive but statistically insignificant. DRIs continue to have 
a positive effect on the likelihood of forced turnovers and this effect is statistically significant 
when DRIs are more likely to be independent.  
Finally, in unreported regressions, I examine the sensitivity of all CEO turnovers to 
market-wide returns, industry-specific returns and firm-specific returns, following Kaplan and 
Minton (2008). The specification used in this analysis is an extension of the main specification of 
Kaplan and Minton: 
              CEO Turnoverit =β0 + β1 Mkt_Returnit x DRI Measureit=1 + β2 Mkt_Returnit x DRI Measureit=0 + 
                             β3 Ind_Returnit x DRI Measureit=1 + β4 Ind_Returnit x DRI Measureit=0 + 
                β5 Firm_Returnit x DRI Measureit=1 + β6 Firm_Returnit x DRI Measureit=0 +          
                β7 DRI Measureit + β8 ∆(ROA) it-1, t + β9 CEO Age>=65it + εIt                             (3)                                                                        
 The dependent variable in Specification (3) is a dummy variable that equals one if firm i 
has a routine or non-routine CEO replacement in year t. Mkt_Return is defined as the cumulative 
equal-weighted market return over the last twelve months relative to the firm’s fiscal year end. 
Ind_Return is defined as the cumulative equal-weighted industry return over the twelve months 
prior to the firm’s fiscal year end minus Mkt_Return. Firm_Return is defined as firm i’s 
cumulative return over the twelve months prior to the firm’s fiscal year end minus Ind_Return. 
∆(ROA)
 it-1, t is the change in firm i’s operating performance (ROA) between year t-1 and year t. I 
use the Logit model to estimate Specification (3) and find that CEO turnovers are significantly 
negatively related to both systematic and idiosyncratic stock performance, consistent with 
Kaplan and Minton (2008). Furthermore, the economic magnitude of the effect of market-wide 
and industry-wide stock returns tends to be smaller while that of firm-specific stock returns tends 
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to be greater for firms with DRIs than it is for other firms. These differences, however, are, in 
general, statistically insignificant and do not substantiate for forced CEO turnovers. 
Overall, it can be inferred from this subsection that the impact of DRIs on CEO 
replacements is weaker than their impact on stock-based pay. In other words, at times when the 
stock market signals a need for replacing the incumbent CEO, boards with DRIs tend to act in 
line with this signal.  
4.4. The Sensitivity of CEO Pay to Sector Performance 
The empirical specifications and the explanatory variables that I use to study pay for 
sector performance (PSP) broadly follow Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), Garvey and 
Milbourn (2006) and Gopalan et al. (2010). Consistent with these studies, I also drop the 
observations that have a fiscal year end other than December to have a peer group of CEOs 
performing over the same period. Furthermore, in all specifications, I control for year and CEO 
fixed-effects. I also restrict the sample to firms with the same CEO from the previous year. The 
dependent variable is total direct compensation (TDC) which is defined as the sum of salary, 
bonus, other annual compensation, long-term incentive payouts, total value of restricted stock 
granted, total value of stock options granted and all other compensation. The empirical 
specification to be estimated is as follows: 
TDCit= β0 + β1 Luckit xDRI Measureit + β2 Skillit xDRI Measureit +β3 DRI Measureit + β4 Luckit +  
                  
β5 Skillit + β6 (Luckit xCDF_Variance_Luckit) + β7 (Skillit xCDF_Variance_Skillit) +  
            β8 CDF_Variance_Luckit+ β9 CDF_Variance_Skillit+ β10 Ln(CEO Tenure)it + 
           Year and CEO Dummies+ εit                                                                                              (4) 
In Specification (4), the firm’s stock performance is separated into “luck” (sector-driven) 
and “skill” (firm-specific). Luck is the market value of the firm at the beginning of the year 
multiplied by the predicted value obtained from the regression of firm stock returns on the equal-
weighted and value-weighted industry returns and year effects. Skill is the market value of the 
firm at the beginning of the year multiplied by the residual from the same regression. Industry is 
defined based on the two-digit SIC industry codes. Following Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a), 
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Luck and Skill are interacted with the cumulative distribution function of their variances, 
respectively, to account for the heterogeneity in the sensitivity of CEO pay to luck and skill 
across firms. To see the relationship between DRIs and PSP, Luck is interacted with DRI 
Measure. The Information Hypothesis predicts that the coefficient of the interaction between 
Luck and DRI Measure is negative and significant. 
The results from the estimation of Specification (3) are presented in Table 14. In Column 
(1) and (2), the OLS and Heckman results for the full sample are provided respectively. 
Consistent with the Information Hypothesis, the interaction between Luck and DRI Measure is 
negative, although the coefficient in the Heckman model is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. If DRIs have an advisory role in setting the sector exposure, then it will 
more likely show up in environments with bigger information gaps about product markets and 
challenges for information acquisition. To test this possibility, I classify firms in four-digit SIC 
industries with a positive median value for R&D Intensity to be in such environments. The 
reason for the choice of an industry characteristic is to avoid potential endogeneity problems 
associated with firm characteristics.43 In Columns (3) and (4), Specification (3) is estimated for 
the subsample of firms in industries that have a median R&D Intensity of zero. The coefficient of 
Luck x DRI Measure is statistically insignificant suggesting that DRIs are ineffective in 
environments where information is possibly more accessible for every executive or director. In 
Columns (5) and (6), the subsample of firms in industries with a positive median value for R&D 
Intensity is considered. Consistent with the Information Hypothesis, the coefficient of Luck x DRI 
Measure is negative and statistically significant. In words, DRIs reduce the need for PSP in 
industries with potentially greater information challenges.44 This implies that boards with DRIs 
provide information and advice to the CEO on the choice of sector exposure, particularly when 
the CEO needs it. In unreported regressions, I also find that the negative effect of DRIs on PSP 
to hold only in differentiated industries, another proxy for the dependence of firms on 
                                                          
43Using firm-level R&D or proxies for growth opportunities such as market-to-book ratio instead yields qualitatively 
similar results. 
44
 To the extent that R&D activities relates to the flexibility of the firm to select its exposure to its primary sector, 
this finding can also be interpreted in light of the flexibility argument of Gopalan, Milbourn, and Song (2010). That 
is, it is possible that DRIs play an effective role that is reflected by a lower PSP, when the firm has the flexibility to 
choose its sector exposure.  
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information about product markets. The evidence documented in this section is, thus, consistent 
with earlier findings and the Information Hypothesis. 
4.4.1. Asymmetric Sensitivity of CEO Pay to Sector Performance 
The evidence that DRIs reduce pay for sector performance can also be explained with the 
conflict-of-interests hypothesis. Therefore, in this section, I examine the relationship between 
DRIs and the asymmetry in pay for sector performance for which the Conflict-of-Interests 
Hypothesis and the Information Hypothesis have different implications.  
 To that end, I estimate the following extension of Specification (4), which is a modified 
version of the one that Garvey and Milbourn (2006) use.  
   TDCit= β0 + β1 LuckisUpit xLuckit + β2LuckisUpit xLuckit xDRI Measureit + β3 DRI Measureit + β4 Luckit+  
   β5 Skillit +β6 (Luckit xCDF_Variance_Luckit)+ β7 (Skillit xCDF_Variance_Skillit) +  
   β8 CDF_Variance_Luckit+ β9 CDF_Variance_Skillit+ β10  Ln(CEO Tenure)it +  
  Year and CEO Dummies + εit                                                                                                      (5) 
Garvey and Milbourn (2006) find that pay for sector performance is significantly greater 
when the sector performs well, i.e., when Luck is positive. In Specification (4), I define LuckisUp 
as a dummy variable that equals one if Luck is positive and zero otherwise. The Information 
Hypothesis predicts that the coefficient on the three-way interaction between Luck, LuckisUp and 
DRI Measure is negative. In other words, since boards with DRIs play a role in the choice of 
sector exposure, the need to tie CEO pay to sector performance is less regardless of the direction 
of sector performance. Contrarily, the conflict-of-interests hypothesis predicts a positive 
coefficient. The results on asymmetric benchmarking are presented in Table 15. Consistent with 
the Information Hypothesis, DRIs reduce the sensitivity of CEO pay to sector performance when 
it is positive. In addition, as can be seen in Columns (5) and (6), the relationship between DRIs 
and PSP is both economically and statistically stronger for firms that are expected to be in 
greater need for the information and advice that DRIs can provide.  
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4.4.2 Additional Robustness Checks 
Controlling for CEO characteristics that have been used as proxies for CEO talent or 
outside opportunities (e.g. Oyer, 2004) or hedging opportunities (Garvey and Milbourn, 2003) 
such as firm size or CEO age do not affect my inferences on pay for sector performance. Finally, 
controlling for industry characteristics such as industry concentration (Aggarwal and Samwick, 
1999b) as measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) do not lead to any difference in my 
inferences. It is important to note that in all these cases, I add not only the control variables 
themselves but also their interactions with Luck to the specifications for PSP. Finally, defining 
Luck and Skill based on the four-digit SIC industry code yields qualitatively similar results.  
5. Conclusion 
 In this paper, I examine the role of directors from related industries in the design of 
stock-based incentive compensation. Directors who have multiple significant roles in 
economically-connected industries are argued to have informational advantages due to their 
greater involvement in the firm’s operating environment. Such informational advantages are 
predicted to optimally reduce the need to delegate board functions to stock markets. The 
empirical evidence in the paper is consistent with this prediction. Directors from related 
industries are associated with a lower sensitivity of CEO pay to the stock price particularly for 
firms with greater dependence on related industries and those with less informative stock prices. 
Lower sensitivity of CEO pay to the stock price can also be explained with potential conflict of 
interests between directors from related industries and shareholders. However, this explanation is 
not supported empirically. For example, of directors from related industries, those who are 
classified as independent from CEO are more likely to substitute board monitoring and advising 
for stock-based compensation. The results on the sensitivity of CEO turnovers to stock returns 
and the sensitivity of CEO pay to sector performance also attach an information role to directors 
from related industries. Overall, the empirical analysis in this paper indicates that boards with 
expertise in related industries are less likely to delegate their functions to stock markets and this 
policy seems consistent with the optimal contracting theory. More generally, this paper is an 
attempt to show that there exist potential heterogeneities among directors in terms of their 
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capacity to acquire and process information that can be useful in monitoring and advising. These 
heterogeneities have implications for the compensation policy as well as other policies of the 
firm.  
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Appendix A: Definition of Variables 
Variable  Source Definition 
Proportional Scores for Directors from Related Industries(DRI)* 
DRIOUT (DRIOUT, 5%) Compact Disclosure 
Proportion of outside directors from industries in the supply chain of the 
primary segment of the firm on the board. Supply chain is identified based 
on the vertical-relatedness threshold of 1% (5%). Vertical-relatedness 
coefficients are obtained from the input/output tables published every five 
years by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
* The corresponding dummy scores equal 1 if the proportional score is greater than zero and the notation for dummy 
scores are DumDRIOUT and DumDRIOUT, 5%., respectively. 
Compensation Variables 
Cash Compensation ExecuComp Sum of salary and bonus 
Option Grants ExecuComp Black-Scholes value of options granted in the current fiscal year 
Restricted Stock Grants ExecuComp Value of restricted stock granted in the current fiscal year 
TDC ExecuComp 
Sum of salary, bonus,  other annual compensation, long-term incentive 
payouts, grant-date value of restricted stock and grant-date value of stock 
options and other compensation 
PPS ExecuComp Change in the value of CEO’s portfolio of stock and option holdings for a 1% change in stock price 
CEO and Governance-Related Characteristics 
Board Size Compact Disclosure Number of directors on the board 
Prop_Outside Compact Disclosure Proportion of Outside Directors on the board 
CEO-Chairman Duality   Compact Disclosure Indicator that equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairman 
CEO Tenure ExecuComp Number of years in CEO position 
CEO Age ExecuComp CEO age 
Inst_Ownership CDA/ Spectrum Proportion of all outstanding shares owned by institutions 
Inst_Concentration CDA/ Spectrum 
Ratio of total number of shares owned by top ten institutions to all shares 
owned by institutions  
 
Other Firm Characteristics 
Market Value Compustat Market value of equity 
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R&D Intensity Compustat Ratio of research and development expenditures to total assets  (Data46/ Data6) 
PIN Stephen Brown Yearly mean of quarterly estimates of Stephen Brown 
Book Debt Compustat Sum of long-term debt (Data 9) and debt in current liabilities (Data 34) 
Book Leverage Compustat Book debt scaled by total assets 
Tobin’s Q Compustat Sum of market value of equity (Data 25 times Data 199) and book debt 
scaled by total assets 
Firm Volatility ExecuComp Standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the past five years 
Cash Flow Compustat Income before extraordinary items (Data 18)  plus amortization and 
depreciation (Data 14) scaled by total assets 
Annual Return ExecuComp Annual percentage returns (Dividends reinvested) 
Luck  ExecuComp 
Predicted value from the regression of annual percentage returns on value-
weighted and equal-weighted four-digit or two-digit SIC industry returns and 
year effects, multiplied by the market value in the beginning of the year 
Skill ExecuComp 
Residual from the regression of annual percentage returns on value-weighted 
and equal-weighted four-digit or two-digit SIC industry returns and year 
effects, multiplied by the market value in the beginning of the year 
Industry Characteristics  
HHI  Compustat Sum of square of the market shares of firms in the same four-digit industry 
industry 
Ind_Correlation CRSP Correlation between the firm’s industry returns and returns of related  
industries (monthly or daily) 
DRI_Supply Compact 
Disclosure 
Number of potential DRIs within a radius of 100 miles of the headquarters of 
the firm  
Ind_Homogeneity CRSP Average of partial correlation coefficients between monthly stock returns of 
all firms in the same 4-digit SIC code and monthly industry returns 
calculated at the 4-digit SIC level  Prop_Integrated Compustat Proportion of firms in the 4-digit SIC industry that have at least one 
secondary segment that is vertically related to its primary segment in a given 
year  NumofSCInd BEA Number of supply-chain industries of the firm’s four-digit SIC industry 
Ind_Median_DRI Compact 
Disclosure 
Median value of the respective DRI measure in the four-digit SIC industry of 
the firm (calculation excludes the firm itself) 
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Table 1: Implications of Information and Conflict-of-Interests Hypotheses 
Hypotheses  Information Hypothesis Conflict-of-Interests Hypothesis 
 Sensitivity of CEO Pay to the Stock Price (PPS) 
The effect of DRIs on PPS Negative effect Negative effect 
The effect of DRIs on PPS in differentiated 
industries Larger negative effect No prediction 
The effect of DRIs on PPS for firms with low 
stock price informativeness Larger negative effect No prediction 
The effect of dependent (co-opted) DRIs on PPS 
relative to the effect of independent (non-co-
opted) DRIs  
Equal negative effect Larger negative effect 
The effect of directors from actual 
customer/supplier firms relative to the rest of 
DRIs on PPS 
Equal negative effect Larger negative effect 
The effect of DRIs on the sensitivity of pay to 
positive performance versus negative 
performance  
Equal negative effect Positive or smaller negative effect 
Level of Compensation 
The effect of DRIs on the level of compensation No prediction Positive effect 
Sensitivity of Forced CEO Turnovers to Stock Returns 
The effect of DRIs on the sensitivity of forced 
CEO turnovers to stock returns  Negative effect Negative effect 
The effect of dependent (co-opted) DRIs on the 
sensitivity of involuntary CEO replacements to 
returns relative to the effect of independent (non-
co-opted) DRIs 
Equal negative effect Larger negative effect 
Sensitivity of CEO Pay to Sector Performance (PSP)  
The effect of DRIs on PSP Negative effect Negative effect 
The effect of DRIs on the sensitivity of pay to 
positive sector performance versus negative 
sector performance 
Equal negative effect Positive or smaller negative effect 
The effect of DRIs on PSP for firms with 
strategic flexibility to change exposure to the 
sector 
Larger negative effect No prediction 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on Directors from Related Industries 
This table presents descriptive statistics on dummy variables for outside directors from related industries (DRIOUT) in Panel A and 
proportion of directors from related industries among outside directors in Panel B. The sample period is 1993-2005. Definitions of 
all variables are provided in Appendix A.  
Panel A: Dummy DRI Measures 
 Obs Mean Median 25% 75% Std Dev 
DumDRIOUT 19,616 0.562 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.496 
DumDRIOUT, 5% 19,616 0.236 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.425 
       
Panel B: Proportional DRI Measures 
 Obs Mean Median 25% 75% Std Dev 
DRIOUT 19,616 0.107 0.063 0.000 0.167 0.138 
DRIOUT , 5% 19,616 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.077 
Non-Zero DRIOUT 11,024 0.191 0.167 0.091 0.250 0.133 
Non-Zero DRIOUT , 5% 4,632 0.139 0.100 0.063 0.167 0.103 
 
Table 3: Distribution of Directors from Related Industries (DRIs) by Fama-French Industries 
This table presents the top and the bottom ten Fama and French (1997) industries in the distribution of outside DRIs identified 
based on the 1% vertical-relatedness threshold. The sample period is 1993-2005. Definitions of all variables are provided in 
Appendix A. 
Dummy DRI Measure (DumDRIOUT)  Proportional DRI Measure (DRIOUT) 
Rank Industry Obs Mean  Rank Industry Obs Mean 
1 Real Estate 3 100.00%  1 Computers 791 17.82% 
2 Rubber and Plastic Products 116 71.55%  2 Candy and Soda 45 16.68% 
3 Computers 791 70.54%  3 Rubber and Plastic Products 116 16.14% 
4 Business Supplies 431 70.30%  4 Business Services 1,737 15.23% 
5 Chemicals 585 69.40%  5 Pharmaceutical Products 709 14.94% 
6 Candy and Soda 45 68.89%  6 Real Estate 3 13.59% 
7 Pharmaceutical Products 709 67.28%  7 Electronic Equipment 1,206 13.53% 
8 Business Services 1,737 64.77%  8 Chemicals 585 13.43% 
9 Insurance 865 64.62%  9 Business Supplies 431 12.72% 
10 Aircraft 105 63.81%  10 Electrical Equipment 202 12.71% 
         
39 Miscellaneous 99 41.41%  39 Textiles 163 5.94% 
40 Healthcare 299 41.14%  40 Miscellaneous 99 5.53% 
41 Printing and Publishing 275 39.27%  41 Printing and Publishing 275 5.53% 
42 Precious Metals 101 38.61%  42 Shipbuilding, Railroad Eq 44 5.35% 
43 Apparel 306 36.27%  43 Apparel 306 4.27% 
44 Defense 53 35.85%  44 Agriculture 67 3.95% 
45 Entertainment 187 34.22%  45 Precious Metals 101 3.74% 
46 Alcoholic Beverages  68 33.82%  46 Alcoholic Beverages  68 3.23% 
47 Agriculture 67 23.88%  47 Defense 53 2.78% 
48 Tobacco Products 19 5.26%  48 Tobacco Products 19 0.24% 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics on Firm and Industry Characteristics 
This table presents descriptive statistics on the firm and industry characteristics employed in the following empirical analyses. The sample 
period is 1993-2005. All unbounded variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. All dollar values are in 1992 constant dollars. Definitions of all 
variables are provided in Appendix A.  
CEO Compensation ($000s) N Mean Median Min 25% 75% Max Std Dev 
Salary 19,616 497.19 459.14 0.00 316.88 645.26 1,409.56 247.40 
Bonus 19,616 533.65 290.60 0.00 66.86 655.90 5,028.67 788.92 
Option Grants 19,391 1,516.14 453.20 0.00 0.00 1,548.51 19,541.93 2,998.22 
Restricted Stock Grants 19,616 362.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7,799.77 1,163.24 
Total Direct Compensation 19,391 3,244.70 1,692.04 142.00 844.81 3,649.15 27,610.46 4,445.94 
PPS 19,580 431.68 123.49 0.00 35.73 356.86 7,396.89 1,009.35 
         
CEO and Governance Characteristics         
Board Size 19,616 9.38 9.00 1.00 7.00 11.00 19.00 3.32 
Prop_Outside 19,616 0.72 0.75 0.00 0.67 0.85 1.00 0.19 
CEO Tenure 18,153 7.25 5.00 0.00 2.00 10.00 38.00 7.37 
CEO Age 18,179 55.73 56.00 39.00 51.00 61.00 77.00 7.47 
CEO-Chairman Duality 19,616 0.60 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.49 
CEO Ownership 18,577 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 1.00 0.08 
Inst_Ownership (%) 17,461 60.75 63.10 0.00 45.95 77.90 100.00 22.90 
Inst_Concentration 17,461 0.58 0.56 0.21 0.48 0.66 1.00 0.14 
         
Other Firm Characteristics         
Market Value ($ millions) 19,598 4,254.49 1,014.18 21.63 388.56 3,240.34 71,429.45 10,111.30 
Annual Return 19,616 0.22 0.12 -0.78 -0.12 0.39 2.71 0.61 
R&D Intensity 19,573 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.85 0.10 
Luck ($ millions) 12,811 1,409.81 170.66 -1,532.14 24.86 726.65 38,920.12 4,658.13 
Skill ($ millions) 12,811 -1,001.08 -66.59 -38,583.075 -458.16 89.73 6,589.7 4,704.68 
Tobin’s Q 19,572 1.67 1.20 0.15 0.82 1.96 8.92 1.50 
PIN 18,229 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.11 0.19 0.93 0.06 
Multi-Segment 19,573 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.49 
Book Leverage 19,572 0.23 0.21 0.00 0.06 0.34 0.85 0.18 
Firm Volatility 18,815 0.43 0.37 0.14 0.28 0.53 1.23 0.22 
Market Share 19,573 0.11 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.14 1.00 0.18 
         
Industry Characteristics         
Differentiated_Ind 19,573 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.48 
HHI 19,573 0.20 0.15 0.02 0.08 0.26 1.00 0.16 
Ind_Homogeneity 19,540 0.18 0.16 -0.46 0.09 0.24 0.75 0.11 
Prop_Integrated 19,559 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.15 1.00 0.13 
Prop_Integrated5% 19,559 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.08 1.00 0.11 
DRI Supply
 
19,616 698.14 388.00 0.00 134.00 904.00 4,081.00 845.90 
DRI Supply5% 19,616 189.97 70.00 0.00 8.00 239.00 1,551.00 294.70 
Ind_Correlation 18,230 0.47 0.49 -0.11 0.39 0.58 1.00 0.14 
Ind_Correlation
 5% 17,038 0.50 0.51 -0.11 0.40 0.60 1.00 0.17 
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Table 5: Determinants of Directors from Related Industries (DRIs) 
This table presents evidence on the characteristics of firms that appoint DRIs. Related industries are identified using the vertical-
relatedness threshold of 1% in Columns (1) and (2) and the vertical-relatedness threshold of 5% in Columns (3) and (4). 
Vertical-relatedness thresholds are obtained from the input/output tables published every five years by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. Columns (1) and (3) report the Probit results for the DRI Measures DumDRIOUT and DumDRIOUT, 5%. DumDRIOUT 
(DumDRIOUT, 5%) is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has at least one outside director from a related industry of its 
primary segment based on the vertical-relatedness threshold of 1% (5%). Columns (2) and (4) report the OLS results for the 
corresponding proportional scores DRIOUT and DRIOUT, 5%. Ind_Correlation, Prop_Integrated and DRI_Supply are defined based 
on the vertical-relatedness threshold used for the dependent variable in the respective column. Definitions of dependent as well 
as independent variables are provided in Appendix A. The sample used for estimation excludes financial and utility firms and is 
from 1993 to 2005. All specifications include year dummies. The coefficients of the year dummies are suppressed for brevity. 
Robust t-statistics that account for clusters at the firm level are reported in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.      
 Dependent Variable: DumDRIOUT DRIOUT DumDRIOUT, 5% DRIOUT, 5% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Probit OLS Probit OLS 
  
    R&D Intensity 0.613*** 0.088*** 1.029*** 0.096*** 
 
[3.04] [3.55] [5.86] [5.20] 
Ind_Correlation 0.329** 0.056*** 0.555*** 0.021*** 
 
[2.01] [3.23] [3.79] [2.68] 
PIN -0.681* -0.054 -0.541 -0.047** 
 
[-1.95] [-1.54] [-1.35] [-2.12] 
Ind_Homogeneity -0.137 -0.007 -0.083 -0.003 
 
[-0.74] [-0.41] [-0.41] [-0.29] 
HHI 0.224 0.011 0.270 0.017* 
 
[1.56] [0.69] [1.56] [1.90] 
Market Share -0.091 -0.028* -0.015 -0.009 
 
[-0.65] [-1.88] [-0.09] [-0.99] 
Prop_Integrated 0.215 0.012 0.434** 0.005 
 
[1.44] [0.73] [2.37] [0.49] 
Ln(Market Value) 0.055*** 0.009*** 0.013 0.000 
 
[3.37] [4.59] [0.70] [0.33] 
Book Leverage 0.140 0.020 0.096 0.004 
 
[1.28] [1.54] [0.78] [0.58] 
Multi-Segment -0.123*** -0.012*** -0.027 -0.005** 
 
[-3.09] [-3.02] [-0.58] [-2.04] 
Prop_Outside 1.731*** 0.098*** 1.317*** 0.032*** 
 
[14.00] [6.69] [9.54] [4.86] 
CEO-Chairman Duality -0.003 -0.004 0.037 -0.001 
 
[-0.10] [-1.05] [0.99] [-0.33] 
Ln(Board Size) 0.679*** 0.002 0.488*** -0.000 
 
[10.74] [0.21] [6.89] [-0.04] 
Ln(DRI Supply) 0.152*** 0.017*** 0.208*** 0.009*** 
 
[12.12] [13.15] [17.63] [15.18] 
Constant -4.079*** -0.171*** -4.098*** -0.036*** 
 
[-17.09] [-7.78] [-17.07] [-3.11] 
     Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
     Observations 14,251 14,251 13,228 13,228 
(Pseudo) R2 0.119 0.094 0.137 0.105 
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Table 6: Effect of Directors from Related Industries (DRIs) on the Sensitivity of CEO Pay to the Stock Price (PPS) 
This table presents evidence on the effect of DRIs on the sensitivity of CEO pay to the stock price (PPS). The dependent variable in all columns is PPS (in $ millions) which is 
defined as the change in CEO wealth for a 1% change in stock price. Columns (1)-(4) use the dummy DRI Measures while Columns (5)-(8) use the proportional DRI 
Measures. In Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6), related industries are identified using the vertical-relatedness threshold of 1%, while Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) use the vertical-
relatedness threshold of 5%. DumDRIOUT (DumDRIOUT, 5%) is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has at least one outside director from a related industry of its 
primary segment based on the vertical-relatedness threshold of 1% (5%). DRIOUT (DRIOUT, 5%) is the corresponding proportional score. In Columns (2) and (4) of Panel A, the 
potential endogeneity problem is controlled for using the Heckman treatment effects model where the first-stage regression is identical to the respective Probit regression in 
Table 4. In Columns (6) and (8) of Panel A, PPS is estimated simultaneously with the respective proportional DRI Measure using the 2SLS model, to control for potential 
simultaneity bias. In Panel B, Ln(DRI_Supply), Ln(NumofSCInd), Ind_Correlation and Ind_Median_DRI are used as instrumental variables to control for the selection biases. 
Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix A. The sample used for estimation excludes financial and utility firms and is from 1993 to 2005. All specifications in 
Panel A include year and the Fama-French industry dummies (Fama and French, 1997). All specifications in Panel B control for year and firm dummies. The coefficients of 
the year and industry or firm dummies are suppressed for brevity. Robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level are reported in square brackets in both panels. Heckman t-
statistics are based on 100 bootstrap replications; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.        
Panel A: Using the Heckman treatment effects model and simultaneous estimation to control for potential endogeneity and simultaneity biases 
Dependent Variable: PPS 
DRI Measure: DumDRIOUT DumDRIOUT, 5% DRIOUT DRIOUT, 5% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Simultaneous-2SLS OLS Simultaneous-2SLS 
     
    
DRI Measure -0.004 -0.155** -0.077*** -0.227** -0.102 -0.559** -0.251** -1.410*** 
 
[-0.15] [-2.26] [-3.43] [-2.36] [-1.33] [-2.00] [-2.29] [-3.13] 
Ln(Market Value) 0.279*** 0.293*** 0.281*** 0.291*** 0.280*** 0.292*** 0.279*** 0.285*** 
 
[11.20] [11.44] [11.08] [11.06] [11.08] [31.31] [11.04] [31.69] 
Tobin’s Q 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.078*** 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.081*** 
 
[4.76] [5.57] [4.73] [4.79] [4.75] [12.74] [4.79] [13.24] 
Firm Volatility  0.181** 0.177** 0.180** 0.187** 0.184** 0.204*** 0.182** 0.203*** 
 
[2.36] [2.34] [2.35] [2.25] [2.42] [3.96] [2.38] [3.89] 
Ln(CEO Tenure) 0.212*** 0.213*** 0.210*** 0.218*** 0.211*** 0.212*** 0.211*** 0.219*** 
 
[8.88] [10.02] [8.94] [7.79] [8.94] [24.94] [8.97] [24.94] 
PIN  0.512** 0.475** 0.498** 0.533** 0.506** 0.486*** 0.496** 0.492** 
 
[2.05] [2.01] [1.99] [2.02] [2.02] [2.64] [1.99] [2.56] 
Cash Flow -0.070 -0.099 -0.080 -0.098 -0.074 -0.099 -0.076 -0.090 
 
[-0.63] [-0.81] [-0.73] [-0.74] [-0.67] [-1.18] [-0.69] [-1.04] 
Inst_Percent -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 
[-4.39] [-4.85] [-4.36] [-3.96] [-4.40] [-9.85] [-4.42] [-8.68] 
Inst_Concentration 0.594*** 0.622*** 0.593*** 0.613*** 0.593*** 0.622*** 0.594*** 0.614*** 
 
[4.16] [4.24] [4.16] [4.28] [4.15] [7.96] [4.16] [7.55] 
Lambda 
 
0.101*** 
 
0.089     
  
[2.61] 
 
[1.51]     
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Constant -2.658*** -1.988*** -2.663*** -2.283*** -2.655*** -2.507*** -2.653*** -2.545*** 
 
[-8.98] [-6.46] [-9.06] [-7.85] [-9.01] [-10.31] [-9.04] [-10.32] 
     
    
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
     
    
Observations 12,085 11,548 12,085 10,762 12,085 11,548 12,085 10,762 
R-squared 0.262 0.265 0.263 0.268 0.262 0.260 0.263 0.258 
 
Panel B: Using instrumental variables to control for endogeneity and controlling for firm fixed effects 
Dependent Variable: PPS 
DRI Measure: DumDRIOUT DRIOUT DumDRIOUT, 5% DRIOUT, 5% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS 
  
    
DRI Measure -0.314* -1.165* -0.428** -3.175** 
 
[-1.91] [-1.93] [-1.97] [-2.31] 
Ln(Market Value) 0.321*** 0.316*** 0.318*** 0.297*** 
 
[8.76] [8.45] [8.51] [8.06] 
Tobin’s Q 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.075*** 0.077*** 
 
[3.80] [3.79] [3.61] [3.57] 
Firm Volatility  -0.112 -0.143 -0.140 -0.194 
 
[-0.77] [-0.99] [-0.90] [-1.19] 
Ln(CEO Tenure) 0.128*** 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.129*** 
 
[5.79] [5.89] [5.60] [5.55] 
PIN  0.146 0.170 0.114 -0.034 
 
[0.56] [0.65] [0.43] [-0.12] 
Cash Flow -0.227*** -0.214** -0.202** -0.112 
 
[-2.66] [-2.48] [-2.25] [-1.01] 
Inst_Percent -0.002** -0.002** -0.001* -0.002** 
 
[-2.21] [-2.25] [-1.90] [-2.03] 
Inst_Concentration 0.570*** 0.553*** 0.574*** 0.556*** 
 
[5.36] [5.17] [5.20] [4.99] 
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Firm Dummies yes yes yes yes 
     
Observations 11,356 11,356 10,624 10,624 
Hansen J p-value 0.951 0.993 0.975 0.880 
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Sargan C p-value 0.035 0.044 0.063 0.020 
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 17.74*** 18.74*** 27.18*** 18.07*** 
First-Stage Results (Only Instruments): 
     Ln(DRI_Supply) 0.049*** 0.012*** 0.041*** 0.005*** 
 
[5.89] [5.25] [8.18] [5.80] 
Ln(NumofSCInd) 0.103*** 0.034*** 
  
 
[3.78] [5.08] 
  
Ind_Correlation 0.049 0.013 -0.025 0.004 
 
[0.85] [0.81] [0.42] [0.34] 
Ind_Median_DRI 
  
0.065*** 0.130*** 
   
[3.49] [4.30] 
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Table 7: Effect of Directors from Related Industries (DRIs) on the Sensitivity of CEO Pay to the 
Stock Price (PPS) in Different Industry and Information Environments  
This table presents evidence on the effect of DRIs on PPS for firms operating in differentiated industries and firms with a low 
probability of informed trading (PIN). The dependent variable in all columns is PPS (in $ millions) which is defined as the 
change in CEO wealth for a 1% change in stock price. Differentiated_Ind is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s 
four-digit SIC industry produces differentiated products. Industries producing differentiated products are identified based on 
the Rauch (1999) classification. Low_PIN is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s PIN is less than the median value 
of PIN in the firm’s four-digit SIC industry. In all columns, related industries are identified using the vertical-relatedness 
threshold of 1%. DumDRIOUT =1 is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has at least one outside director from related 
industries. DumDRIOUT =0 is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm does not have any outside director from its related 
industries. In Columns (2) and (4), the Heckman treatment effects model is used to control for the potential endogeneity 
problem. The differences between coefficients of interest along with the respective t-statistics are provided at the bottom of 
the table. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix A. The sample used for estimation excludes financial and 
utility firms and is from 1993 to 2005. All specifications include year and Fama-French industry dummies (Fama and French, 
1997). Robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level are reported in square brackets. Heckman t-statistics are based on 100 
bootstrap replications; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.        
Dependent Variable: PPS 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
  
  
  
Differentiated_Ind x DumDRIOUT =1 (β1) 0.011 0.012   
 
[0.22] [0.26]   
Differentiated_Ind x DumDRIOUT =0 (β2) 0.113** 0.122**   
 
[2.16] [2.50]   
Low_PIN x DumDRIOUT =1 (β1) 
  
-0.079*** -0.076*** 
   
[-2.72] [-2.88] 
Low_PIN x DumDRIOUT =0 (β2) 
  
-0.025 -0.028 
   
[-0.85] [-0.87] 
DumDRIOUT 0.042 -0.108 0.023 -0.134** 
 
[1.12] [-1.40] [1.06] [-1.99] 
Ln(Market Value) 0.278*** 0.292*** 0.276*** 0.291*** 
 
[11.22] [11.49] [11.53] [11.66] 
Tobin’s Q 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 
 
[4.82] [5.65] [4.76] [5.55] 
Firm Volatility  0.186** 0.182** 0.176** 0.173** 
 
[2.42] [2.40] [2.35] [2.35] 
Ln(CEO Tenure) 0.211*** 0.213*** 0.211*** 0.213*** 
 
[8.91] [10.02] [8.86] [10.01] 
PIN  0.506** 0.467**   
 
[2.03] [1.99]   
Cash Flow -0.073 -0.103 -0.058 -0.090 
 
[-0.67] [-0.85] [-0.52] [-0.74] 
Inst_Percent -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 
[-4.35] [-4.77] [-4.44] [-4.88] 
Inst_Concentration 0.592*** 0.619*** 0.610*** 0.636*** 
 
[4.17] [4.24] [4.30] [4.39] 
Lambda 
 
0.103***  0.103*** 
  
[2.69]  [2.65] 
Constant -2.683*** -2.018*** -2.539*** -1.889*** 
 
[-8.93] [-6.54] [-9.36] [-6.55] 
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Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes 
   
  
Observations 12,085 11,548 12,085 11,548 
R-squared 0.263 0.266 0.263 0.265 
   
  
Differences between coefficients   
β1 − β2 -0.102** -0.110** -0.054 -0.048 
 
[4.75] [5.88] [2.05] [1.27] 
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Table 8: Effect of Independent and Non-Co-opted Directors from Related Industries (DRIs) on 
the Sensitivity of CEO Pay to the Stock Price (PPS) 
This table evidence on the effect of independent or non-co-opted DRIs on PPS. The dependent variable in all columns is 
PPS (in $ millions) which is defined as the change in CEO wealth for a 1% change in stock price. In all columns, related 
industries are identified using the vertical-relatedness threshold of 1%. DumDRIOUT is a dummy variable that equals one 
if the firm has at least one outside director from a related industry of its primary segment. Independent DRI is a dummy 
variable that equals one if at least one outside DRI of the firm is identified as independent in the IRRC database. 
Dependent DRI is a dummy variable that equals one if none of the outside DRIs of the firm are identified as independent. 
Non-Co-opted DRI is a dummy variable that equals one if at least one outside DRI of the firm has been appointed before 
the incumbent CEO. Co-opted DRI is a dummy variable that equals one if all DRIs of the firm have been appointed 
during the tenure of the incumbent CEO in the firm. In Columns (2) and (4), the Heckman treatment effects model is 
used to control for the potential endogeneity problem. The differences between coefficients of interest along with the 
respective t-statistics are provided at the bottom of the table. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix A. 
The sample used for estimation excludes financial and utility firms and is from 1993 to 2005. All specifications include 
year and Fama-French industry dummies (Fama and French, 1997). Robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level are 
reported in square brackets. Heckman t-statistics are based on 100 bootstrap replications; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.        
DRI classifications in all columns are defined based on DumDRIOUT. 
Dependent Variable: PPS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
  
    
Independent DRI (β1) -0.036*** -0.067*** 
  
 
[-2.98] [-4.51] 
  
Dependent DRI (β2) 0.022 -0.049 
  
 
[0.48] [-0.99] 
  
Non-Co-opted DRI (β1) 
  
-0.211*** -0.376*** 
   
[-4.09] [-3.61] 
Co-opted DRI (β2) 
  
0.005 -0.167* 
   
[0.16] [-1.85] 
Ln(Market Value) 0.316*** 0.327*** 0.324*** 0.340*** 
 
[10.53] [10.13] [10.50] [10.86] 
Tobin’s Q 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 
 
[4.03] [4.10] [3.57] [3.47] 
Firm Volatility  0.243** 0.226** 0.231** 0.208** 
 
[2.43] [1.98] [2.17] [1.99] 
Ln(CEO Tenure) 0.240*** 0.244*** 0.245*** 0.246*** 
 
[8.32] [8.67] [8.22] [8.51] 
PIN  0.930*** 0.892** 1.096*** 1.008** 
 
[2.64] [2.42] [2.85] [2.52] 
Cash Flow -0.072 -0.109 -0.024 -0.087 
 
[-0.46] [-0.77] [-0.14] [-0.57] 
Inst_Percent -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 
[-4.46] [-4.50] [-4.67] [-5.09] 
Inst_Concentration 0.587*** 0.620*** 0.539*** 0.591*** 
 
[3.10] [3.13] [2.59] [2.76] 
Lambda 
 
0.065*** 
 
0.109** 
  
[2.89] 
 
[2.07] 
Constant -3.339*** -2.229*** -3.318*** -2.175*** 
 
[-9.03] [-5.36] [-8.53] [-4.53] 
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Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes 
     Observations 8,287 7,997 6,955 6,736 
R-squared 0.283 0.287 0.292 0.295 
     
Differences between coefficients 
  β1 − β2 -0.058 -0.018 -0.216*** -0.209*** 
 
[1.64] [0.16] [14.75] [13.82] 
 
 
58 
 
Table 9: Effect of Directors from Related Industries (DRIs) on the Level of CEO 
Compensation  
This table presents evidence on the effect of DRIs on the level and the change in the level of CEO compensation. 
The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (2) is TDC (in $ millions) which is defined as the sum of salary, bonus, 
other annual compensation, long-term incentive payouts, grant-date value of restricted stock, grant-date value of 
stock and other compensation. The dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4) is ∆(TDC), the change in TDC. In all 
columns, related industries are identified using the vertical-relatedness threshold of 1%. DumDRIOUT is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the firm has at least one outside director from a related industry of its primary segment. In 
Columns (2) and (4), the Heckman treatment effects model is used to control for the potential endogeneity problem. 
Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix A. The sample used for estimation excludes financial and 
utility firms and is from 1993 to 2005. All specifications include year and Fama-French industry dummies (Fama 
and French, 1997). Robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level are reported in square brackets. Heckman t-statistics 
are based on 100 bootstrap replications; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.        
Dependent Variable: TDC ∆(TDC) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
  
    
DumDRIOUT 0.014 -0.171 0.046 -0.129 
 
[0.16] [-0.59] [0.76] [-0.67] 
Ln(Market Value) 1.858*** 1.869*** 0.147*** 0.151*** 
 
[22.23] [21.75] [3.56] [3.79] 
Tobin’s Q -0.073 -0.066 0.178*** 0.179*** 
 
[-1.36] [-1.27] [5.91] [5.17] 
Firm Volatility  2.914*** 2.930*** 0.158 0.150 
 
[8.63] [9.71] [0.81] [0.73] 
Ln(CEO Tenure) -0.022 -0.032 0.059* 0.047 
 
[-0.39] [-0.51] [1.90] [1.38] 
PIN  -0.557 -0.607 1.909** 1.625* 
 
[-0.47] [-0.53] [2.18] [1.75] 
Cash Flow -1.383*** -1.370*** 0.498 0.543 
 
[-3.27] [-2.85] [1.43] [1.58] 
Inst_Percent -0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.000 
 
[-0.87] [-0.96] [0.29] [-0.20] 
Inst_Concentration 3.005*** 3.012*** -0.212 -0.185 
 
[6.23] [6.43] [-0.85] [-0.77] 
Lambda 
 
0.133 
 
0.114 
  
[0.72] 
 
[0.96] 
Constant -13.700*** -11.761*** 0.683 -1.724*** 
 
[-9.41] [-12.83] [0.67] [-3.19] 
     
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes 
     
Observations 12,003 11,470 11,421 10,919 
R-squared 0.357 0.357 0.026 0.026 
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Table 10: Effect of Directors from Related Industries (DRIs) on the Sensitivity of CEO Pay 
to Positive and Negative Stock Returns 
This table presents evidence on the effect of DRIs on the sensitivity of CEO pay to positive versus negative returns, 
separately. The dependent variable in all columns is PPS (in $ millions) which is defined as the change in CEO 
wealth for a 1% change in stock price. In Columns (1) and (2), related industries are identified using the vertical-
relatedness threshold of 1% while Columns (3) and (4) use the vertical-relatedness threshold of 5%. DumDRIOUT 
(DumDRIOUT, 5%) equals one if the firm has at least one outside director from a related industry of its primary 
segment based on the vertical-relatedness threshold of 1% (5%). Positive_Return is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the stock return is positive, whereas Negative_Return is a dummy variable that equals one if the stock return is 
negative. In Columns (2) and (4), the Heckman treatment effects model is used to control for the potential 
endogeneity problem. The differences between coefficients of interest along with the respective t-statistics are 
provided at the bottom of the table. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix A. The sample used for 
estimation excludes financial and utility firms and is from 1993 to 2005. All specifications include year and Fama-
French industry dummies (Fama and French, 1997). Robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level are reported in 
square brackets. Heckman t-statistics are based on 100 bootstrap replications; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Dependent Variable: PPS 
DRI Measure: DumDRIOUT DumDRIOUT, 5% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
  
    Positive_Return x DRI Measure (β1) 0.008 -0.141** -0.084*** -0.232*** 
 
[0.28] [-2.28] [-3.32] [-2.60] 
Negative_ Return x DRI Measure (β2) -0.020 -0.166*** -0.063*** -0.199** 
 
[-0.87] [-2.75] [-2.70] [-2.21] 
Ln(Market Value) 0.279*** 0.292*** 0.281*** 0.291*** 
 
[11.14] [11.61] [11.04] [10.28] 
Tobin’s Q 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.080*** 
 
[4.64] [4.58] [4.72] [4.59] 
Firm Volatility  0.181** 0.177** 0.178** 0.185** 
 
[2.33] [2.41] [2.30] [2.25] 
Ln(CEO Tenure) 0.213*** 0.214*** 0.211*** 0.219*** 
 
[8.86] [9.13] [8.91] [8.13] 
PIN  0.493* 0.461* 0.511** 0.552** 
 
[1.94] [1.77] [2.03] [2.11] 
Cash Flow -0.083 -0.110 -0.086 -0.100 
 
[-0.73] [-1.04] [-0.77] [-0.89] 
Inst_Percent -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 
[-4.40] [-4.41] [-4.36] [-4.52] 
Inst_Concentration 0.596*** 0.622*** 0.586*** 0.601*** 
 
[4.15] [3.80] [4.11] [4.38] 
Lambda 
 
0.099*** 
 
0.085 
  
[2.86] 
 
[1.46] 
Constant -3.121*** -1.989*** -3.141*** -2.298*** 
 
[-9.80] [-5.70] [-9.80] [-7.85] 
     Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes 
     Observations 12,032 11,496 12,032 10,712 
R-squared 0.262 0.265 0.263 0.268 
     
Differences between coefficients 
  β1 − β2 0.028 0.025 -0.021 -0.033 
 
[1.86] [1.60] [0.99] [2.13] 
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Table 11: Effect of Directors from Supplier or Customer Firms on the Sensitivity of CEO 
Pay to the Stock Price (PPS) 
This tables presents evidence on the effect of directors from customer or supplier firms on PPS. The dependent 
variable in all columns is PPS (in $ millions) which is defined as the change in CEO wealth for a 1% change in stock 
price. In Columns (1) and (2), related industries are identified using the vertical-relatedness threshold of 1% while 
Columns (3) and (4) use the vertical-relatedness threshold of 5%. DumDRIOUT (DumDRIOUT, 5%) is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the firm has at least one outside director from a related industry of its primary segment based on the 
vertical-relatedness threshold of 1% (5%). Firm DRI is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has at least one 
director from its actual customer or supplier firms. There are 465 firm-year observations that involve such directors. 
Industry DRI is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm does not have any business relationship with its DRIs. 
In Columns (2) and (4), the Heckman treatment effects model is used to control for the potential endogeneity 
problem. The differences between coefficients of interest along with the respective t-statistics are provided at the 
bottom of the table. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix A. The sample used for estimation excludes 
financial and utility firms and is from 1993 to 2005. All specifications include year and Fama-French industry 
dummies (Fama and French, 1997). Robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level are reported in square brackets. 
Heckman t-statistics are based on 100 bootstrap replications; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.       
Dependent Variable: PPS 
DRI Measure: DumDRIOUT DumDRIOUT, 5% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
  
    
Industry DRI (β1) -0.001 -0.158** -0.071*** -0.235** 
 
[-0.05] [-2.31] [-3.14] [-2.41] 
Firm DRI (β2) 0.113 -0.069 0.093 -0.075 
 
[1.03] [-0.56] [0.84] [-0.54] 
Ln(Market Value) 0.278*** 0.293*** 0.280*** 0.291*** 
 
[11.13] [11.42] [11.00] [10.99] 
Tobin’s Q 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.079*** 
 
[4.79] [5.59] [4.75] [4.80] 
Firm Volatility  0.177** 0.174** 0.176** 0.182** 
 
[2.31] [2.29] [2.29] [2.19] 
Ln(CEO Tenure) 0.212*** 0.213*** 0.211*** 0.218*** 
 
[8.89] [10.01] [8.95] [7.79] 
PIN  0.505** 0.473** 0.491* 0.527** 
 
[2.01] [1.99] [1.95] [1.98] 
Cash Flow -0.070 -0.101 -0.080 -0.103 
 
[-0.63] [-0.83] [-0.73] [-0.78] 
Inst_Percent -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 
[-4.39] [-4.84] [-4.36] [-3.97] 
Inst_Concentration 0.595*** 0.623*** 0.594*** 0.613*** 
 
[4.18] [4.25] [4.18] [4.29] 
Lambda 
 
0.103*** 
 
0.098 
  
[2.66] 
 
[1.63] 
Constant -2.654*** -1.985*** -2.657*** -2.280*** 
 
[-8.94] [-6.44] [-9.02] [-7.79] 
     
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes 
     
Observations 12,085 11,548 12,085 10,762 
R-squared 0.262 0.265 0.263 0.268 
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Differences between coefficients 
  β1 − β2 -0.114 -0.089 -0.164 -0.160 
 
[1.11] [0.75] [2.28] [1.89] 
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Table 12: Directors from Related Industries (DRIs) on the Compensation Committee and the 
Sensitivity of CEO Pay to the Stock Price (PPS) 
This table presents evidence on the effect of DRIs sitting on the compensation committee on PPS. The dependent variable 
in all columns is PPS (in $ millions) which is defined as the change in CEO wealth for a 1% change in stock price. In 
Columns (1) and (2), related industries are identified using the vertical-relatedness threshold of 1% while Columns (3) and 
(4) use the vertical-relatedness threshold of 5%. DumDRIOUT (DumDRIOUT, 5%) equals one if the firm has at least one 
outside director from a related industry of its primary segment based on the vertical-relatedness threshold of 1% (5%). 
DRIs on the compensation committee are identified using the IRRC database. Comp_Comm DRI is a dummy variable that 
equals one if at least of the outside DRIs of the firm serves on the compensation committee. Non_Comp_Comm DRI is 
dummy variable that equals one if the firm has at least one outside DRI and none of them serves on the firm’s 
compensation committee. In Columns (1) and (2), related industries are identified based on the vertical-relatedness 
threshold of 1% while in Columns (3) and (4) the vertical-relatedness threshold of 5% is used. In Columns (2) and (4), the 
Heckman treatment effects model is used to control for the potential endogeneity problem. The differences between 
coefficients of interest along with the respective t-statistics are provided at the bottom of the table. Definitions of all 
variables are provided in Appendix A. The sample used for estimation excludes financial and utility firms and is from 1993 
to 2005. All specifications include year and Fama-French industry dummies (Fama and French, 1997). Robust t-statistics 
clustered at the firm level are reported in square brackets. Heckman t-statistics are based on 100 bootstrap replications; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.        
Dependent Variable: PPS 
DRI Measure: DumDRIOUT DumDRIOUT, 5% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
  
    Comp_Comm DRI (β1) -0.035 -0.214** -0.109*** -0.541** 
 
[-1.04] [-2.35] [-3.12] [-2.56] 
Non_Comp_Comm DRI (β2) 0.024 -0.155* -0.080** -0.505** 
 
[0.56] [-1.65] [-2.07] [-2.41] 
Ln(Market Value) 0.323*** 0.339*** 0.323*** 0.331*** 
 
[10.47] [10.84] [10.37] [10.34] 
Tobin’s Q 0.088*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.091*** 
 
[3.55] [3.46] [3.55] [3.49] 
Firm Volatility  0.238** 0.215** 0.233** 0.194* 
 
[2.23] [2.03] [2.17] [1.69] 
Ln(CEO Tenure) 0.250*** 0.251*** 0.249*** 0.250*** 
 
[8.37] [8.68] [8.37] [8.29] 
PIN  1.108*** 1.014** 1.080*** 0.921** 
 
[2.87] [2.54] [2.79] [2.29] 
Cash Flow -0.026 -0.090 -0.037 -0.139 
 
[-0.15] [-0.59] [-0.22] [-0.74] 
Inst_Percent -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** 
 
[-4.63] [-5.04] [-4.59] [-5.01] 
Inst_Concentration 0.537** 0.588*** 0.532** 0.556** 
 
[2.57] [2.71] [2.54] [2.57] 
Lambda 
 
0.114** 
 
0.253** 
  
[2.16] 
 
[2.00] 
Constant -3.323*** -2.187*** -3.310*** -2.490*** 
 
[-8.52] [-4.53] [-8.45] [-6.71] 
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes 
     
Observations 6,955 6,736 6,955 6,418 
R-squared 0.290 0.294 0.291 0.298 
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Differences between coefficients 
  β1 − β2 -0.059 -0.059 -0.029 -0.036 
 
[2.33] [2.46] [0.58] [0.65] 
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Table 13: Effect of Directors from Related Industries (DRIs) on the Sensitivity of Forced CEO Turnovers to Stock Returns 
This table presents evidence on the effect of DRIs on the sensitivity of forced CEO turnovers to stock returns. The dependent variable in both Panel A and Panel B, Forced CEO 
Turnover is a dummy variable that equals one if the incumbent CEO departs involuntarily. In both panels, all columns use the vertical-relatedness threshold of 1% to identify related 
industries. DumDRIOUT is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has at least one outside director from a related industry of its primary segment. Independent DRI is a dummy 
variable that equals one if at least one outside DRI of the firm is identified as independent in the IRRC database. Non-Co-opted DRI is a dummy variable that equals one if at least 
one outside DRI of the firm has been appointed before the incumbent CEO. Mkt_Adj_Return is the cumulative market-adjusted return over the twelve months prior to the fiscal year 
end. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix A. In both panels, Columns (2), (4) and (6) use the Heckman treatment effects model to control for the potential 
endogeneity problems. The sample used for estimation excludes financial and utility firms and is from 1993 to 2005. All specifications include year and Fama-French industry 
dummies (Fama and French, 1997). Robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level are reported in square brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Panel A: Specifications with the interaction of market-adjusted stock returns with the DRI Measure=1 and DRI Measure=0. 
Dependent Variable: Forced CEO Turnover 
DRI Measure: DumDRIOUT Independent DRI Non-Co-opted DRI 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Logit Heckman Logit Heckman Logit Heckman 
Mkt_Adj_Return x DRI Measure=1 -0.741*** -0.725*** -0.336*** -0.310** -0.147 -0.459 
 
[-3.13] [-3.03] [-2.77] [-2.48] [-0.23] [-0.65] 
Mkt_Adj_Return x DRI Measure=0 -0.907** -0.920** -0.913*** -0.950*** -0.911*** -0.924*** 
 
[-2.56] [-2.49] [-2.90] [-2.92] [-3.42] [-3.36] 
DRI Measure 0.242 -0.370 0.144** 0.106 1.059*** 1.106*** 
 
[1.31] [-0.64] [2.08] [1.27] [2.91] [3.05] 
Ind_Adj_ROA -0.982*** -0.940*** -2.460*** -2.706*** -2.414*** -2.727*** 
 
[-3.07] [-2.69] [-3.91] [-3.94] [-3.58] [-3.86] 
Ln(Market Value) -0.098* -0.078 -0.055 -0.055 0.003 0.004 
 
[-1.67] [-1.19] [-0.74] [-0.67] [0.04] [0.04] 
CEO-Chairman Duality -0.355** -0.285* -0.509** -0.457** -0.546** -0.565** 
 
[-2.19] [-1.68] [-2.56] [-2.22] [-2.51] [-2.45] 
CEO Age>=65 0.966*** 0.953*** 1.175*** 1.161*** 1.235*** 1.247*** 
 
[3.99] [3.84] [4.32] [4.13] [4.07] [4.04] 
CEO_Percent_Owned -3.154 -2.925 -2.225 -2.059 -2.073 -1.881 
 
[-1.49] [-1.37] [-1.08] [-1.01] [-0.88] [-0.82] 
Outsider_Controlled 0.416 0.554 0.183 0.101 0.365 0.231 
 
[1.30] [1.57] [0.51] [0.28] [0.82] [0.53] 
Lambda 
 
0.410 
 
0.198  0.094 
  
[1.14] 
 
[1.32]  [0.97] 
Constant -5.567*** -5.525*** -5.088*** -5.111*** -5.469*** -5.511*** 
 
[-4.62] [-4.60] [-3.89] [-3.79] [-3.84] [-3.72] 
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 12,898 11,853 8,653 8,031 6,921 6,447 
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.067 0.105 0.107 0.101 0.107 
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Panel B: Specifications with the interaction of the market-adjusted stock return with the DRI measure. 
Dependent Variable: Forced CEO Turnover 
DRI Measure: DumDRIOUT Independent DRI Non-Co-opted DRI 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Logit Heckman Logit Heckman Logit Heckman 
     
  
Mkt_Adj_Return x DRI Measure 0.166 0.194 0.032 0.092 0.765 0.466 
 
[0.41] [0.47] [0.22] [0.61] [1.11] [0.62] 
Mkt_Adj_Return  -0.907** -0.920** -0.913*** -0.997*** -0.911*** -0.924*** 
 
[-2.56] [-2.49] [-3.12] [-3.26] [-3.42] [-3.36] 
DRI Measure 0.242 -0.370 0.156** 0.127 1.059*** 1.106*** 
 
[1.31] [-0.64] [2.29] [1.56] [2.91] [3.05] 
Ind_Adj_ROA -0.982*** -0.940*** -2.422*** -2.697*** -2.414*** -2.727*** 
 
[-3.07] [-2.69] [-3.84] [-3.95] [-3.58] [-3.86] 
Ln(Market Value) -0.098* -0.078 -0.048 -0.043 0.003 0.004 
 
[-1.67] [-1.19] [-0.65] [-0.52] [0.04] [0.04] 
CEO-Chairman Duality -0.355** -0.285* -0.509** -0.464** -0.546** -0.565** 
 
[-2.19] [-1.68] [-2.57] [-2.27] [-2.51] [-2.45] 
CEO Age>=65 0.966*** 0.953*** 1.183*** 1.174*** 1.235*** 1.247*** 
 
[3.99] [3.84] [4.40] [4.22] [4.07] [4.04] 
CEO_Percent_Owned -3.154 -2.925 -2.178 -2.003 -2.073 -1.881 
 
[-1.49] [-1.37] [-1.07] [-0.99] [-0.88] [-0.82] 
Outsider_Controlled 0.416 0.554 0.174 0.081 0.365 0.231 
 
[1.30] [1.57] [0.49] [0.23] [0.82] [0.53] 
Lambda 
 
0.410 
 
0.172  0.094 
  
[1.14] 
 
[1.13]  [0.97] 
Constant -5.567*** -5.525*** -5.136*** -5.176*** -5.469*** -5.511*** 
 
[-4.62] [-4.60] [-3.93] [-3.83] [-3.84] [-3.72] 
     
  
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 12,898 11,853 8,653 8,031 6,921 6,447 
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.067 0.106 0.109 0.101 0.107 
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Table 14: Effect of Directors from Related Industries (DRIs) on the Sensitivity of CEO Pay to Sector Performance (PSP) 
This table presents evidence on the effect of DRIs on PSP. The dependent variable in all columns is the CEO total direct compensation (TDC). In all columns, related industries are 
identified based on the vertical-relatedness threshold of 1%. DumDRIOUT is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has at least one outside director from a related industry of 
its primary segment. Luck denotes sector performance and Skill denotes firm-specific performance estimated following Garvey and Milbourn (2006). All dollar values in the table 
are in $ millions. Columns (3) and (4) use the subsample of firms from industries with a median value for R&D Intensity (Median_R&D) that is zero, while Columns (5) and (6) 
use the subsample of firms from industries with a positive median value for R&D Intensity. R&D Intensity is defined as the ratio of research and development expenditures to total 
assets. In Columns (2), (4) and (6), the Heckman treatment effects model is used to control for the potential endogeneity problem. Definitions of all variables are provided in 
Appendix A. The sample used for estimation excludes firms with a fiscal year end other than December and firms that replaced their CEO from the previous year. The sample 
period is from 1993 to 2005. All specifications include year and CEO dummies. Robust t-statistics are reported in square brackets. Heckman t-statistics are based on 100 bootstrap 
replications; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.       
Dependent Variable: TDC 
Regression Sample: Full Sample Median_R&D=0 Median_R&D>0 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
       
Luck 1.556*** 1.418*** 1.545*** 1.439*** 1.791*** 1.526*** 
 [6.12] [5.13] [5.22] [4.74] [3.44] [2.68] 
Luck x DumDRIOUT -0.077* -0.064 0.017 0.049 -0.145** -0.131** 
 [-1.66] [-1.29] [0.22] [0.59] [-2.52] [-2.33] 
Skill 0.999*** 0.910*** 1.262*** 1.113*** 0.654** 0.659** 
 [4.72] [4.40] [4.53] [3.56] [2.16] [2.07] 
Skill x DumDRIOUT -0.018 -0.013 0.039 0.082 -0.017 -0.031 
 [-0.42] [-0.31] [0.51] [1.09] [-0.31] [-0.57] 
DumDRIOUT 113.693 118.645 67.062 -95.927 186.589 51.708 
 [1.27] [0.37] [0.59] [-0.23] [1.22] [0.07] 
CDF_Variance_Luck x Luck -1.485*** -1.351*** -1.564*** -1.488*** -1.670*** -1.403** 
 [-5.58] [-4.59] [-4.92] [-4.43] [-3.10] [-2.38] 
CDF_Variance_Skill x Skill -0.996*** -0.908*** -1.331*** -1.217*** -0.636** -0.632** 
 [-4.52] [-4.22] [-4.51] [-3.56] [-2.03] [-1.99] 
CDF_Variance_Luck  2,567.696 5,361.221 2,681.453 7,073.560 -2,885.532 -10,276.384 
 [1.34] [1.28] [1.30] [1.27] [-0.33] [-0.62] 
CDF_Variance_Skill  526.383 -2,268.012 1,843.406 -2,888.693 2,810.570 9,200.975 
 [0.28] [-0.61] [0.88] [-0.55] [0.37] [0.77] 
Ln(CEO Tenure) -40.070 -53.593 -160.395 -249.015 203.560 285.797 
 [-0.28] [-0.32] [-0.82] [-1.21] [0.89] [1.20] 
Lambda  13.709  152.800  58.262 
  [0.06]  [0.58]  [0.13] 
Constant 2,857.116*** 2,872.764*** 2,784.217*** 3,278.143*** 3,228.501*** 3,587.836 
 [4.12] [3.24] [2.70] [3.08] [3.49] [1.21] 
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Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
CEO Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Observations 11,248 10,103 6,956 6,227 4,292 3,876 
R-squared 0.076 0.075 0.084 0.087 0.079 0.073 
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Table 15: Effect of Directors from Related Industries (DRIs) on the Asymmetric Sensitivity of CEO Pay to Sector Performance (PSP) 
This table presents evidence on the effect of DRIs on the asymmetry in PSP. The dependent variable in all columns is the CEO’s total direct compensation (TDC). In all columns, 
related industries are identified based on the vertical-relatedness threshold of 1%. DumDRIOUT is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has at least one outside director from a 
related industry of its primary segment. Luck denotes sector performance and Skill denotes firm-specific performance estimated following Garvey and Milbourn (2006). All dollar 
values in the table are in $ millions. LuckisUp is a dummy variable that equals one if Luck is positive. Columns (3) and (4) use the subsample of firms from industries with a median 
value for R&D Intensity (Median_R&D) that is zero, while Columns (5) and (6) use the subsample of firms from industries with a positive median value for R&D Intensity. R&D 
Intensity is defined as the ratio of research and development expenditures to total assets. In Columns (2), (4) and (6), the Heckman treatment effects model is used to control for the 
potential endogeneity problem. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix A. The sample used for estimation excludes firms with a fiscal year end other than December 
and firms that replaced the CEO from the previous year. The sample period is from 1993 to 2005. All specifications include year and CEO dummies. Robust t-statistics are reported 
in square brackets. Heckman t-statistics are based on 100 bootstrap replications; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.       
Dependent Variable: TDC 
Regression Sample: Full Sample Median_R&D=0 Median_R&D>0 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
       
LuckisUp x Luck 1.378*** 1.481*** 1.286*** 1.328*** 1.644** 1.933*** 
 [4.23] [4.45] [3.37] [3.07] [2.29] [2.67] 
LuckisUp*Luck x DumDRIOUT -0.060** -0.052* -0.017 -0.024 -0.133*** -0.111** 
 [-2.38] [-1.88] [-0.57] [-0.70] [-3.24] [-2.37] 
Luck 0.424 0.176 0.479 0.324 0.397 -0.125 
 [1.16] [0.44] [1.13] [0.67] [0.46] [-0.14] 
Skill 1.132*** 1.049*** 1.405*** 1.272*** 0.734** 0.759** 
 [5.47] [5.29] [5.08] [4.08] [2.44] [2.44] 
DumDRIOUT 121.054 124.534 90.848 -69.956 188.081 105.862 
 [1.37] [0.39] [0.81] [-0.17] [1.23] [0.14] 
CDF_Variance_Luck x Luck -1.716*** -1.568*** -1.720*** -1.601*** -1.901*** -1.661*** 
 [-6.33] [-5.28] [-5.31] [-4.91] [-3.58] [-2.87] 
CDF_Variance_Skill x Skill -1.131*** -1.043*** -1.421*** -1.285*** -0.717** -0.739** 
 [-5.13] [-4.95] [-4.76] [-3.86] [-2.28] [-2.30] 
CDF_Variance_Luck 2,381.662 4,957.371 2,403.443 6,450.635 -6,338.703 -2,820.651 
 [1.23] [1.24] [1.19] [1.17] [-0.64] [-0.19] 
CDF_Variance_Skill 230.724 -2,461.220 1,781.165 -2,793.338 5,019.356 1,359.306 
 [0.12] [-0.70] [0.85] [-0.55] [0.57] [0.12] 
Ln(CEO Tenure) -34.839 -46.623 -146.989 -233.404 222.744 277.902 
 [-0.25] [-0.28] [-0.76] [-1.13] [0.98] [1.15] 
Lambda  16.238  159.102  26.428 
  [0.08]  [0.62]  [0.06] 
Constant 2,995.885*** 3,059.635*** 2,806.868*** 3,386.023*** 3,743.703*** 3,684.579 
 [4.38] [3.51] [2.78] [3.24] [3.68] [1.34] 
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
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CEO Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Observations 11,248 10,103 6,956 6,227 4,292 3,876 
R-squared 0.081 0.081 0.090 0.093 0.084 0.079 
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I examine how stock-based incentive compensation for the CEO is designed following corporate 
acquisitions conditional on the economic nature of the acquisition. Large acquisitions represent 
significant changes in the economic environment of the firm. Furthermore, these changes are more 
likely to occur with conglomerate acquisitions. Accordingly, implications of the two mainstream 
theories of incentive compensation, i.e., efficient contracting theory and agency theory, are tested 
separately for conglomerate acquisitions. The empirical tests generally show that stock-based 
compensation is employed more intensely after conglomerate acquisitions than otherwise. Overall, the 
results documented in this paper seem consistent with the notion that greater economic uncertainties 
that are likely to follow conglomerate acquisitions induce the board to rely more heavily on stock-
based incentives, an external monitoring mechanism.  
JEL Classification: D8; J3; G3 
Keywords: CEO Incentive Compensation; Stock-Based Compensation; Board of Directors; Monitoring; 
Conglomerate Acquisitions; Target Industry; Related Industries 
 
                                                          
*
 I am grateful to Mark Chen, Nishant Dass, Omesh Kini, Vikram Nanda and Chip Ryan for helpful comments and suggestions. I 
acknowledge financial support from Max Burns Fellowship. All remaining errors are mine. Contact information: Suite 1229, 
Department of Finance, Georgia State University 35 Broad St. Atlanta, GA 30303 Email: bonal1@gsu.edu Phone: (404) 413-
7318. 
1 
 
Examining compensation contracts following important corporate events such as mergers 
and acquisitions can shed light on the dynamic nature of compensation contracts. Mergers and 
acquisitions can particularly be regarded as significant changes in the economic environment for 
the board as well as management, and are likely to lead to major shifts in the design of incentive 
compensation. It is reasonable to further argue that any such effect on incentive compensation is 
likely to be more prominent for conglomerate acquisitions. The rationale for this argument is that 
the contracting parties, i.e., the board and the CEO, remain in the same primary industry or its 
chain of economically-connected industries in the case of a related acquisition, whereas they 
enter a completely new and unrelated sector after a conglomerate acquisition. Therefore, in this 
paper, I conduct an empirical analysis of the possible effects of conglomerate acquisitions on 
CEO incentive compensation.  
The implications of conglomerate acquisitions on incentive compensation are drawn from 
the two mainstream theories of executive compensation: the efficient contracting theory (e.g., 
Holmstrom, 1979; Prendergast, 2002) and the agency theory (e.g., Berle and Means, 1932; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). The 
efficient contracting theory has two implications regarding the effect of acquisitions on incentive 
compensation. Firstly, it suggests that greater uncertainties in the post-acquisition contracting 
environment are expected to induce the board to rely more on incentive compensation 
(Prendergast, 2000; 2002). That is, the board is likely to delegate its monitoring and advisory 
functions to the stock market to a greater extent if the acquisition results in additional 
uncertainties that hinder the board’s ability to conduct its pre-acquisition level of internal 
monitoring and advising.2 This projection is formalized as the Uncertainty Hypothesis. As 
discussed earlier, the Uncertainty Hypothesis is expected to apply more to the case of unrelated 
acquisitions.  
Another implication of the efficient contracting theory is based on a different dimension of 
uncertainty that can also impact the degree of stock-based CEO compensation: uncertainty about 
the stock price, i.e., stock volatility. The efficient contracting theory predicts a negative tradeoff 
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 In Onal (2012), I study a mechanism that is likely to mitigate the board’s uncertainty about the economic 
environment: presence of directors with expertise in related industries of the firm (DRIs) on the board. As expected, 
DRIs are found to reduce the use of stock-based incentives. On the contrary, unrelated acquisitions are expected to 
increase the board’s uncertainty about the economic environment and, thereby, the use of stock-based incentives. 
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between stock-based compensation and stock volatility. The rationale for this prediction is that if 
stock volatility rises, the risk-averse CEO requires a higher premium on stock-based 
compensation which makes it costlier for the firm and is expected to induce the board to reduce 
its reliance on this incentive mechanism. Thus, another channel through which acquisitions can 
trigger changes in the sensitivity of CEO pay to the stock price (PPS) is due to their impact on 
stock volatility. More specifically, if an acquisition is followed by a more stable stock price due to 
diversification effects, then stock-based incentives become less costly for the firm. Therefore, the 
board may employ more of this mechanism after the acquisition. This projection is also more 
likely to prevail for unrelated acquisitions because the related ones are less likely to provide such 
diversification benefits. These arguments and the prediction that follows are formalized as the 
Diversification Hypothesis.  
 The arguments and predictions under the efficient contracting theory abstract away from 
the possibility that CEOs have influence over their compensation arrangements. These 
arrangements are, therefore, likely to be based on the preferences of the CEO, rather than optimal 
contracting principles. Bebchuk and Fried (2003), for example, argue that the CEO has influence 
over the set of information that the board relies on to make compensation decisions. Acquisitions 
as well as other major corporate events, on the other hand, have been proposed and shown to be 
opportunities for the CEO to extract a compensation scheme that he favors, such as one with 
lower sensitivity to poor performance (Harford and Li, 2007). Following this line of reasoning, 
the greater economic uncertainty following unrelated acquisitions is likely to allow the CEO to 
more easily manipulate the information available to the board in order to reduce his exposure to 
the stock market. Consequently, the possible negative impact on PPS is expected to be stronger 
after unrelated acquisitions than otherwise. This prediction is referred to as the Agency 
Hypothesis.  
Carrying out an empirical analysis over these non-mutually exclusive hypotheses and 
their implications requires classification of acquisitions as related and unrelated. The selection 
criteria used to identify acquisitions that are expected to have a significant and distinct impact on 
CEO compensation results in a sample of 465 acquisitions completed over the period of 1993-
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2005.3 Of these acquisitions, 194 are classified as horizontal, i.e., take place in the acquirer’s 
four-digit SIC industry. Of the remaining 271, 51 (32) are classified as vertical, i.e., in the supply 
chain of the acquirer, at the 1% (5%) vertical-relatedness threshold.4 Thus, there are a total of 
245 (226) related acquisitions at the 1% (5%) vertical-relatedness threshold.  
Having constructed the final sample of related and unrelated acquisitions, I argue that the 
board faces greater uncertainty in its monitoring/advising environment following unrelated 
acquisitions, but, at the same time, can expect a lower stock volatility due to potential 
diversification benefits of these acquisitions. Both of these two forces predict a positive 
relationship between unrelated acquisitions and PPS, while the Agency Hypothesis predicts the 
opposite. Thus, I first test whether PPS is higher or lower following unrelated acquisitions than 
otherwise, after controlling for other determinants of PPS. If it is higher, I conduct additional 
tests to illustrate whether it is lower post-acquisition stock volatility or greater uncertainty in the 
economic environment that is causing the increase. In the main test, I divide unrelated 
acquisitions into two groups based on their impact on stock volatility. The Diversification 
Hypothesis predicts a positive effect on PPS if the acquirer’s stock becomes less volatile after an 
acquisition, whereas the Uncertainty Hypothesis does not predict a systematic relationship 
between stock volatility and PPS. I also conduct a secondary test based on the argument that the 
acquiring board is likely to adjust more easily to the post-acquisition environment if it has 
members with significant roles, i.e., executive positions or directorships, in the target industry or 
its supply chain. I refer to these directors as directors from related industries of the target (DRTs) 
and expect them to reduce potential post-acquisition uncertainties faced by the acquirer’s board. 
This possibility is hinted on in the following excerpt from the popular book by Andrew R. Sorkin 
titled “Too Big To Fail". 
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 These criteria require that: (i) the deal is completed; (ii) the acquirer has zero ownership in the target prior to the 
acquisition and acquires at least 50% of the target’s outstanding shares; (iii) the deal size is at least 10% of the 
market value of the acquirer’s assets; (iv) two deals completed by the same acquirer do not overlap, i.e., there must 
be at least two years between the completion of the first deal and the announcement of the second (Harford and Li, 
2007).; (v) the acquirer is listed on the Compustat database and has the compensation data available on ExecuComp 
database; (vi) the acquirer is not in financial or utility industries.  
4
 Vertical relatedness is measured based on the input-output tables published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis in 
1992, 1997 and 2002.  
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“Everyone in the group (of Goldman Sachs board members) had a view about (a possible 
merger with) AIG… They all looked to one particular board member for direction: Edward Liddy. 
As the chief executive of Allstate, the major auto and home insurer, Liddy was the one person in 
the room with actual experience in the insurance business.”  
Andrew R. Sorkin, “Too Big To Fail”, Page 113.  
Had the Goldman Sachs’ board pursued a merger with AIG, Edward Liddy would have 
likely been pivotal in the board’s adaptation to the post-merger environment and, thereby, reduce 
any need for additional stock-based incentives. In general, the Uncertainty Hypothesis predicts 
the intensity of stock-based incentives to be greatest following conglomerate acquisitions and in 
the absence of DRTs on the acquirer’s board. The Diversification Hypothesis, on the other hand, 
attaches no role to such directors. 
As argued earlier, the Agency Hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between PPS 
and acquisitions. This prediction, however, applies particularly to firms with powerful CEOs, 
i.e., weak boards. To test this implication, boards are classified as strong and weak based on 
three governance characteristics: (i) CEO tenure; (ii) CEO-Chairman duality; (iii) whether the 
majority of the board consists of co-opted directors or not (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2010).5 
The Agency Hypothesis predicts any negative impact on PPS to be stronger for acquirers with 
weak boards.  
The first set of results is based on the ordinary least squares model. These results are 
largely consistent with the Uncertainty Hypothesis and inconsistent with the other hypotheses 
proposed in the paper. Specifically, the relationship between acquisitions and the sensitivity of 
CEO pay to the stock price is, in general, insignificant. However, unrelated acquisitions are 
followed by a significant increase in PPS, while related acquisitions are not. These findings 
appear inconsistent with the Agency Hypothesis. Furthermore, the significant effect of unrelated 
acquisitions on PPS prevails primarily in the cases where the acquisition is accompanied by an 
increase in stock volatility and in the absence of DRTs on the acquirer’s board. This evidence 
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 More specifically, firms whose CEOs have a tenure longer than the median value of CEO tenure in that year, 
whose CEO is also the chairman of the board, or with the majority of the directors who are co-opted, i.e., are 
appointed after the CEO assumed his post, are assumed to have weak boards, whereas the rest of the firms are 
assumed to have strong boards.    
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seems inconsistent with the Diversification Hypothesis. Finally, the increase in PPS prescribed 
by the efficient contracting theory seems to be implemented only by boards that are classified as 
strong. This implies that CEOs who are more likely to have control over their pay arrangements 
at least impede the enforcement of higher post-acquisition PPS. 
The results described so far use the OLS model for estimation. Thus, they need to be 
interpreted with great caution simply because corporate acquisitions are most likely to be 
endogenous events especially when their effect on CEO compensation is being investigated. In 
other words, the observed and unobserved characteristics of the acquirer such as its governance 
structure may be driving both the acquisition decision and the post-acquisition compensation 
policy. The econometric challenge faced in correcting for potential endogeneity biases in this 
setup is that there are two stages that the acquirer goes through before finalizing the acquisition 
decision and setting the compensation policy afterwards. In the first stage, it chooses whether to 
make an acquisition or not and, in the second stage, it chooses whether to acquire a related or an 
unrelated target. The tests that involve interactions with unrelated acquisitions are further 
potentially contaminated if the interaction variable is also endogenously determined. For 
example, the results based on the interaction of unrelated acquisitions with board characteristics 
such as board strength or having DRTs on the board must be interpreted with extra caution. 
I attempt to address concerns regarding such endogeneity problems partially by using a 
predictive model or instrumental variables for making unrelated acquisitions, at the expense of 
not controlling for the initial acquisition decision. The predictive model is used in the first stage 
of the Heckman treatment effects model where the second stage consists of the PPS regressions. 
The instrumental variables in a 2SLS setting are mostly drawn from the predictive model for 
unrelated acquisitions. To be specific, two or three of the following industry characteristics are 
used as instruments: (i) the natural logarithm of the number of related acquisitions in the firm’s 
four-digit SIC industry; (ii) the average pair-wise correlation of equal-weighted monthly stock 
returns between the firm’s four-digit SIC industry and its customer and supplier industries; and 
(iii) the total number of directors serving at related-industry firms that are located within one 
hundred miles of the firm’s headquarter; (iv) the natural logarithm of the total number of firms in 
related industries; (v) the natural logarithm of the number of vertically-integrated firms in the 
firm’s four-digit SIC industry. The results based on these instrumental variables and the 
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predictive model for unrelated acquisitions are always in the same direction as the main OLS 
results and are usually statistically significant.  
A final modification to the PPS regressions is necessary to disentangle the effects of 
acquisitions on PPS and the changes in other determinants of PPS such as firm size. This is done 
by controlling for the change in the determinants of PPS instead of their levels, with the 
exception of CEO tenure.6 After this modification, the overall impact of unrelated acquisitions 
on PPS remains positive but becomes statistically insignificant at conventional levels. However, 
unrelated acquisitions followed by greater stock volatility are associated with significantly higher 
PPS.  Finally, the change in total direct compensation (TDC1) and its components around 
unrelated acquisitions are examined. The evidence on TDC1 and its components is largely 
parallel to the evidence on PPS. TDC1 is significantly higher only after unrelated acquisitions 
that increase stock volatility. Neither unrelated nor related acquisitions are found to have any 
effect on cash compensation, i.e., salary and bonuses. Overall, this paper suggests that the 
economic relatedness of the target to the acquirer is an important factor in shaping the post-
acquisition incentive compensation. Formally, the empirical analyses yield support for the 
efficient contracting theory and, particularly, the notion that any shock to the economic 
environment that is accompanied by additional uncertainties such unrelated acquisitions induces 
provision of more stock-based compensation, i.e., more intense external monitoring.      
This study contributes specifically to the literature on CEO compensation (e.g., Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990; Yermack, 1995; Guay, 1999; Core and Guay, 1999; Aggarwal and Samwick, 
1999; Prendergast, 2000, 2002; Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006). It examines the implications of the efficient contracting 
theory and agency theory about the impact of significant changes in the economic environment 
on the design of compensation contracts. Thus, the paper is related most to the branch of the 
literature on the effects of corporate events, such as acquisitions, on compensation contracts 
(e.g., Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman, 2001; Bliss and Rosen, 2001; Grinstein and Hribar, 
2004; Harford and Li, 2007; Fich, Starks, and Yore, 2008). The focus in these papers has mostly 
been on the implications of agency problems on post-acquisition contracts. This paper is an 
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attempt to illustrate that the economic nature of the event and the environment that follows are 
also important determinants of compensation contracts. The post-acquisition contract seems to be 
designed in accordance with the efficient contracting theory. In a related paper, Onal (2012), I 
examine incentive contracts when the board has members who are likely to be more informed 
about the existing contracting environment. This paper, on the other hand, focuses on significant 
changes to the environment and has a dynamic framework.    
This paper also contributes to the literature on the role of corporate boards, surveyed 
extensively by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Becht, Bolton, and Roell (2003) and Adams, 
Hermalin, and Weisbach (2009). It explores the way that the acquirer’s board designs CEO 
compensation which reflects the degree to which it delegates its monitoring and advisory role to 
the stock market following acquisitions. Another closely-related branch of the literature is that on 
the substitution of different governance mechanisms (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993; Garvey 
and Swan, 2002; Cai, Liu, and Qian, 2009). I examine how the substitution of board monitoring 
with stock-based compensation is affected by related and unrelated acquisitions. Finally, this 
paper contributes to the literature on the interaction between product markets and corporate 
finance (e.g., Fee and Thomas, 2004; Kale and Shahrur, 2007). It suggests that greater 
uncertainty about product markets caused by unrelated acquisitions has ramifications for the 
design of incentive compensation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I lay out the theoretical 
background and describe the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes the data and discusses 
some summary statistics. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results and finally 
section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development 
There are two mainstream theories of executive compensation contracts: efficient 
contracting theory and agency theory. In this section, I begin with developing the hypotheses and 
predictions based on the efficient contracting theory on incentive compensation following 
acquisitions. Prendergast (2000; 2002) suggests that an important factor in the design of an 
agent’s incentive compensation is the uncertainty in the monitoring (and advising) environment 
faced by the principal. More specifically, it is more costly for the principal to monitor the agent 
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directly if the uncertainty in the environment is greater. Thus, the principal is expected to 
substitute incentive compensation for direct monitoring of the agent’s actions to a greater extent. 
As exemplified by Prendergast, a US-based company is likely to give greater incentives to its 
division manager in Armenia than its division manager in Canada. The reason for this 
discrepancy is that the company is less knowledgeable about the economic and institutional 
environment in Armenia and the set of actions that is proper for the division manager in that 
environment. One source of uncertainty of the principal about the monitoring environment can, 
thus, be his geographical distance from the agent (e.g., Alam, Chen, Ciccotello, and Ryan, 2011).  
Another reason for the principal to be highly uncertain about the optimality of the agent’s 
actions can be the distance of the principal’s industrial expertise to the industry of the agent. For 
example, managers of a division in the same sector as the firm’s primary sector are likely to be 
given lower incentive compensation than managers of a division in an unrelated sector. By the 
same logic, when the firm invests in economically distant, i.e., unrelated, industries to the firm’s 
primary industry, the difficulty for the board to monitor and judge CEO actions is likely to 
become greater. This, in turn, is expected to induce the board to employ stock-based incentives 
more intensely as an external monitoring mechanism. Formally, the sensitivity of CEO pay to the 
stock price is predicted to be higher for firms that make conglomerate acquisitions than those 
making related or no acquisitions. These arguments and the prediction that follows are referred 
to as the Uncertainty Hypothesis. 
Uncertainty Hypothesis: 
1a: CEO compensation is more sensitive to the stock price following acquisitions in 
unrelated sectors than otherwise.  
Acquisitions in unrelated industries can, however, also make stock-based compensation 
less costly to the extent that they lead to lower uncertainty about the firm’s stock price, i.e., 
lower stock volatility. This effect, too, is likely to induce the board to grant more stock-based 
compensation to the CEO after unrelated acquisitions. This idea is based on the diversification 
benefits of unrelated acquisitions and, hence, is coined the Diversification Hypothesis: 
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Diversification Hypothesis: 
2a: CEO compensation is more sensitive to the stock price following unrelated 
acquisitions than otherwise.  
If unrelated acquisitions are followed by higher stock-based incentives, it is not clear 
which of these two hypotheses can explain it better. To unravel the underlying factor that drives 
any positive impact on PPS, unrelated acquisitions that lead to lower stock volatility can be 
examined separately from those that lead to higher stock volatility. If stock-based compensation 
is higher only when the stock price becomes less volatile, then the Diversification Hypothesis is 
more likely to explain the increase in incentive compensation. Otherwise, the Uncertainty 
Hypothesis is more likely to hold. 
Uncertainty Hypothesis: 
1b: CEO compensation becomes more sensitive to the stock price following unrelated 
acquisitions than otherwise, regardless of the impact of these acquisitions on stock volatility.  
Diversification Hypothesis: 
2b: CEO compensation becomes more sensitive to the stock price for unrelated 
acquisitions that reduce stock volatility than otherwise.  
 The two hypotheses can further be tested by considering the possibility that boards are 
not equally distant in terms of their industrial expertise to the new, unrelated sector. Boards with 
members who hold significant other positions in the target industry or one of its supply-chain 
industries can be argued to face a lower degree of uncertainty about the target industry. Thus, the 
effect of greater uncertainty following unrelated acquisitions is expected to be mitigated by the 
information flow from directors about the new industry. I refer to such directors as directors from 
related industries of the target (DRTs) and formalize the respective implication as follows. 
 Uncertainty Hypothesis: 
1c: For firms that execute unrelated acquisitions, post-acquisition CEO compensation is 
less sensitive to the stock price in the presence of DRTs on the board than otherwise.  
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Under the Diversification Hypothesis, on the other hand, incentive compensation 
becomes less costly after conglomerate acquisitions regardless of the composition of the board. 
Thus, DRTs are not expected to play a role in the design of incentive compensation. 
Diversification Hypothesis: 
2c: CEO compensation becomes more sensitive to the stock price following unrelated 
acquisitions regardless of the composition of the acquirer’s board. 
The scenarios and hypotheses developed so far are solely based on the efficient 
contracting theory and abstracts away from agency problems (e.g., Berle and Means, 1932; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). More recently, Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that CEOs 
generally can influence their compensation arrangements because they can control the set of 
information accessed by the board in making these arrangements. This ability of the CEO makes 
compensation contracts part of the agency problems in public corporations, rather a solution to 
them. In addition, corporate deals such as acquisitions have been shown to form a basis for CEOs 
to extract a contract that they prefer, such as one with a higher level of compensation that is at 
the same time more stable through lower sensitivity to stock performance (e.g., Harford and Li, 
2007; Fich, Starks, and Yore, 2008). It can, therefore, be inferred from these papers that 
acquisitions provide the CEO greater flexibility to manipulate the information available to the 
board because of greater economic uncertainty facing the firm. Because these arguments are 
more likely to apply if a firm enters an economically distant sector, unrelated acquisitions are 
expected to be associated with a lower PPS and higher cash compensation.  
Agency Hypothesis: 
3a: CEO compensation becomes less sensitive to the stock price following unrelated 
acquisitions than otherwise.  
3b: The CEO receives a higher level of cash compensation following unrelated 
acquisitions than otherwise. 
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3. Data Description 
The data on mergers and acquisitions are drawn from the SDC Platinum database and 
spans 1993-2005. I use the following set of criteria to refine the sample of mergers or 
acquisitions to be examined in delineating the distinct effect of acquisitions on stock-based 
compensation: (i) the deal must be completed; (ii) the deal size must be at least 10% of the 
acquirer market value prior to the announcement; (iii) deals completed by the same acquirer in 
consecutive years must not overlap;7 (iv) the acquirer must have zero ownership in the target 
prior to the acquisition and acquire at least 50% ownership in the target; (v) the acquirer must be 
listed on the Compustat and have the compensation data available on ExecuComp. In addition, 
the acquirers from financial and utility industries are excluded because these industries are 
regulated and the pay-setting process may be subject to limitations. These sample selection 
criteria lead to a sample of 465 acquisitions completed between 1993 and 2005. Consistent with 
other studies (e.g., Grinstein and Hribar, 2004), about two-thirds of these deals, i.e., 343 deals to 
be precise, are completed in the same year that they are announced. Most of the rest of the deals, 
i.e., 119 deals, close in the fiscal year that follows the announcement year.  
Table 1 provides the distribution of these acquisitions by Fama-French industry 
categories (Fama and French, 1997). Among the industries with most frequent acquisition 
activity are Business Services with 71 and Electronic Equipment with 45 acquisitions. 
Classification of acquisitions as related and unrelated is based on four-digit SIC codes of the 
target and the acquirer. If the target and the acquirer have the same four-digit SIC codes, the 
acquisition is classified as a horizontal acquisition. If the target is in one of the supplier or 
customer industries of the acquirer’s primary industry, the acquisition is classified as a vertical 
one. Customer and supplier industries are identified based on the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ 
input-output (IO) tables that provide information on the trading activity between industries in the 
US. For every pair of IO codes, vertical-relatedness coefficients (VRC) are constructed. 
Specifically, for a given pair of industries, industry i and j, if the proportion of the output of 
industry i sold to industry j is a% and the proportion of the input of industry i bought from 
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 As defined by Harford and Li (2007), two deals completed by the same bidder do not overlap if the gap between 
the completion of the first deal and the announcement of the second one is at least two years.  
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industry j is b%, then the VRC between industry i and industry j is a% + b%. If this sum is at 
least 1% (5%), industry i and industry j are classified as vertically related at 1% (5%). The IO 
tables are updated every five years. Therefore, acquisitions completed in years from 1993 to 
1996 are matched to the VRCs from 1992 using the concordance table for IO and SIC codes. 
Acquisitions completed between 1997 and 2001 and those between 2002 and 2005 are matched 
to the VRCs from 1997 and 2002, respectively, using the concordance tables for NAICS and IO 
codes for the respective year. Deals for which the acquirer’s VRC with the target is at least 1% 
(5%) are then classified as vertical acquisitions at 1% (5%). This process results in classification 
of 194 deals as horizontally related. Among the remaining 271 deals, 51 (32) deals are classified 
as vertically related at the 1% (5%) vertical-relatedness threshold. Thus, the total number of 
related deals comes to 245 and 226 for the 1% and 5% vertical-relatedness thresholds, 
respectively. The distributions of horizontal and vertical acquisitions by Fama-French industries 
are also presented in Table 1. Table 2 provides the distribution of all deals as well as the 
horizontal and vertical ones by the completion year. Finally, Table 3 provides some of the deal 
characteristics such as the deal size to see if there are any systematic differences between related 
and unrelated deals. Related deals seem to be larger deals than the unrelated ones, although this 
difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Deal size relative to the acquirer’s 
value of assets prior to the announcement year (Deal-to-Acquirer), however, is significantly 
higher for related acquisitions than unrelated ones. Other deal characteristics are largely similar 
across the two subsamples.  
A relevant board characteristic in this paper is based on the possibility that the acquirer 
may have a director with expertise in the target industry on its board. Testing the empirical 
implications of this possibility requires identification of acquirers, if any, with such board 
members. The process used here follows directly from the classification of deals as related and 
unrelated. Formally, a director of the acquirer who is at the same time an executive or a director 
in an industry that has the same four-digit SIC code as the target industry is classified as 
horizontally related to the target. Similarly, a director who has such positions in an industry with 
which the target industry has a VRC of at least 1% (5%) is classified as vertically related to the 
target at 1% (5%). These directors of the acquirer are referred to as directors related to the target 
or shortly DRTs. As shown in Table 4, there are 55 (38) acquirers with at least one director who 
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is vertically-related at 1% (5%) and 24 acquirers with at least one director horizontally-related to 
the target. Due to the big overlap between these two groups, there are a total of 57 (42) acquirers 
with DRTs at the 1% (5%) vertical-relatedness threshold. 
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics on variables used in the multivariate analyses. 
Dollar values are in constant 2005 dollars. All unbounded variables are winsorized at 1% and 
99%. Total direct compensation (TDC) and its components are listed first. Mean (Median) TDC 
is $4.58 million ($2.40 million). The sensitivity of CEO pay to the stock price, PPS is defined as 
the dollar change in CEO wealth for a 1% change in stock prices following Guay (1999), Core 
and Guay (1999, 2002), and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006). Option values are based on the 
Black and Scholes (1973) formula modified to account for dividends (Merton, 1973). The 
sensitivity of previously granted option and share values to stock prices is computed using the 
approximation method detailed in Core and Guay (2002). The mean (median) PPS is $579,480 
($190,940). New_PPS measure the sensitivity of the stocks and options granted in the current 
year. It has a mean (median) of $49,209 ($16,696).  
Market value of equity, which can be considered as a proxy for firm size, has a mean 
(median) of about $5.64 ($1.25) billion. Tobin’s Q is used as a proxy for growth opportunities 
and has a mean (median) of 1.91 (1.40). PIN is the yearly mean of the quarterly estimates of 
probability of informed trading used in Brown, Hillegeist and Lo (2004) and estimated based on 
the market microstructure model of Easley, Kiefer and O’hara (1997).8 The mean (median) PIN 
is about 0.15 (0.15). CEO Tenure, the number of years since the incumbent CEO assumed the 
CEO position, has a mean (median) of 7.34 (5) years. Stock Volatility is the standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns over the past five years. It has a mean (median) of 0.45 (0.40). Cash Flow 
is defined as income before extraordinary items plus amortization and depreciation divided by 
total assets. Its mean (median) is 0.09 (0.10). Finally, the data on institutional ownership are 
drawn from CDA/Spectrum. The mean (median) of percent of shares owned by institutions 
(Inst_Ownership) is 66% (68%). Finally, Inst_Concentration is the ratio of number of shares 
owned by top ten institutions to total number of shares owned by all institutions. The fewer the 
number of institutions that command all institutional ownership is, the more powerful each one 
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 PIN is the probability that the trading activity on a given stock over a given period is based on private information 
of the traders.  
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of them is expected to be as suggested by Hartzell and Starks (2003). The mean (median) 
Inst_Concentration is 58% (56%).  
Variables that are used as determinants of unrelated acquisitions are listed at the lower 
panel. Ind_Related_Deals stands for the number of related acquisitions made by firms in the 
firm’s four-digit SIC industry in a given year. It has mean (median) of 10 (1). RI_Correlation, 
the average pair-wise correlation of equal-weighted monthly returns between the firm’s four-
digit SIC industry and its related industries over three years. It has a mean (median) of 0.45 
(0.47). RI_Direc_Supply is the total number directors in the related-industry firms located within 
100 miles with the firm’s headquarters. There is a mean (median) of about 660 (348) such 
directors. Market share is based on the firm’s sale and has a mean (median) of 0.12 (0.05). HHI 
is also based on sales and has a mean (median) of 0.21 (0.17). Book leverage is defined as long-
term debt plus short-term debt divided by total assets. Its mean (median) is 0.22 (0.20). Multi-
Segment has a mean of 0.38, meaning that about 38% of all firms in the sample have multiple 
divisions. At 61% of all firms, CEO also serves as the chairman of the board. Proportion of 
outside director serving on the board is 73%, on average. Finally, both the mean and the median 
of board size are 9.  
 4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. The Impact of Acquisitions on the Sensitivity of CEO Pay to the Stock Price   
 To examine the impact of all acquisitions on the sensitivity of CEO pay to the stock price 
(PPS), I use the following specification.     
∆(PPS)it-1, t+1 (or New_PPSit+1) =β0 + β1 Acqt +  β2  Ln(Market Valueit+1 ) + β3 Tobin’s Qit+!  +  
                                                          β4 Stock Volatilityit+1+ β5 Ln(CEO Tenure)it+1+ β6 Cash Flowit+! +  
                                                          β7 PIN it+1 + β8 Inst_Ownership it+1 + β9 Inst_Concentration it+1 +  
                                                         Year and Industry Dummies + εIt                                                                   (1)  
 This specification is estimated for all ExecuComp firms. The dependent variable is either 
the change in the portfolio of new and existing stock-based incentives of the CEO between year 
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t-1 and t+1 (∆(PPS)it-1, t+1) or the new grants of incentives (New_PPSit+1) in year t+1.9 PPS is 
formally measured as the sensitivity of CEO wealth to a 1% change in firm i’s stock price, 
following Core and Guay (1999, 2002) and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) among others. 
According to Baker and Hall (2004), this measure of incentives is related to CEO choices that 
affect percentage returns to the firm such as setting the firm’s strategy and is found to apply 
better to the arguments made in this paper. In other words, uncertainties in the environment are 
expected to hinder the ability of the board to monitor or provide advice on strategic choices of 
the CEO.10 The main explanatory variable, Acqt is a dummy variable that equals one if firm i has 
executed an acquisition in year t and zero otherwise.  
 Other explanatory variables, measured in the fiscal year t+1, are drawn from the literature 
on the sensitivity of CEO pay to the stock price. Market Value, as a proxy for firm size, has been 
used to control for CEO talent, difficulty of monitoring and CEO wealth (e.g., Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985; Smith and Watts, 1992; Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia, 1999; Baker and Hall, 
2004).11 Hence, it is predicted to be positively related to PPS. Tobin’s Q is employed to control 
for growth opportunities (e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992). Stock Volatility is argued by one strand 
of the literature to be correlated with the uncertainty in the environment and, thus, is expected to 
be positively related to PPS (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Core and Guay, 1999). However, it 
is a more direct measure of the uncertainty about the stock price which is expected to reduce the 
use of stock-based compensation as the CEO is assumed to be risk averse (e.g., Aggarwal and 
Samwick, 1999). Hence, its net effect on PPS is ambiguous and is found to be sensitive to the 
specification that is estimated.12  
 Ln(CEO Tenure) is used as a proxy for potential horizon problems (Dechow and Sloan, 
1991), weaker career (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992) or reputational concerns (Milbourn, 2003) 
that arise as the CEO approaches retirement. To control for availability of cash flows for 
compensation or the need for higher incentives due to the free cash flow problem (e.g., Jensen, 
                                                          
9
 The main results and inferences in the paper are similar when the change in PPS between t+1 and t (or t+1 and t-2) 
is used as the dependent variable. ∆(PPS)it+1, t-1 is chosen to match the change in incentives for acquirers relative to 
the pre-acquisition year.  
10 The alternative incentives measure, i.e., sensitivity of CEO pay to a $1,000 dollar change in firm value, is argued 
to be associated with CEO choices that affect dollar returns to the firm such as buying a corporate jet, as exemplified 
by Baker and Hall. 
11
 CEO wealth captures CEO risk aversion. Wealthier CEOs are projected to be less risk averse. 
12
 Prendergast (1999) provides a review of this literature. 
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1986), I include Cash Flow which is defined as the sum of income before extraordinary items, 
depreciation and amortization scaled by total assets. Following Hartzell and Starks (2003) and 
Kang and Liu (2008), I control for the impact of institutional investors on PPS using percent of 
institutional ownership and the concentration of institutional ownership in the firm. To the extent 
that it limits informed trading of the firm’s stock, institutional ownership can mitigate 
informativeness of the stock price and reduce the reliance on PPS (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993). 
Concentrated institutional ownership, on the other hand, is expected to capture the intensity of 
institutional investors’ influence over the board and is likely to lead to higher PPS. Kang and Liu 
document that PPS is positively related to stock price informativeness. Therefore, I also include 
PIN in all PPS regressions to control for stock price informativeness. I exclude finance and 
utility firms as boards of these regulated firms may not have full control over the pay-setting 
process. Finally, I include year and 48 Fama-French industry dummies in all specifications.  
The effect of (un-)relatedness of the acquirer to the target on PPS is examined using the 
following specification. 
∆(PPS)it-1, t+1 (or New_PPSit+1) = β0 + β1 Unrelated_Acqt, 1% (5%) + β2 Related_Acqt, 1% (5%) +  
                                                     Control Variables + εIt                                                      (2) 
Unrelated_Acqt, 1% (5%) is a dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer and the target 
have the same four-digit SIC code or if the target is vertically related to the acquirer at the 1% 
(5%) vertical relatedness threshold. Related_Acqt, 1% (5%) is a dummy variable that equals one if 
the acquirer and the target do not have the same four-digit SIC code and the target is not in the 
supply chain of the acquirer based on the 1% (5%) vertical relatedness threshold. The control 
variables consist of those listed in Specification (1). 
The first set of results is presented in Table 6. As can be seen in Columns (1) of Panel A, 
acquisitions altogether do not have a significant effect on the change in the sensitivity of CEO 
pay to the stock price, consistent with Harford and Li (2007). In Columns (2) and (3) where 
acquirers in unrelated sectors are compared to the rest of the ExecuComp firms, unrelated 
acquisitions are found to be associated with a higher PPS, both at the 1% and 5% vertical-
relatedness thresholds. In columns (4) and (5), it is seen that related acquisitions do not have a 
significant impact on the acquirer’s incentive compensation policy. This implies that, unlike the 
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unrelated ones, related acquisitions do not cause major changes in the economic environment 
and, thus, do not require adjustments to stock-based incentives. At the bottom of the panel, it is 
also documented that unrelated acquisitions are followed by significantly higher stock-based 
incentives than related acquisitions. In Panel B, the dependent variable measures the sensitivity 
of new grants of stocks and options to the stock price and a similar pattern is observed. Overall, 
these results seem consistent with the efficient contracting theory and inconsistent with the 
Agency Hypothesis.  
Coefficients of control variables are sometimes in different directions as found by related 
studies, due to the fact that dependent variables employed in this study are different. In Panel A, 
market value of equity, Tobin’s Q, CEO tenure and PIN are positively related to the change in 
PPS as expected. Although Stock Volatility is positively related to the level of PPS (e.g., Core 
and Guay, 1999), it has a significantly negative effect on the change in PPS. This suggests that 
firms with greater uncertainty about their stock price tend to lower PPS over time, although the 
level of PPS still remains higher than that of firms with lower stock volatility. Other variables 
are not associated with a significant change in PPS. In Panel B, the effect of CEO tenure and 
cash flow on new incentives is different from their effects on the level of PPS. These findings 
imply that the extent to which new stocks and options are granted is lower after the CEO has 
accumulated significant ownership in the firm and when the firm generates larger cash flows 
with which more cash compensation can be paid.13  
4.1.1. Uncertainty Hypothesis versus Diversification Hypothesis   
In the previous section, it is documented that unrelated acquisitions are associated with a 
higher sensitivity of CEO pay to the stock price. This result, however, is consistent with both the 
Uncertainty Hypothesis and the Diversification Hypothesis. In this section, I attempt to unravel 
the main force driving the effect of unrelated acquisitions on incentive compensation. To that 
end, I first split unrelated acquisitions into two groups based their effect on stock volatility. One 
group of acquisitions lead to a higher post-acquisition stock volatility than pre-acquisition 
volatility and the other group lead a lower post-acquisition stock volatility than pre-acquisition 
volatility. Under the Diversification Hypothesis¸ the positive impact on PPS is expected to hold 
                                                          
13
 As will be seen in the results for cash compensation, cash compensation is positively related to cash flows. 
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for the group of acquisitions that lower stock volatility. The Uncertainty Hypothesis, on the other 
hand, predicts the opposite pattern to the extent that increased uncertainty in the environment 
dictates itself in higher stock volatility. 
The following extension of Specification (1) is used to test whether the effect of unrelated 
acquisitions on PPS is due to lower or higher post-acquisition volatility.   
∆(PPS)it-1, t+1 (or New_PPSit+1)=β0 + β1 (Higher Volatility)it-1, t+1 x Unrelated_Acqt, 1% (5%) + 
                                                                                 
β2 (Lower Volatility)it-1, t+1 x Unrelated_Acqt, 1% (5%) +   
                                                   Control Variables + εIt                         (3) 
In Specification (3), Lower Volatility is a dummy variable that equals one if post-
acquisition stock volatility is lower than pre-acquisition volatility for unrelated acquisitions. 
Higher Volatility is a dummy variable that equals one if post-acquisition stock volatility is higher 
than or equal to its pre-acquisition value. Stock volatility, here, is defined as the annual standard 
deviation of the daily returns. Control Variables include the other explanatory variables in 
Specification (1). The results from estimation of Specification (3) are presented in Table 7. The 
coefficient of Higher Volatility x Unrelated_Acq1% (5%) is positive and significant while that of 
Lower Volatility x Unrelated_Acq
 1% (5%) is insignificant. This finding seems inconsistent with the 
Diversification Hypothesis. To the extent that annual stock volatility is correlated with the 
uncertainty in the contracting environment, it is consistent with the Uncertainty Hypothesis. In 
other words, greater uncertainty following unrelated acquisitions seems to induce the board of 
the acquirer to resort more to stock-based incentives.  
The second approach used to test the Uncertainty Hypothesis against the Diversification 
Hypothesis focuses on the heterogeneity among acquirer board members in their familiarity with 
the target. Specifically, acquirer directors who hold executive positions or director seats in 
industries that are vertically or horizontally related to the target industry are argued to be more 
informed about the target. These directors, referred to as DRTs shortly, are expected to fill the 
information gap that causes the board’s uncertainty to grow after entering a new and unrelated 
sector. Hence, under the Uncertainty Hypothesis, unrelated acquisitions are associated with 
greater need for PPS due to greater uncertainty, but this need is mitigated if there is a DRT on the 
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acquirer’s board. The Diversification Hypothesis, on the other hand, does not attach a role to 
DRTs. 
To test the effect of DRTs on PPS, the following specification is estimated. 
∆(PPS)it-1, t+1 (or New_PPSit+1)= β0 + β1 DRT=0 x Unrelated_Acqt, 1% (5%) +  
                                                    β2 DRT=1 x Unrelated_Acqt, 1% (5%) +   
                                                   Control Variables + εIt                  (4)  
The main explanatory variable in this specification, DRT is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the acquisition is an unrelated one and the acquirer has at least one director from industries 
that are horizontally or vertically related to the target industry. Other variables follow from the 
earlier specifications. Under the Uncertainty Hypothesis, acquirers with no DRTs are expected to 
account for the overall positive impact of unrelated acquisitions on PPS. The results presented in 
Table 8 seem consistent with the Uncertainty Hypothesis for the 1% vertical-relatedness 
threshold. Acquirers with no DRTs based on this threshold are the ones that have a significantly 
higher PPS than non-acquirers. This effect, however, is weaker for the 5% vertical-relatedness 
threshold possibly due to the inclusion of DRTs identified at the 1% relatedness threshold in the 
no-DRT group of acquirers. Another weakness in these results is that the coefficient of DRT=1 x 
Unrelated_Acqt, 1% (5%), β2 is larger in magnitude than the coefficient of DRT=0 x 
Unrelated_Acqt, 1% (5%). This is most likely caused by a few outliers in the sample of unrelated 
acquisitions that involve DRTs.  
4.1.2. Strong Boards versus Weak Boards  
  In this section, I explore the impact of unrelated acquisitions on incentive compensation 
conditional on the acquirer’s board strength. For this purpose, I use various definitions to classify 
boards as strong and weak vis-à-vis the CEO. Using these classifications, I estimate the 
following extension of Specification (1) to examine the behavior of strong boards relative to 
weak boards around related and unrelated acquisitions.            
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∆(PPS)it-1, t+1 (or New_PPSit+1) = β0 + β1 Strong Boardit+1 x Unrelated_Acqt, 1% (5%) +  
                                                     β2 Weak Boardit+1 x Unrelated_Acqt, 1% (5%) + 
                                                    β3 Strong Boardit+1 + Control Variables + εIt                     (5)  
Following Harford and Li (2007) and in line with Hermalin and Weisbach’s (1998) 
model, Strong Boardit is first defined as a dummy variable that equals one if CEO Tenure is 
below the median value of CEO Tenure in year t. Weak Boardit+1 is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the board is not strong, i.e., Strong Boardit+1 is equal to zero. The second 
classification is based on CEO-Chairman duality. This classification assumes that the board is 
weak, if the CEO is also the chairman of the board. The final classification follows Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen (2010) and classifies boards with a majority of co-opted directors, i.e., those 
who are appointed after the CEO assumed the CEO post, as weak boards. Boards with a minority 
of co-opted directors, on the other hand, are classified as strong boards. 
The results from estimation of Specification (5) are presented in Table 9. The interaction 
of unrelated acquisitions with Strong Boardit is positively and significantly related to PPS, while 
that with Weak Boardit is not, for all classifications of strong and weak boards. This implies that 
higher stock-based incentives following unrelated acquisitions are adopted mainly when the 
board is likely to have more control over compensation arrangements. Hence, it can be 
concluded that the role of boards in incentive design can only partly be explained by the 
managerial power theory and the uncertainty in the environment is another critical dimension 
that should be taken into account in compensation studies.    
4.1.3. Controlling for Endogeneity with Instrumental Variables and the Heckman Treatment 
Effects Model 
Although the inferences made in the previous sections provide insights on the 
relationship between acquisitions and stock-based compensation, they are based on OLS 
estimators and are subject to two-layered endogeneity problems associated with the events under 
consideration. The first layer involves the acquisition decision and the second layer involves the 
decision to acquire in related and unrelated sectors. The acquisition and the compensation 
policies of a given firm are likely to be determined simultaneously by observed and unobserved 
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factors. In this section, a step toward finer inferences is taken by utilizing two alternative 
estimation methods to at least account for the endogeneity problem in the second layer: (i) using 
instrumental variables for the choice of acquiring in unrelated sectors and the 2SLS model for 
estimation; (ii) constructing a model to predict acquisitions in unrelated sectors and using this 
model in the first stage of the Heckman treatment effects model.  
The predictive model used for unrelated acquisitions is as follows: 
Unrelated_Acqit =β0 + β1 Ln(Ind_Related_Deals)it-1+  β2  RI_Correlationit-1 + β3  Ln(RI_Direc_Supply)it-1 +  
                               β4 (Tobin’s Q/Ind_Q)it-1+ β5 Ln(Market Value)it-1+ β6  Market Shareit-1+ β7  HHIit-1+  
                              β8 Book Leverageit-1+ β9 Multi-Segmentit-1+ β10 Chairman-CEOit-1+ β8 Prop_Outsideit-1+ 
                              β10 Ln(Board Size) it-1+ Year and Industry Dummies + εIt                                        (6)  
All explanatory variables in Specification (6) are measured with one year lag relative to 
the dependent variable Unrelated_Acqit. The first variable, Ln(Ind_Rel_Deals) is the natural 
logarithm of the number of related deals in the firm’s four-digit SIC industry. If its competitors 
pursue vertical or horizontal integration due to an economic transformation in the industry, the 
firm will also be induced to pursue a related acquisition and forgo any opportunity in unrelated 
sectors. Hence, this variable is expected to be negatively related to unrelated acquisitions. 
Ind_Correlation
 
is the average pair-wise correlation of equal-weighted monthly returns of the 
firm’s four-digit SIC industry with its customer and supplier industries in year t-1. This variable 
is also likely to be negatively related to unrelated acquisitions because if the correlation is higher, 
that means the firm is more strongly connected to its related industries and a move outside its 
related industries may jeopardize the firm’s competitiveness. RI_Direc_Supply is the total 
number, i.e., supply, of directors at related-industry firms that are located within one hundred 
miles of the firm’s headquarter. Dass et al. (2011) find that firms are more likely to appoint 
directors from their related industries when the supply of these directors is greater. As board 
members, these directors may, then, have incentive to reduce the likelihood of unrelated 
acquisitions as their role on the boards of these firms as well as their future employment 
opportunities may suffer from such acquisitions. RI_Direc_Supply may also increase the 
likelihood of unrelated acquisitions, if having directors from related industries on the board is 
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treated as a means of obtaining information about related industries and/or mitigating 
coordination and contractual problems with these industries. In other words, it may serve as a 
low-cost alternative to a related acquisition. Thus, if the firm chooses to make an acquisition 
attempt, it is less likely to target a related sector from where it can appoint a director instead. 
Hence, the net effect of the supply of directors from related industries is ambiguous. 
Tobin’s Q/Ind_Q is the ratio of the firm’s Tobin’s Q to the average Tobin’s Q in the 
firm’s four-digit SIC industry, excluding the firm itself. If the firm’s Q is higher than the average 
in its industry, it is more likely to invest in sectors where the firm didn’t exhaust the growth 
opportunities. Thus, this variable is expected to be positively related to the likelihood of an 
unrelated acquisition. Firms with higher market share and those in concentrated industries are 
less likely to acquire in unrelated sectors. The rationale for this prediction is that competing in 
multiple sectors may put their competitive position in their primary sector in danger. Agency 
problems in the firm, such as CEO hubris (Roll, 1986), are also expected to affect acquisition 
decisions. Thus, a number of agency-related variables, namely the proportion of outside 
directors, CEO-Chairman duality and board size, are included in the model. As other firm 
characteristics that may affect the acquisition decision, I include firm size and leverage along 
with industry and year dummies to predict the likelihood of an unrelated acquisition. This 
specification is estimated using the Probit model and the results are presented in Panel A of 
Table 10. As expected, the number of related deals by competitors is negatively related to the 
likelihood of an unrelated acquisition. Stronger correlation with related industries also seems to 
deter the firm from expanding into unrelated sectors.  The supply of directors in related 
industries is found to have a negative impact on unrelated acquisitions and, as discussed earlier, 
one possible explanation is that these directors deter the firm from unrelated acquisitions due to 
career concerns. Among other explanatory variables, only leverage has a significant effect on 
unrelated acquisitions. Firms with higher leverage are less likely to make an unrelated 
acquisition. This is possibly because these firms are already exposed to a greater risk than firms 
with lower leverage and they are not willing or able to take on additional potential uncertainties 
associated with such acquisitions.  
Having constructed a model to predict unrelated acquisitions, I now either use certain 
variables from this model as instrumental variables in the 2SLS framework or include the whole 
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model in the first stage of the Heckman treatment effects model. Panel B of Table 10 provides 
the results on the second stage PPS regressions. In Columns (1) and (2), the 2SLS results are 
reported. Three instruments that can predict unrelated acquisitions are employed. 
Ln(Ind_Rel_Deals)it-1 and Ind_Correlationit-1 are drawn from Specification (6). The third 
instrument, Ln(Ind_Rel_Deals)it-1 is the natural logarithm of the number vertically integrated 
firms in the firm’s four-digit SIC industry and is similar in spirit to Ln(Ind_Integrated)it-1. The 
extent to which the firms in an industry choose vertically integration is likely to indicate the 
severity of coordination and contracting problems with suppliers and customers of that industry. 
Thus, a firm in such an industry is less likely to choose an unrelated acquisition over a related 
one. These instruments pass the relevance and validity tests. There is also no a priori reason to 
expect these industry characteristics to have a direct impact on post-acquisition PPS. The 
coefficients of the instruments along with the respective t-statistics from the first stage are 
reported in the lower panels of the table. As expected, Ln(Ind_Rel_Deals)it-1 and Ind_Correlation 
it-1 are negatively related to the likelihood of acquisitions in unrelated sectors. The coefficient of 
Ln(Ind_Integrated)it-1  has the expected sign, but it is statistically insignificant. The results from 
the second stage, presented in the upper panel, are similar to the OLS results. At both the 1% and 
the 5% vertical-relatedness thresholds, unrelated acquisitions are associated with a greater 
change in PPS. These results are significant at the 5% significance level. 
The results from the Heckman treatment effects model are reported in Columns (3) and 
(4). The effect of unrelated acquisitions on PPS is significant at 10% using the 1% vertical-
relatedness threshold, while it is insignificant at the 5% vertical-relatedness threshold. The 
inverse mills ratio, Lambda is negative in both columns, suggesting that the observed factors in 
the model predicting unrelated acquisitions at the same time reinforce a lower sensitivity of CEO 
pay to the stock price. However, the fact that it is insignificant in both columns possibly means 
that the model does not fully account for factors driving the acquisition decisions. Therefore, in 
the remaining analysis, I employ only the OLS and the 2SLS models. Overall, it can be 
concluded from this section that, after controlling for endogeneity biases to some extent, the 
evidence is still in the direction predicted under the efficient contracting theory, but somewhat 
weaker in terms of statistical significance. 
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4.1.3. Controlling for the Change in Control Variables 
The specifications used in the previous sections use the level of control variables in the 
year that follows the acquisitions. These specifications, however, do not control for changes in 
the determinants of the sensitivity of CEO pay to the stock price (PPS). These changes are 
themselves likely to induce adjustments in PPS. To see if acquisitions have any effect over and 
beyond these effects, I estimate Specification (1) with the change in the determinants of PPS 
between t-1 and t+1 as control variables, with the exception of CEO tenure as the change in CEO 
tenure is not likely to have a meaningful relationship with PPS. The results from this estimation 
are presented in Table 11. The OLS results are reported in Panel A. In Columns (1) and (2), it is 
seen that the coefficient of unrelated acquisitions is still positive but becomes insignificant at 
conventional levels. In Columns (3) and (4), Specification (3) is estimated with the change in 
control variables and the results imply that the effect of an unrelated acquisition on incentive 
compensation materializes only when the acquisition causes a jump in stock volatility. This, 
again, seems consistent with the Uncertainty Hypothesis and inconsistent with the 
Diversification Hypothesis. In Panel B, the 2SLS model is used to correct for endogeneity 
problems. Differently from the earlier specifications used in these models, the control variables 
in the second stage are the changes in the determinants of PPS, except for Ln(CEO Tenure). 
Similar to the OLS results reported in Panel A, the coefficient of Unrelated_Acq is positive but 
statistically insignificant at conventional levels. 
4.2. The Impact of Acquisitions on the Level of CEO Compensation and Its Components 
Inspecting the impact of unrelated acquisitions on the level of compensation can provide 
a more complete picture about the relationship between these acquisitions and compensation 
contracts. The empirical specification that will be employed is the same as Specifications (1) and 
its extensions, except that the dependent variable is the change in total direct compensation 
(TDC1), rather than PPS, between t-1 and t+1. The corresponding results are presented in Table 
12 and Table 13. In Column (1), I find that acquisitions are associated with significantly higher 
compensation, consistent with earlier studies (e.g., Bliss and Rosen, 2001). Columns (2) through 
(5) reveal that it is the unrelated acquisitions that form the basis for higher compensation.  
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The natural question that arises is whether the change in TDC1 around acquisitions is in 
the form of cash, stock, or a combination of these two components of TDC1. Panel B provides 
the results on the investigation of this question. Columns (1) and (2) use the change in cash 
compensation as the dependent variable. The coefficient of Unrelated_Acq is negative but 
insignificant in both columns. In Columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the change in the 
stock-based component of TDC1 and the CEO is found to experience a significant rise in this 
component of his total compensation around unrelated acquisitions. Elaborating further on this 
result, Columns (5) and (6) reveal that only the acquisitions that cause an increase in stock 
volatility are associated with a significantly higher stock-based compensation. Finally, in Panel 
C, I attempt to correct for endogeneity using the 2SLS models using Ln(Ind_Rel_Deals),
 
RI_Direc_Supply and Ln(RI_Firms) as instruments. The only new instrument, here, is 
Ln(RI_Firms) which is defined as the natural logarithm of the total number of firms in the firm’s 
related industries. These instruments also pass the validity and relevance tests. The 2SLS results 
presented in Columns (1) and (2) are consistent with the OLS results and imply that unrelated 
acquisitions involve a rise in stock-based compensation and, thereby, total direct compensation.  
The final set of results on total direct compensation is provided in Table 13. The only 
difference from the earlier regressions on TDC1 is that I control for changes in the determinants 
of compensation, except for Ln(CEO Tenure). Similar to the PPS results using the same set of 
control variables, the overall effect of unrelated acquisitions on TDC1 and its stock component is 
mostly insignificant. However, it is positive and significant for those that increase the uncertainty 
about the firm’s stock price. Overall, the results on TDC1 and its components confirm those 
obtained on PPS and are generally consistent with the Uncertainty Hypothesis.  
5. Conclusion 
  Studying incentive compensation policy in a dynamic framework can provide valuable 
insights. In this paper, I examine stock-based CEO compensation following significant 
acquisitions in unrelated sectors. Such an analysis is important for at least three reasons. Firstly, 
entry into completely new sectors can exacerbate the ability of the board to monitor and advise 
which, in turn, is likely to require adjustments to stock-based incentives given to the CEO. More 
specifically, the board, facing additional uncertainties in the new sector, may choose to delegate 
26 
 
its functions to stock investors to a greater extent by giving the CEO more stock-based 
compensation. Under this scenario, the effect of unrelated acquisitions on stock-based incentives 
is expected to be positive. Secondly, it is possible that after an unrelated acquisition, the firm’s 
stock price becomes less volatile, making stock-based incentives less costly. Thus, under this 
second scenario, unrelated acquisitions that indeed reduce stock volatility are expected to be 
associated with a significant increase in stock-based incentives. Finally, CEOs may take 
advantage of unrelated acquisitions, i.e., significant shocks to the firm’s economic environment, 
to enforce changes in their compensation scheme that they prefer. Because the CEO, as a risk-
averse agent, prefers to reduce his exposure to the stock market, the relationship between stock-
based incentives and unrelated acquisitions is likely to be negative. The net effect of unrelated 
acquisitions, then, is a pure empirical question. The paper presents evidence that seems 
consistent with the first scenario and inconsistent with the other two scenarios. Specifically, the 
sensitivity of CEO pay to the stock price is generally higher following unrelated acquisitions that 
increase stock volatility. In conclusion, this paper suggests that the effect of a corporate event on 
incentive compensation policy depends largely on the economic nature of the event and how it 
affects the contracting environment of the firm. 
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Appendix A: Definition of Variables Used in the Empirical Analysis 
Variable  Source Definition 
Acq SDC Platinum 
Dummy variable that equals one if the firm completed an acquisition in the 
preceding year. 
Related_Acq 
SDC 
Platinum 
and BEA 
Dummy variable that equals one if the firm completed a horizontally- or 
vertically-related acquisition in the preceding year (at the 1% or 5% vertical-
relatedness thresholds). The acquisition is horizontally-related if the target is 
in the same four-digit SIC code as the acquirer. Vertically-related targets are 
identified using the Input-Output tables published by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) every five years. 
 
Unrelated_Acq 
SDC 
Platinum 
and BEA 
Dummy variable that equals one if the firm completed an unrelated 
acquisition in the preceding year. 
 DRT (Directors from 
Related Industries of the 
Target) 
Compact 
Disclosure 
and BEA 
Dummy variable that equals one if the firm completed an unrelated 
acquisition in the preceding year and has a director from the same four-digit 
SIC industry as the target industry or vertically-related industries of the 
target industry (at the 1% or 5% vertical-relatedness thresholds).  
Compensation Variables 
Cash Compensation ExecuComp Sum of salary and bonus 
Option Grants ExecuComp Black-Scholes value of options granted in the current fiscal year 
Restricted Stock Grants ExecuComp Value of restricted stock granted in the current fiscal year 
Total Direct 
Compensation (TDC1) ExecuComp 
Sum of salary, bonus,  other annual compensation, long-term incentive 
payouts, grant-date value of restricted stock and grant-date value of stock 
options and other compensation 
New_PPS ExecuComp Change in the value of CEO’s portfolio of stock and option grants in the 
current year for a 1% change in stock price 
PPS ExecuComp Change in the value of CEO’s portfolio of all stock and option holdings for a 1% change in stock price 
Other Firm  and Industry Characteristics 
CEO Tenure ExecuComp Number of years in CEO position 
Inst_Ownership CDA/ Spectrum Proportion of all outstanding shares owned by institutions 
Inst_Concentration CDA/ Spectrum 
Ratio of total number of shares owned by top ten institutions to all shares 
owned by institutions  
Firm Size Compustat Market value of equity 
PIN Stephen Brown Yearly mean of quarterly estimates of Stephen Brown 
Tobin’s Q Compustat Sum of market value of equity (Data 25 times Data 199) and book debt 
scaled by total assets 
Stock Volatility ExecuComp Standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the past five years 
Cash Flow Compustat Income before extraordinary items (Data 18)  plus amortization and depreciation (Data 14) scaled by total assets 
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Ind_Related_Deals SDC Platinum 
Natural logarithm of the number of related acquisitions made in the firm’s 
four-digit SIC industry 
RI_Correlation CRSP 
Average pair-wise correlation of equal-weighted stock returns of the firm’s 
industry with its customer and supplier  industries, calculated using monthly 
returns over three years  
RI_Direc_Supply Compact Disclosure 
Number of directors at related-industry firms located within a radius of 100 
miles of the headquarters of the firm 
Market Share Compustat Ratio of firm sales to industry sales 
HHI Compustat Sum of square of the market shares of all firms in the firm’s four-digit SIC industry 
Book Leverage Compustat Sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets 
Multi-Segment Compustat Dummy variable that equals one if the firm has two or more segments 
Chairman-CEO Compact Disclosure Dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board 
Prop_Outside Compact Disclosure Proportion of Outside Directors on the board 
Board Size Compact Disclosure Number of directors on the board 
Deal Characteristics   
Deal Size ($millions) SDC Platinum Transaction value in 2005 dollars 
Deal-to-Acquirer SDC Platinum 
Ratio of the transaction value to acquirer’s market value in the fiscal year 
prior to the deal announcement (restricted to be at least 10%). 
Percent_Acquired SDC Platinum Percent of shares that the bidder acquired 
Tender Dummy  SDC Platinum Dummy variable that equals one if the bid is a tender offer 
Hostile Dummy SDC Platinum  Dummy variable that equals one if the bid is unsolicited 
Cash Dummy SDC Platinum  Dummy variable that equals one if the means of payment is 100% cash 
Stock Dummy SDC Platinum  Dummy variable that equals one if the means of payment is 100% stock 
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Table 1: Distribution of the Final Sample of Acquisitions by Industry 
This table presents the distribution of the final sample of all acquisitions together and the sample of 
horizontal and vertical acquisitions at the 1% and 5% vertical-relatedness thresholds separately by 
Fama-French industry categories (Fama and French, 1997). The sample period is from 1993 to 2005. 
The sample excludes financial and utility industries. Definitions of all variables are provided in 
Appendix A.  
Industry Category All Deals Horizontal Vertical at 1% Vertical at 5% 
Agriculture 1 0 0 0 
Food Products 7 0 2 2 
Alcoholic Beverages 2 2 0 0 
Tobacco Products 1 0 0 0 
Recreational Products 4 1 1 1 
Entertainment 11 3 1 1 
Printing and Publishing 9 4 1 1 
Consumer Goods 4 1 0 0 
Apparel 9 3 2 2 
Healthcare 16 11 0 0 
Medical Equipment 15 6 3 1 
Pharmaceutical Products 14 4 1 1 
Chemicals 14 4 1 0 
Rubber and Plastic Products 1 0 1 0 
Textiles 4 3 0 0 
Construction Materials 9 1 0 0 
Construction 10 4 0 0 
Steel Works, Etc. 12 3 1 0 
Fabricated Products 2 0 0 0 
Machinery 26 9 1 1 
Electrical Equipment 7 2 1 1 
Miscellaneous 2 1 0 0 
Automobiles and Trucks 5 1 0 0 
Aircraft 2 1 0 0 
Shipbuilding, Railroad 
Equipment 
2 2 0 0 
Defense 2 0 0 0 
Precious Metals 2 2 0 0 
Nonmetallic Mining 1 0 0 0 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 25 20 2 1 
Telecommunications 10 4 1 1 
Personal Services 3 1 1 1 
Business Services 71 32 11 6 
Computers 29 12 5 5 
Electronic Equipment 45 20 4 2 
Measuring and Control 
Equipment 
16 5 4 3 
Business Supplies 8 2 1 0 
Transportation 6 3 1 1 
Wholesale 23 7 2 1 
Retail 26 11 3 0 
Restaurant, Hotel, Motel 9 9 0 0 
Total 465 194 51 32 
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Table 2: Distribution of the Final Sample of Acquisitions by Year 
This table presents the distribution of the final sample of all acquisitions together and the sample 
of horizontal and vertical acquisitions at the 1% and 5% vertical-relatedness thresholds 
separately by the effective year of the acquisitions. The sample period is from 1993 to 2005. 
The sample excludes financial and utility industries. Definitions of all variables are provided in 
Appendix A.  
Effective Year All Deals Horizontal Vertical at 1% Vertical at 5% 
1993 12 6 2 1 
1994 40 19 1 0 
1995 33 14 5 4 
1996 48 21 4 3 
1997 41 15 5 3 
1998 39 12 5 2 
1999 58 22 10 5 
2000 47 20 4 2 
2001 36 17 4 4 
2002 22 8 3 2 
2003 30 14 3 2 
2004 46 17 5 4 
2005 13 9 0 0 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics on Deal Characteristics 
This table presents descriptive statistics on the deal characteristics of the final sample of acquisitions. The sample 
period is from 1993 to 2005. The sample excludes financial and utility industries. Definitions of all variables are 
provided in Appendix A. All unbounded variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. All dollar values are in 2005 
constant dollars.  
All Acquisitions N Mean Median Min 25% 75% Max Std Dev 
Deal Size ($millions) 465 1,801.82 268.45 13.77 103.47 1,053.44 44,724.11 5,463.55 
Deal-to-Acquirer 465 0.42 0.27 0.11 0.17 0.51 1.99 0.38 
Percent_Acquired 465 99.85 100.00 63.70 100.00 100.00 100.00 2.02 
Tender Dummy  465 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.32 
Hostile Dummy 465 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.15 
Cash Dummy 465 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.37 
Stock Dummy 465 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.47 
         
Related Acquisitions N Mean Median Min 25% 75% Max Std Dev 
Deal Size ($millions) 245 1,917.67 386.88 13.77 140.34 1,233.85 44,724.11 5,610.94 
Deal-to-Acquirer 245 0.46 0.31 0.11 0.17 0.61 1.99 0.40 
Percent_Acquired 245 99.78 100.00 63.70 100.00 100.00 100.00 2.58 
Tender Dummy  245 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.34 
Hostile Dummy 245 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.19 
Cash Dummy 245 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.38 
Stock Dummy 245 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.49 
         
Unrelated Acquisitions N Mean Median Min 25% 75% Max Std Dev 
Deal Size ($millions) 220 1,672.81 192.17 13.77 89.78 853.56 44,724.11 5,304.38 
Deal-to-Acquirer 220 0.37 0.24 0.11 0.16 0.40 1.99 0.36 
Percent_Acquired 220 99.93 100.00 84.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 1.08 
Tender Dummy  220 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.30 
Hostile Dummy 220 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.10 
Cash Dummy 220 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.37 
Stock Dummy 220 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.43 
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Table 4: Acquirer Directors from Related Industries of the Target (DRTs) 
This table presents the number of cases where the acquirer has at least one board member from 
the same four-digit SIC industry as the target’s primary sector or the supply-chain of the 
target’s primary sector. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix A. The sample 
period is from 1993 to 2005.  
 N 
Acquirers with Directors from Customer or Supplier Industries of 
the Primary Sector of the Target (Vertically-Related) at 1% (5%)  
55 (38) 
Acquirers with Directors from the Primary Sector of the Target 
(Horizontally-Related) 
24 
Acquirers with Directors from either Vertically- or Horizontally-
Related Industries of the Primary Sector of the Target at 1% (5%) 
57 (42) 
 
 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics on the Variables Used in the Empirical Analysis 
This table presents descriptive statistics on the variables employed in the following empirical analyses. The sample period is from 1993 to 
2005. The sample excludes financial and utility industries. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix A. All unbounded 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. All dollar values are in 2005 constant dollars. 
Compensation Variables N Mean Median Min 25% 75% Max Std Dev 
Salary ($000s) 12,454 685.49 624.82 0.00 437.50 879.43 1,947.19 341.36 
Bonus ($000s) 12,454 689.51 393.54 0.00 93.55 882.21 7,033.61 967.74 
Option Grants ($000s) 12,373 2,212.66 743.92 0.00 59.36 2,304.72 27,987.90 4,180.09 
Restricted Stock Grants ($000s) 12,454 482.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10,865.85 1,570.90 
Total Direct Compensation ($000s) 12,373 4,483.99 2,404.53 200.41 1,214.64 5,148.75 38,883.61 6,001.08 
New_PPS ($000s) 12,454 49.21 16.70 0.00 2.70 51.34 636.52 93.23 
PPS ($000s) 12,454 579.48 190.94 0.00 68.96 512.10 10,690.83 1,294.80 
         
Control Variables in PPS Regressions 
Market Value  ($millions) 12,454 5,643.09 1,251.86 30.16 500.85 3,984.30 98,679.41 13,871.53 
Tobin’s Q 12,454 1.91 1.40 0.15 0.97 2.21 9.26 1.55 
PIN  12,454 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.11 0.19 0.70 0.06 
CEO Tenure (Years) 12,454 7.34 5.00 0.00 2.00 10.00 35.00 7.34 
Stock Volatility 12,454 0.45 0.40 0.14 0.30 0.56 1.23 0.21 
Cash Flow 12,454 0.09 0.10 -0.49 0.06 0.14 0.30 0.11 
Inst_Ownership (%) 12,454 65.89 68.20 0.36 52.65 81.21 99.99 20.45 
Inst_Concentration 12,454 0.58 0.56 0.24 0.47 0.66 1.00 0.14 
         
Additional Variables used as Determinants of Unrelated Acquisitions 
Ind_Related_Deals 12,454 10.44 1.00 0.00 0.00 6.00 168.00 29.12 
RI_Correlation 11,840 0.45 0.47 -0.10 0.37 0.54 0.73 0.12 
RI_Direc_Supply 12,340 659.63 384.00 0.00 139.00 861.50 3,784.00 783.10 
Market Share 12,398 0.12 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.16 1.00 0.18 
HHI 12,454 0.21 0.17 0.03 0.09 0.28 1.00 0.16 
Book Leverage 12,454 0.22 0.20 0.00 0.06 0.33 3.39 0.19 
Multi-Segment 12,454 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.49 
Chairman-CEO 12,340 0.61 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.49 
Prop_Outside 12,340 0.73 0.75 0.00 0.67 0.85 1.00 0.17 
Board Size 12,340 8.96 9.00 1.00 7.00 11.00 19.00 2.95 
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Table 6: The Effect of Acquisitions on the Sensitivity of CEO Pay to the Stock Price (PPS) 
This table presents evidence on the effect of all, related and unrelated acquisitions on PPS. The sample period is from 
1993 to 2005. The dependent variable in Panel A,  (∆PPS)t-1, t+1 is the change in the sensitivity of CEO to the stock 
price between year t-1 and t+1. The dependent variable in Panel B, New_PPSt+1  is the sensitivity of stocks and 
options granted in year t+1. In both panels, Columns (2) and (5) use the 1% vertical-relatedness threshold, whereas 
Columns (3) and (6) use the 5% relatedness threshold. All columns use the OLS model for estimation. The differences 
between coefficients of interest along with the respective t-statistics are provided at the bottom of each panel. 
Definitions of all the independent variables are provided in Appendix A. Both panels include year and Fama-French 
industry dummies (Fama and French, 1997). Both panels exclude financial and utility industries. Robust t-statistics 
clustered at the firm level are reported in square brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.    
Panel A: The dependent variable is based on all stocks and options of the CEO (PPS). 
Dependent Variable: ∆(PPS)t-1, t+1 
Vertical-Relatedness Threshold: 
 
1% 5% 1% 5% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
   
  
Acq
 t 0.052 
  
  
 
[0.95] 
  
  
Unrelated_Acq
 t (β1) 
 
0.175** 0.153** 0.174** 0.153** 
  
[2.10] [1.98] [2.09] [1.97] 
Related_Acq
 t (β2) 
   
-0.053 -0.049 
    
[-0.74] [-0.65] 
Ln(Market Value)
 t+1 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 
 
[4.58] [4.58] [4.58] [4.60] [4.58] 
Tobin’s Q
 t+1 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.090*** 0.091*** 
 
[6.91] [6.91] [6.92] [6.89] [6.89] 
PIN
 t+1 0.972*** 0.970*** 0.968*** 0.971*** 0.968*** 
 
[3.93] [3.92] [3.92] [3.93] [3.92] 
Ln(CEO Tenure)
 t+1 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 
 
[8.41] [8.42] [8.42] [8.43] [8.42] 
Stock Volatility
 t+1 -0.107* -0.105* -0.106* -0.105* -0.106* 
 
[-1.81] [-1.79] [-1.81] [-1.78] [-1.80] 
Cash Flow
 t+1 -0.054 -0.052 -0.052 -0.053 -0.054 
 
[-0.58] [-0.56] [-0.56] [-0.58] [-0.58] 
Inst_Ownership
 t+1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
[0.48] [0.48] [0.47] [0.49] [0.48] 
Inst_Concentration
 t+1 -0.081 -0.079 -0.080 -0.080 -0.080 
 
[-0.83] [-0.81] [-0.82] [-0.82] [-0.82] 
Constant -0.526** -0.529** -0.526** -0.530** -0.527** 
 
[-2.06] [-2.07] [-2.06] [-2.08] [-2.07] 
    
  
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
    
  
Observations 9,546 9,546 9,546 9,546 9,546 
R-squared 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 
  
  
Differences between coefficients 
 
  
β1 − β2 
   
0.227** 0.202* 
    
[4.23] [3.43] 
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Panel B: The dependent variable is based on post-acquisition grants of stocks and options to the CEO. 
Dependent Variable: New_PPSt+1 
Vertical-Relatedness Threshold: 
 
1% 5% 1% 5% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
   
  
Acq
 t 0.010* 
  
  
 
[1.82] 
  
  
Unrelated_Acq
 t (β1) 
 
0.014* 0.013* 0.014* 0.013* 
  
[1.68] [1.71] [1.69] [1.72] 
Related_Acq
 t (β2) 
   
0.005 0.005 
    
[0.81] [0.76] 
Ln(Market Value)
 t+1 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
 
[18.44] [18.41] [18.41] [18.43] [18.43] 
Tobin’s Q
 t+1 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 
[4.61] [4.59] [4.60] [4.60] [4.60] 
PIN
 t+1 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 
 
[1.61] [1.61] [1.60] [1.60] [1.60] 
Ln(CEO Tenure)
 t+1 -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* 
 
[-1.89] [-1.87] [-1.87] [-1.88] [-1.88] 
Stock Volatility
 t+1 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 
[6.58] [6.60] [6.59] [6.60] [6.59] 
Cash Flow
 t+1 -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** 
 
[-3.72] [-3.73] [-3.73] [-3.71] [-3.71] 
Inst_Ownership
 t+1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
[1.27] [1.28] [1.28] [1.27] [1.27] 
Inst_Concentration
 t+1 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 
 
[4.55] [4.55] [4.55] [4.55] [4.55] 
Constant -0.352*** -0.352*** -0.352*** -0.352*** -0.352*** 
 
[-15.46] [-15.44] [-15.44] [-15.45] [-15.45] 
    
  
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
    
  
Observations 12,261 12,261 12,261 12,261 12,261 
R-squared 0.283 0.283 0.283 0.283 0.283 
    
  
Differences between coefficients 
 
  
β1 − β2 
   
0.009 0.008 
    
[0.60] [0.53] 
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Table 7: The Sensitivity of CEO Pay to the Stock Price (PPS) and the Change in Stock 
Volatility around Unrelated Acquisitions 
This table presents evidence on the effect of unrelated acquisitions on PPS conditional on the change in stock price 
volatility. The sample period is from 1993 to 2005. The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (2),  (∆PPS)t-1, t+1 is the 
change in the sensitivity of CEO to the stock price between year t-1 and t+1. The dependent variable in Columns (3) 
and (4), New_PPSt+1  is the sensitivity of stocks and options granted in year t+1. (Higher Volatility)t-1, t+1 is a dummy 
variable that equals of if stock volatility is higher after the unrelated acquisition than it was before. (Lower Volatility)t-
1, t+1 is a dummy variable that equals of if stock volatility is lower after the unrelated acquisition than it was before. 
Definitions of other independent variables are provided in Appendix A. Columns (1) and (3) use the 1% vertical-
relatedness threshold, whereas Columns (2) and (4) use the 5% relatedness threshold. All columns use the OLS model 
for estimation. The differences between coefficients of interest along with the respective t-statistics are provided at the 
bottom of the table. All columns include year and Fama-French industry dummies (Fama and French, 1997). All 
columns exclude financial and utility industries. Robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level are reported in square 
brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.    
Dependent Variable: ∆(PPS)t-1, t+1 New_PPSt+1 
Vertical-Relatedness Threshold: 1% 5% 1% 5% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
  
  
(Higher Volatility)t-1, t+1 x Unrelated_Acqt (β1) 0.266** 0.218* 0.029** 0.026** 
 
[2.09] [1.91] [2.14] [2.13] 
(Lower Volatility)t-1, t+1 x Unrelated_Acqt (β2) 0.071 0.072 -0.004 -0.003 
 
[0.69] [0.72] [-0.54] [-0.45] 
Ln(Market Value)t+1 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
 
[4.57] [4.57] [18.41] [18.41] 
Tobin’s Qt+1 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 
[6.91] [6.92] [4.59] [4.60] 
PINt+1 0.974*** 0.971*** 0.040 0.040 
 
[3.94] [3.93] [1.63] [1.62] 
Ln(CEO Tenure)t+1 0.108*** 0.108*** -0.002* -0.002* 
 
[8.42] [8.42] [-1.87] [-1.87] 
Stock Volatilityt+1 -0.106* -0.107* 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 
[-1.79] [-1.81] [6.61] [6.59] 
Cash Flowt+1 -0.052 -0.052 -0.037*** -0.037*** 
 
[-0.56] [-0.57] [-3.73] [-3.73] 
Inst_Ownershipt+1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
[0.49] [0.48] [1.30] [1.30] 
Inst_Concentrationt+1 -0.080 -0.080 0.047*** 0.047*** 
 
[-0.82] [-0.82] [4.53] [4.53] 
Constant -0.530** -0.526** -0.352*** -0.352*** 
 
[-2.08] [-2.06] [-15.44] [-15.43] 
   
  
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES 
   
  
Observations 9,546 9,546 12,261 12,261 
R-squared 0.073 0.073 0.284 0.284 
   
  
Differences between coefficients   
β1 − β2 0.195 0.146 0.033** 0.029** 
 
[1.40] [0.91] [4.46] [4.11] 
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Table 8: The Sensitivity of CEO Pay to the Stock Price (PPS) and Acquirer Board Members 
with Expertise in the Target Industry 
This table presents evidence on the effect of unrelated acquisitions on PPS conditional on whether acquirer has a board 
member with expertise in target’s supply chain. The sample period is from 1993 to 2005. The dependent variable in 
Columns (1) and (2),  (∆PPS)t-1, t+1 is the change in the sensitivity of CEO to the stock price between year t-1 and t+1. 
The dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4), New_PPSt+1  is the sensitivity of stocks and options granted in year 
t+1. DRT is a dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer has a board member who is at the same time an executive 
or a director in a related industry of the target. Definitions of other independent variables are provided in Appendix A. 
Columns (1) and (3) use the 1% vertical-relatedness threshold, whereas Columns (2) and (4) use the 5% relatedness 
threshold. All columns use the OLS model for estimation. The differences between coefficients of interest along with 
the respective t-statistics are provided at the bottom of the table. All columns include year and Fama-French industry 
dummies (Fama and French, 1997). All columns exclude financial and utility industries. Robust t-statistics clustered at 
the firm level are reported in square brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
     Dependent Variable: ∆(PPS)t-1, t+1 New_PPSt+1 
Vertical-Relatedness Threshold: 1% 5% 1% 5% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
  
  
Unrelated_Acqt x DRT=0 (β1) 0.153* 0.119 0.015* 0.012 
 
[1.93] [1.59] [1.73] [1.53] 
Unrelated_Acqt x DRT=1 (β2)  0.509 0.653 -0.002 0.029 
 
[0.82] [1.30] [-0.05] [0.86] 
Ln(Market Value)t+1 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
 
[4.60] [4.59] [18.45] [18.47] 
Tobin’s Qt+1 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 
[6.94] [6.95] [4.62] [4.63] 
PINt+1 0.952*** 0.947*** 0.036 0.036 
 
[3.93] [3.92] [1.49] [1.47] 
Ln(CEO Tenure)t+1 0.108*** 0.108*** -0.002* -0.002* 
 
[8.42] [8.42] [-1.82] [-1.82] 
Stock Volatilityt+1 -0.110* -0.111* 0.042*** 0.042*** 
 
[-1.88] [-1.90] [6.43] [6.41] 
Cash Flowt+1 -0.049 -0.049 -0.036*** -0.036*** 
 
[-0.53] [-0.53] [-3.65] [-3.64] 
Inst_Ownershipt+1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
[0.44] [0.44] [1.17] [1.16] 
Inst_Concentrationt+1 -0.085 -0.085 0.046*** 0.046*** 
 
[-0.86] [-0.86] [4.41] [4.41] 
Constant -0.517** -0.514** -0.351*** -0.351*** 
 
[-2.03] [-2.02] [-15.36] [-15.36] 
   
  
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
   
  
Observations 9,546 9,546 12,261 12,261 
R-squared 0.073 0.073 0.282 0.282 
   
  
Differences between coefficients   
β1 − β2 -0.356 -0.534 0.017 -0.017 
 
[0.33] [1.11] [0.18] [0.23] 
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Table 9: The Sensitivity of CEO Pay to the Stock Price (PPS) and Acquirer Board Strength    
This table presents evidence on the effect of unrelated acquisitions on PPS conditional on the strength of the board vis-à-vis 
the CEO. The sample period is from 1993 to 2005. The dependent variable in all columns,  (∆PPS)t-1, t+1 is the change in the 
sensitivity of CEO to the stock price between year t-1 and t+1. In Column (1) and (2), Strong Board is a dummy variable 
that equals one if CEO Tenure is greater than its median value in year t, whereas Weak Board is a dummy variable that 
equals one if CEO Tenure is lower than its median value in year t. In Column (3) and (4), Strong Board is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, whereas Weak Board is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
CEO is not the chairman if the board. In Column (5) and (6), Strong Board is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
majority of the directors are not appointed after the CEO assumed his post, i.e., not co-opted, whereas Weak Board is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the majority of the directors are co-opted. Definitions of other independent variables are 
provided in Appendix A. Columns (1) and (3) use the 1% vertical-relatedness threshold, whereas Columns (2) and (4) use 
the 5% relatedness threshold. All columns use the OLS model for estimation. The differences between coefficients of 
interest along with the respective t-statistics are provided at the bottom of the table. All columns include year and Fama-
French industry dummies (Fama and French, 1997). All columns exclude financial and utility industries. Robust t-statistics 
clustered at the firm level are reported in square brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Dependent Variable: ∆(PPS)t-1, t+1 
Board Strength is based on: CEO Tenure Chairman-CEO Non-Coopted 
Vertical-Relatedness Threshold: 1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
  
    
Unrelated_Acqt x Strong Boardt+1 (β1) 0.227* 0.204* 0.340** 0.313* 0.357** 0.333** 
 
[1.89] [1.85] [2.03] [1.94] [2.06] [2.05] 
Unrelated_Acqt  x Weak Boardt+1 (β2) 0.129 0.106 0.071 0.057 0.049 0.025 
 
[1.02] [0.90] [0.76] [0.66] [0.40] [0.22] 
Strong Boardt+1 0.039 0.039 -0.046** -0.046** -0.094*** -0.094*** 
 
[1.36] [1.35] [-2.32] [-2.32] [-3.51] [-3.52] 
Ln(Market Value)t+1 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.038** 0.038** 
 
[4.48] [4.47] [4.46] [4.46] [2.24] [2.23] 
Tobin’s Qt+1 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 
 
[6.93] [6.93] [7.02] [7.01] [6.65] [6.64] 
PINt+1 0.854*** 0.852*** 0.954*** 0.952*** 0.818** 0.816** 
 
[3.13] [3.12] [3.50] [3.49] [2.29] [2.29] 
Ln(CEO Tenure)t+1 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 
 
[7.06] [7.05] [8.31] [8.31] [4.86] [4.86] 
Stock Volatilityt+1 -0.104* -0.105* -0.119** -0.119** -0.389*** -0.390*** 
 
[-1.80] [-1.81] [-2.06] [-2.07] [-4.68] [-4.68] 
Cash Flowt+1 -0.031 -0.031 -0.015 -0.014 -0.113 -0.113 
 
[-0.32] [-0.32] [-0.15] [-0.15] [-0.77] [-0.77] 
Inst_Ownershipt+1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 
[0.64] [0.64] [0.26] [0.26] [0.91] [0.91] 
Inst_Concentrationt+1 -0.085 -0.085 -0.115 -0.115 -0.203* -0.204* 
 
[-0.89] [-0.89] [-1.16] [-1.16] [-1.67] [-1.67] 
Constant -0.726*** -0.724*** -1.071*** -1.069*** -0.102 -0.099 
 
[-2.81] [-2.80] [-5.50] [-5.49] [-0.36] [-0.35] 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
   
    
Observations 9,505 9,505 9,608 9,608 6,715 6,715 
R-squared 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.080 0.079 
   
    
Differences between coefficients     
β1 − β2 0.098 0.098 0.269 0.256 0.308 0.308 
 
[0.28] [0.33] [1.92] [1.92] [2.09] [2.43] 
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Table 10: The Sensitivity of CEO Pay to the Stock Price (PPS) After Correcting for Endogeneity 
This table presents evidence on the effect of unrelated acquisitions on PPS using the 2SLS model with instrumental variables or 
the Heckman treatment effects model for estimation. The sample period is from 1993 to 2005. Panel A reports the results from the 
first stage of the Heckman treatment effects model which is a predictive model for unrelated acquisitions. The dependent variable, 
Unrelated_Acqt is a dummy variable that equals one if the acquisition is classified as an unrelated one. Column (1) uses the 1% 
vertical relatedness threshold, whereas Columns (2) uses the 5% relatedness threshold. Both columns use the Probit Model for 
estimation. The dependent variable in Panel B,  (∆PPS)t-1, t+1 is the change in the sensitivity of CEO to the stock price between 
year t-1 and t+1. Columns (1) and (3) use the 1% vertical-relatedness threshold, whereas Columns (2) and (4) use the 5% 
relatedness threshold. Columns (1) and (2) use the 2SLS Model and Columns (3) and (4) use the Heckman treatment effects 
model for estimation. The coefficients of the instrumental variables used in Columns (1) and (2) are reported at the bottom of the 
panel along with the respective t-statistics. Ln(IndRelatedDeals)t-1 is the natural logarithm of the number of related acquisitions by 
all firms in the firm’s four-digit SIC industry at t-1. RI_Correlationt-1 is the average pair-wise correlation of equal-weighted stock 
returns between the firm’s four-digit SIC industry and its customer and supplier industries, calculated using monthly returns from 
t-3 to t-1. Ln(Ind_Integrated)t-1 is the natural logarithm of the number of vertically-integrated firms in the firm’s four-digit SIC 
industry at t-1. Definitions of all other variables used in the table are provided in Appendix A. In both panels, all columns include 
year and Fama-French industry dummies (Fama and French, 1997) and exclude financial and utility industries. Robust t-statistics 
clustered at the firm level are reported in square brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.    
Panel A: Determinants of Unrelated Acquisitions 
Dependent Variable: Unrelated_Acqt 
Vertical-Relatedness Threshold: 1% 5% 
  (1) (2) 
  
  Ln(Ind_Related_Deals)t-1 -0.067* -0.056 
 
[-1.74] [-1.55] 
RI_Correlationt-1 -0.764** -0.718** 
 
[-2.03] [-1.99] 
Ln(RI_Direc_Supply)t-1 -0.032 -0.036* 
 
[-1.43] [-1.67] 
(Tobin’s Q/Ind_Q)t-1 0.007 -0.014 
 
[0.17] [-0.37] 
Ln(Market Value)t-1 -0.033 -0.027 
 
[-1.23] [-1.05] 
Market Sharet-1 0.346 0.334 
 
[1.27] [1.31] 
HHIt-1 -0.280 -0.168 
 
[-0.81] [-0.53] 
Book Leveraget-1 -0.811*** -0.910*** 
 
[-3.36] [-3.78] 
Multi-Segmentt-1 0.115 0.103 
 
[1.52] [1.40] 
Chairman-CEOt-1 -0.053 -0.007 
 
[-0.78] [-0.10] 
Prop_Outsidet-1 0.203 0.213 
 
[0.98] [1.04] 
Ln(Board Size)t-1 0.018 0.020 
 
[0.19] [0.22] 
Constant -1.314*** -1.329*** 
 
[-3.57] [-3.77] 
   
Year Dummies YES YES 
Industry Dummies YES YES 
   
Observations 9,278 9,351 
R-squared 0.059 0.056 
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Panel B: The Effect of Unrelated Acquisitions on PPS using 2SLS and Heckman Treatment effects models. 
Dependent Variable: ∆(PPS)t-1, t+1 
Estimation Model: 2SLS Heckman Treatment 
Vertical-Relatedness Threshold: 1% 5% 1% 5% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
  
  
Unrelated_Acqt   10.863** 10.456** 1.404* 1.212 
 
[1.97] [2.05] [1.73] [1.49] 
Ln(Market Value)t+1 0.052** 0.041* 0.053*** 0.053*** 
 
[2.42] [1.74] [3.66] [3.65] 
Tobin’s Qt+1 0.105*** 0.110*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 
 
[5.83] [5.80] [7.00] [7.02] 
PINt+1 0.791* 0.593 0.931*** 0.930*** 
 
[1.76] [1.24] [3.49] [3.50] 
Ln(CEO Tenure)t+1 0.111*** 0.108*** 0.105*** 0.104*** 
 
[5.59] [5.52] [7.60] [7.61] 
Stock Volatilityt+1 -0.106 -0.170 -0.126* -0.127* 
 
[-0.98] [-1.48] [-1.87] [-1.89] 
Cash Flowt+1 0.288 0.288 -0.025 -0.023 
 
[1.11] [1.14] [-0.24] [-0.23] 
Inst_Ownershipt+1 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
 
[-0.27] [-0.42] [1.02] [1.02] 
Inst_Concentrationt+1 0.052 0.047 -0.097 -0.096 
 
[0.29] [0.26] [-0.90] [-0.90] 
Lambda 
  
-0.489 -0.424 
   
[-1.50] [-1.28] 
Constant -0.840*** -0.676** -0.974*** -0.263 
 
[-2.72] [-2.10] [-3.59] [-1.36] 
   
  
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES 
   
  
Observations 8,714 8,714 8,144 8,214 
R-Squared 
  
0.077 0.077 
Hansen J p-value 0.141 0.185   
Sargan C p-value 0.004 0.003   
Anderson-Rubin p-value <0.001 <0.001   
F-Statistic  2.30* 2.46*   
First-Stage Coefficients  
  
  
   
  
Ln(Ind_Related_Deals)t-1 -0.002* -0.002*   
 
[1.92] [1.76]   
RI_Correlationt-1  -0.025* -0.025   
 
[1.68] [1.62]   
Ln(Ind_Integrated)t-1 -0.004 -0.001   
 
[0.23] [0.53]   
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Table 11: The Effect of Acquisitions on the Sensitivity of CEO Pay to the Stock Price (PPS) After 
Controlling for Changes in Other Determinants  
This table presents evidence on the effect of unrelated acquisitions on PPS controlling for changes in other determinants of PPS with 
the exception of CEO tenure. The sample period is from 1993 to 2005. Panel A uses the OLS model, while Panel B uses the 2SLS 
model for estimation. The dependent variable in both panels,  (∆PPS)t-1, t+1 is the change in the sensitivity of CEO to the stock price 
between year t-1 and t+1. In Panel A, (Higher Volatility)t-1, t+1 is a dummy variable that equals of if stock volatility is higher after the 
unrelated acquisition than it was before. (Lower Volatility)t-1, t+1 is a dummy variable that equals of if stock volatility is lower after the 
unrelated acquisition than it was before. Columns (1) and (3) use the 1% vertical-relatedness threshold, whereas Columns (2) and (4) 
use the 5% relatedness threshold. The differences between coefficients of interest along with the respective t-statistics are provided at 
the bottom of the panel. In Panel B, the coefficients of the instrumental variables used in the 2SLS model are reported at the bottom 
of the panel along with the respective t-statistics. Ln(IndRelatedDeals)t-1 is the natural logarithm of the number of related acquisitions 
by all firms in the firm’s four-digit SIC industry. RI_Direc_Supplyt-1 is the total number directors in the related-industry firms located 
within one hundred miles with the firm’s headquarters. Column (1) use the 1% vertical-relatedness threshold, whereas Columns (2) 
use the 5% relatedness threshold. Definitions of all other variables are provided in Appendix A. In both panels, all columns include 
year and Fama-French industry dummies (Fama and French, 1997) and exclude financial and utility industries. Robust t-statistics 
clustered at the firm level are reported in square brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.    
Panel A: The Effect of Unrelated Acquisitions on PPS using the OLS model. 
Dependent Variable: ∆(PPS)t-1, t+1 
Vertical-Relatedness Threshold: 1% 5% 1% 5% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
  
  
Unrelated_Acq
 t 0.114 0.097   
 
[1.44] [1.31]   
(Higher Volatility)t-1, t+1 x Unrelated_Acqt (β1)  
  
0.202* 0.172 
   
[1.74] [1.60] 
(Lower Volatility)t-1, t+1 x Unrelated_Acqt (β2) 
  
0.005 0.001 
   
[0.05] [0.01] 
∆(Ln(Market Value))t-1, t+1 0.286*** 0.286*** 0.286*** 0.286*** 
 
[8.52] [8.52] [8.51] [8.51] 
∆( Tobin’s Q)t-1, t+1 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 
 
[5.29] [5.29] [5.28] [5.29] 
∆( PIN)t-1, t+1 0.037 0.035 0.044 0.040 
 
[0.14] [0.13] [0.17] [0.16] 
Ln(CEO Tenure)
 t+1 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 
 
[7.93] [7.92] [7.93] [7.92] 
∆( Stock Volatility)t-1, t+1 -0.325* -0.325* -0.328* -0.329* 
 
[-1.92] [-1.93] [-1.94] [-1.95] 
∆( Cash Flow)t-1, t+1 -0.250*** -0.250*** -0.250*** -0.251*** 
 
[-2.88] [-2.89] [-2.89] [-2.89] 
∆( Inst_Ownership)t-1, t+1 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
[-3.18] [-3.18] [-3.16] [-3.17] 
∆(Inst_Concentration)t-1, t+1 0.112 0.113 0.113 0.114 
 
[1.12] [1.13] [1.13] [1.14] 
Constant -0.054 -0.054 -0.054 -0.054 
 
[-0.29] [-0.29] [-0.29] [-0.29] 
   
  
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES 
   
  
Observations 8,632 8,632 8,632 8,632 
R-squared 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 
   
  
Differences between coefficients   
β1 − β2 
  
0.197 0.171 
   
[1.73] [1.42] 
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Panel B: The Effect of Unrelated Acquisitions on PPS using 2SLS model. 
Dependent Variable: ∆(PPS)t-1, t+1 
Estimation Model: 2SLS 
Vertical-Relatedness Threshold: 1% 5% 
  (1) (2) 
  
  Unrelated_Acqt   6.386 6.362 
 
[1.48] [1.43] 
∆(Ln(Market Value))t-1, t+1 0.186** 0.171* 
 
[2.49] [1.94] 
∆( Tobin’s Q)t-1, t+1 0.133*** 0.138*** 
 
[4.69] [4.30] 
∆( PIN)t-1, t+1 0.334 0.218 
 
[0.98] [0.67] 
Ln(CEO Tenure)
 t+1 0.111*** 0.110*** 
 
[6.92] [6.92] 
∆( Stock Volatility)t-1, t+1 -0.409* -0.480* 
 
[-1.85] [-1.88] 
∆( Cash Flow)t-1, t+1 0.170 0.205 
 
[0.54] [0.58] 
∆( Inst_Ownership)t-1, t+1 -0.002* -0.002* 
 
[-1.93] [-1.95] 
∆(Inst_Concentration)t-1, t+1 0.028 0.058 
 
[0.19] [0.41] 
Constant -0.231** -0.227** 
 
[-2.30] [-2.28] 
   
Year Dummies YES YES 
Industry Dummies YES YES 
   
Observations 8,632 8,632 
Hansen J p-value 0.218 0.219 
Sargan C p-value 0.0932 0.0909 
Anderson-Rubin p-value 0.0736 0.0736 
F-Statistic  3.516** 2.906* 
First-Stage Coefficients  
  
   
Ln(Ind_Related_Deals)t-1 -0.002* -0.002* 
 
[2.09] [1.96] 
RI_Direc_Supplyt-1  -0.000* -0.000* 
 
[1.76] [1.69] 
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Table 12: The Effect of Acquisitions on the Level of CEO Compensation (TDC1) and Its Cash and 
Stock-Based Components 
This table presents evidence on the effect of all, related and unrelated acquisitions on total direct compensation (TDC1) and its cash 
and stock-based components. The sample period is from 1993 to 2005. All columns in Panel A and B use the OLS model for 
estimation, while Panel C uses the 2SLS model for estimation. In Panel A, the dependent variable in all columns is (∆ TDC1)t-1, t+1, 
the change in TDC1 between t-1 and t+1. TDC1 is the sum of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, long-term incentive 
payouts, grant-date value of restricted stock and grant-date value of stock options and other compensation. Columns (1) and (3) use 
the 1% vertical-relatedness threshold, whereas Columns (2) and (4) use the 5% relatedness threshold. In Panel B, the dependent 
variable in Columns (1) and (2) is ∆(TotalCash)t-1, t+1, the change in cash compensation between t-1 and t+1, while that in Columns 
(3)-(6) is ∆(TotalStock)t-1, t+1, the change in stock-based compensation between t-1 and t+1. Columns (1), (3) and (6) use the 1% 
vertical-relatedness threshold, whereas Columns (2), (4) and (6) use the 5% relatedness threshold. (Higher Volatility)t-1, t+1 is a 
dummy variable that equals of if stock volatility is higher after the unrelated acquisition than it was before. (Lower Volatility)t-1, t+1 
is a dummy variable that equals of if stock volatility is lower after the unrelated acquisition than it was before. In Panels A and B, 
the differences between coefficients of interest along with the respective t-statistics are provided at the bottom of each panel. In 
Panel C, the dependent variable in Column (1) is ∆(TDC1)t-1, t+1 and that in Column (2) is ∆(TotalStock)t-1, t+1. Both columns use the 
1% vertical-relatedness threshold. The coefficients of the instrumental variables used in the 2SLS model are reported at the bottom 
of the panel along with the respective t-statistics. Ln(IndRelatedDeals)t-1  is the natural logarithm of the number of related 
acquisitions by all firms in the firm’s four-digit SIC industry at t-1. RI_Direc_Supplyt-1 is the total number directors in the related-
industry firms located within one hundred miles with the firm’s headquarters at t-1. Ln(RI_Firms)t-1 is the natural logarithm of the 
number of related-industry firms in customer and supplier industries of the firm’s four-digit SIC industry at t-1. Definitions of all 
other variables used in the table are provided in Appendix A. In all panels, all columns include year and Fama-French industry 
dummies (Fama and French, 1997) and exclude financial and utility industries. Robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level are 
reported in square brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.    
  Panel A: The dependent variable is the change in TDC1 around acquisitions. 
Dependent Variable: ∆(TDC1)t-1, t+1 
Vertical-Relatedness Threshold: 
 
1% 5% 1% 5% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
    
  
Acqt 0.741* 
  
  
 
[1.80] 
  
  
Unrelated_Acqt (β1) 
 
1.105* 1.017* 1.112* 1.024* 
  
[1.88] [1.87] [1.89] [1.88] 
Related_Acqt (β2) 
   
0.421 0.454 
    
[0.75] [0.75] 
Ln(Market Value)t+1 0.374*** 0.376*** 0.375*** 0.375*** 0.374*** 
 
[4.70] [4.70] [4.69] [4.70] [4.69] 
Tobin’s Qt+1 0.382*** 0.381*** 0.381*** 0.382*** 0.382*** 
 
[5.62] [5.60] [5.60] [5.61] [5.61] 
PINt+1 5.538*** 5.542*** 5.527*** 5.534*** 5.526*** 
 
[3.32] [3.32] [3.31] [3.32] [3.31] 
Ln(CEO Tenure)t+1 -0.042 -0.042 -0.042 -0.042 -0.042 
 
[-0.67] [-0.66] [-0.66] [-0.66] [-0.67] 
Stock Volatilityt+1 0.401 0.410 0.404 0.406 0.402 
 
[1.00] [1.02] [1.01] [1.01] [1.00] 
Cash Flowt+1 -0.732 -0.742 -0.744 -0.730 -0.731 
 
[-1.14] [-1.16] [-1.16] [-1.14] [-1.14] 
Inst_Ownershipt+1 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
[0.89] [0.91] [0.91] [0.89] [0.89] 
Inst_Concentrationt+1 -1.312** -1.312** -1.313** -1.308** -1.310** 
 
[-2.45] [-2.45] [-2.46] [-2.45] [-2.45] 
Constant -4.795*** -4.809*** -4.796*** -4.800*** -4.792*** 
 
[-3.91] [-3.91] [-3.90] [-3.91] [-3.90] 
    
  
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
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Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
    
  
Observations 9,464 9,464 9,464 9,464 9,464 
R-squared 0.049 0.050 0.049 0.050 0.050 
    
  
Differences between coefficients 
 
  
β1 − β2 
   
0.691 0.570 
    
[0.73] [0.49] 
 
 
Panel B: The dependent variables are changes in the components of TDC1. 
 
∆(TotalCash)t-1, t+1 ∆(TotalStock)t-1, t+1 
Vertical-Relatedness Threshold: 1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
   
  
 
Unrelated_ Acqt -0.042 -0.090 1.164** 1.144**   
 
[-0.70] [-1.47] [2.04] [2.16]   
(Higher Volatility)t-1, t+1 x Unrelated_Acqt (β1)  
   
 1.888** 1.710** 
    
 [2.12] [2.14] 
(Lower Volatility)t-1, t+1 x Unrelated_Acqt (β2) 
   
 0.334 0.432 
    
 [0.52] [0.69] 
Ln(Market Value)t+1 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.277*** 0.275*** 0.276*** 0.274*** 
 
[7.30] [7.30] [3.72] [3.71] [3.71] [3.69] 
Tobin’s Qt+1 0.002 0.002 0.388*** 0.388*** 0.387*** 0.388*** 
 
[0.29] [0.28] [5.85] [5.85] [5.85] [5.86] 
PINt+1 0.783*** 0.786*** 4.209*** 4.189*** 4.247*** 4.219*** 
 
[3.65] [3.66] [2.64] [2.63] [2.66] [2.65] 
Ln(CEO Tenure)t+1 0.056*** 0.056*** -0.215*** -0.216*** -0.215*** -0.216*** 
 
[5.19] [5.19] [-3.76] [-3.76] [-3.75] [-3.76] 
Stock Volatilityt+1 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.132 0.126 0.131 0.124 
 
[3.74] [3.74] [0.35] [0.33] [0.35] [0.33] 
Cash Flowt+1 0.268*** 0.267*** -0.930 -0.929 -0.933 -0.932 
 
[3.40] [3.38] [-1.54] [-1.54] [-1.55] [-1.55] 
Inst_Ownershipt+1 -0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
[-0.38] [-0.37] [1.33] [1.32] [1.35] [1.34] 
Inst_Concentrationt+1 -0.238*** -0.239*** -0.837* -0.837* -0.841* -0.843* 
 
[-2.95] [-2.96] [-1.65] [-1.65] [-1.65] [-1.66] 
Constant -0.461 -0.463 -4.664*** -4.649*** -4.661*** -4.642*** 
 
[-1.39] [-1.40] [-4.44] [-4.43] [-4.43] [-4.42] 
    
   
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
    
   
Observations 9,593 9,593 9,464 9,464 9,464 9,464 
R-squared 0.058 0.058 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 
       
Differences between coefficients     
β1 − β2     1.554 1.278 
     [2.01] [1.60] 
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Panel C: The Effect of Unrelated Acquisitions on TDC and its stock component using 2SLS model. 
Estimation Model: 2SLS 
Dependent Variable: ∆(TDC)t-1, t+1 ∆(TotalStock)t-1, t+1 
  (1) (2) 
  
  Unrelated_Acqt   69.942** 58.097** 
 
[2.09] [2.01] 
Ln(Market Value)t+1 0.316** 0.229** 
 
[2.40] [2.00] 
Tobin’s Qt+1 0.433*** 0.433*** 
 
[4.36] [4.88] 
PINt+1 3.654 2.653 
 
[1.26] [1.05] 
Ln(CEO Tenure)t+1 -0.049 -0.225** 
 
[-0.43] [-2.33] 
Stock Volatilityt+1 0.582 0.161 
 
[0.80] [0.26] 
Cash Flowt+1 1.492 0.852 
 
[0.97] [0.64] 
Inst_Ownershipt+1 -0.001 0.000 
 
[-0.14] [0.08] 
Inst_Concentrationt+1 -0.019 0.312 
 
[-0.02] [0.29] 
Constant -3.625* -2.729* 
 
[-1.93] [-1.67] 
   
Year Dummies YES YES 
Industry Dummies YES YES 
   
Observations 9,004 9,004 
Hansen J p-value 0.937 0.888 
Sargan C p-value <0.001 0.001 
Anderson-Rubin p-value 0.004 0.008 
F-Statistic  2.09* 2.09* 
First-Stage Coefficients  
  
   
Ln(Ind_Related_Deals)t-1 -0.002* -0.002* 
 
[1.84] [1.84] 
RI_Direc_Supplyt-1  -0.000* -0.000* 
 
[1.70] [1.70] 
Ln(RI_Firms)t-1 -0.001 -0.001 
 
[1.22] [1.22] 
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Table 13: The Effect of Acquisitions on the Level of CEO Compensation (TDC) After Controlling for 
Changes in Other Determinants  
This table presents evidence on the effect of unrelated acquisitions on TDC1 controlling for changes in other determinants of 
TDC1 with the exception of CEO tenure. The sample period is from 1993 to 2005. Panel A uses the OLS model for estimation, 
while Panel B uses the 2SLS model for estimation. In Panel A, the dependent variable in Columns (1) and (2) is  (∆ TDC1)t-1, t+1, 
the change in TDC1 between t-1 and t+1. TDC1 is the sum of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, long-term incentive 
payouts, grant-date value of restricted stock and grant-date value of stock options and other compensation. The dependent 
variable in Columns (3) and (4) is ∆(TotalStock)t-1, t+1, the change in stock-based compensation between t-1 and t+1. (Higher 
Volatility)t-1, t+1 is a dummy variable that equals of if stock volatility is higher after the unrelated acquisition than it was before. 
(Lower Volatility)t-1, t+1 is a dummy variable that equals of if stock volatility is lower after the unrelated acquisition than it was 
before. The differences between coefficients of interest along with the respective t-statistics are provided at the bottom of the 
panel. In Panel B, the dependent variable in Column (1) is ∆(TDC1)t-1, t+1 and that in Column (2) is ∆(TotalStock)t-1, t+1. The 
coefficients of the instrumental variables used in the 2SLS model are reported at the bottom of the panel along with the respective 
t-statistics. Ln(IndRelatedDeals)t-1 is the natural logarithm of the number of related acquisitions by all firms in the firm’s four-
digit SIC industry at t-1. RI_Direc_Supplyt-1 is the total number directors in the related-industry firms located within one hundred 
miles with the firm’s headquarters at t-1. Ln(RI_Firms)t-1 is the natural logarithm of the number of related-industry firms in 
customer and supplier industries of the firm’s four-digit SIC industry at t-1. Definitions of all other variables used in the table are 
provided in Appendix A. In both panels, all columns use the 1% vertical-relatedness threshold. In both panels, all columns include 
year and Fama-French industry dummies (Fama and French, 1997) and exclude financial and utility industries. Robust t-statistics 
clustered at the firm level are reported in square brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Panel A: The Effect of Unrelated Acquisitions on TDC and its stock component using the OLS model. 
Dependent Variable: ∆(TDC)t-1, t+1 ∆(TotalStock)t-1, t+1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
  
  
Unrelated_Acq
 t 0.620 
 
0.735  
 
[1.02] 
 
[1.25]  
(Higher Volatility)t-1, t+1 x Unrelated_Acqt (β1) 
 
1.586*  1.623* 
  
[1.66]  [1.74] 
(Lower Volatility)t-1, t+1 x Unrelated_Acqt (β2) 
 
-0.579  -0.367 
  
[-0.93]  [-0.60] 
∆(Ln(Market Value))t-1, t+1 1.786*** 1.785*** 1.320*** 1.319*** 
 
[9.71] [9.72] [7.72] [7.73] 
∆( Tobin’s Q)t-1, t+1 0.112 0.112 0.155 0.155 
 
[0.97] [0.96] [1.39] [1.39] 
∆( PIN)t-1, t+1 -0.611 -0.534 -0.967 -0.895 
 
[-0.38] [-0.33] [-0.60] [-0.55] 
Ln(CEO Tenure)
 t+1 -0.056 -0.056 -0.214*** -0.214*** 
 
[-0.92] [-0.92] [-3.89] [-3.89] 
∆( Stock Volatility)t-1, t+1 1.862** 1.820* 1.217 1.178 
 
[2.00] [1.95] [1.43] [1.38] 
∆( Cash Flow)t-1, t+1 -1.687** -1.692** -2.076*** -2.081*** 
 
[-2.16] [-2.17] [-2.78] [-2.79] 
∆( Inst_Ownership)t-1, t+1 -0.011* -0.010* -0.007 -0.006 
 
[-1.69] [-1.66] [-1.09] [-1.06] 
∆(Inst_Concentration)t-1, t+1 -0.133 -0.121 0.351 0.361 
 
[-0.19] [-0.17] [0.52] [0.53] 
Constant 4.777** 4.769** -0.846* -0.852* 
 
[2.26] [2.25] [-1.74] [-1.76] 
   
  
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES 
   
  
Observations 8,547 8,547 8,547 8,547 
R-squared 0.065 0.065 0.051 0.052 
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Differences between coefficients 
 
  
β1 − β2 
 
2.165*  1.990* 
  
[3.45]  [3.09] 
 
 
 
Panel B: The Effect of Unrelated Acquisitions on TDC and its stock component using 2SLS model. 
Estimation Model: 2SLS 
Dependent Variable: ∆(TDC)t-1, t+1 ∆(TotalStock)t-1, t+1 
  (1) (2) 
  
  Unrelated_Acqt   30.838 22.292 
 
[1.52] [1.27] 
∆(Ln(Market Value))t-1, t+1 1.241*** 0.931*** 
 
[3.24] [2.79] 
∆( Tobin’s Q)t-1, t+1 0.294* 0.290** 
 
[1.88] [2.03] 
∆( PIN)t-1, t+1 0.819 0.127 
 
[0.40] [0.07] 
Ln(CEO Tenure)
 t+1 -0.031 -0.197*** 
 
[-0.41] [-2.99] 
∆( Stock Volatility)t-1, t+1 1.412 0.870 
 
[1.29] [0.91] 
∆( Cash Flow)t-1, t+1 0.389 -0.613 
 
[0.23] [-0.40] 
∆( Inst_Ownership)t-1, t+1 -0.008 -0.005 
 
[-1.17] [-0.72] 
∆(Inst_Concentration)t-1, t+1 -0.552 0.068 
 
[-0.66] [0.09] 
Constant 0.318 0.480* 
 
[1.02] [1.71] 
   
Year Dummies YES YES 
Industry Dummies YES YES 
   
Observations 8,484 8,484 
Hansen J p-value 0.470 0.149 
Sargan C p-value 0.041 0.115 
Anderson-Rubin p-value 0.093 0.055 
F-Statistic  2.784** 2.784** 
First-Stage Coefficients  
  
   
Ln(Ind_Related_Deals)t-1 -0.002** -0.002* 
 
[2.17] [1.84] 
RI_Direc_Supplyt-1  -0.000* -0.000* 
 
[1.89] [1.70] 
Ln(RI_Firms)t-1 -0.001 -0.001 
 
[1.05] [1.22] 
   
 
